Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 18:06:26 +0100 From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker-AT-uba.uva.nl> Subject: Re: Plato's nihilism At 17:10 25-1-02 +0100, you wrote: >Hi Rene, > >welcome back, you wrote: > >>He maintains for instance that Plato is as big a nihilist as Nietzsche. > >well, this is an interesting observation (accusation ?), can you >say some more about this, where does Heidegger elaborates this >and how does his argument run ? Jan, NIetzsche, vol. 2: "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus" / The Being-historical determination of nihilism (1944,46), German p. 343: "Metaphysics is as metaphysics the actual nihilism. The essence of nihilism IS historically [geschichtlich] as metaphysics, the metaphysics of Plato is not less nihilistic than the metaphysics of Nietzsche." As with all Heidegger publications, the composition of the Nietzsche volumes is well taken care of. Of the Nietzsche interpretations of vol. 1, he says in the GA edition, that they don't show directly anything of his own ways. (Contributions) In order to possibly understand the motives of these, a thinking through of Nietzsche is a sine qua non. But vice versa: understanding Nietzsche presupposes understanding metaphysics, and its fundamental perspectives (Hinsichten) - essence and existence, possibility-actuality, onto-theology. This (hermeneutical) circle cannot be passed by, so one better steps right into it. (Heidegger stresses again and again: Geschichte is not history. Plato's thinking IS still, not because it is remembered and fixed in texts, it is there, first, in its radicalization (reversement) by Nietzsche, and, second, maybe, it is something that is still waiting for us. (that is, when metaphysics is thought from Being)) What does nihilism, the uninvited guest, mean, asks Nietzsche? That the highest values are devaluating. Bringing in new values doesn't help, as long as the principle of positing values remains the same, and that is that they are BELIEVED as the real reality. Nietzsche's perfect nihilist states with irony. What does nihilism mean to Heidegger? That, with Being, it is nothing. How long is it already nothing with Being? As long as being (on, ens) is 'open' as being, since Plato and Aristoteles, since the 'leading' question. Since then Being stays out. Does this mean that there is something like Being that then stays out? No, says H, the staying out of Being, is Being itself. But then, the staying out of Being is nothing negative, but would correspond to its Wesen, the way it is, west. And here is a chance again to see, why there isn't the remotest trace of reproach in the statement, that metaphysics doesn't think Being itself: it thinks the Being of beings (as such, and as a whole). Departing from that which is, it asks for what it is, its essence, and from this existing essence, the whole of that which is, appears in a new light. Also Nietzsche thinks along these lines, when he overcomes metaphysical ideals by unmasking them as the needs of a self-conceiting power. The word "Sein" doesn't refer to a reality, but is the highest value of an essentially (de)valuating will, which is printed upon what only really is: becoming. It is not so, that Heidegger says, that Nietzsche doesn't think radically enough. It is so radical, that no perspectives are left anymore for a 'new' metaphysics. But it is the radical, last consequence of what Plato started: the letting out of Being, as that which is already taken for granted BEFORE the question for the ens qua ens can be posed. Now, the impossibility of metaphysics, is necessary, with regards to a new beginning. As long as one thinks that metaphysics is still possible, in whatever (nihilistic) form, the staying-out of Being is not allowed. In German: Das Auslassen des Ausbleibens. As long as the staying-out is not acknowledged, the circling in the dried-out schemes of metaphysics, remains unavoidable. In order to acknowledge it, metaphysics should be recognized as (essential) nihilism, in H's sense. And for this, it is necessary to think through Nietzsche's perfect nihilism, nihilism in Nietzsche's sense, who himself traced its history back to Plato, in "History of an error". Ad reproaching: that Plato or Nietzsche think Being as Being of beings, is not their philosophical idea, it's the way Being gives itself, and that was their 'task', as H. always says. But let's not worry about THEIR task, and how they fullfilled it, but about the not allowing of the staying out of Being that is happening now in a raging silence, so that even the talk of a task only seems ephemer. Jan, I hope there is still some logic left in the above, I'll just push send now, Rene ----------------------------------- drs. René de Bakker Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam Afdeling Catalogisering tel. 020-5252309 --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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