File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2002/heidegger.0201, message 74


Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2002 18:06:26 +0100
From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker-AT-uba.uva.nl>
Subject: Re: Plato's nihilism


At 17:10 25-1-02 +0100, you wrote:
>Hi Rene,
>
>welcome back, you wrote:
>
>>He maintains for instance that Plato is as big a nihilist as Nietzsche.
>
>well, this is an interesting observation (accusation ?), can you
>say some more about this, where does Heidegger elaborates this
>and how does his argument run ?

Jan,

NIetzsche, vol. 2: "Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus" /
The Being-historical determination of nihilism (1944,46), German p. 343:

"Metaphysics is as metaphysics the actual nihilism. The essence of nihilism
IS historically [geschichtlich] as metaphysics, the metaphysics of Plato
is not less nihilistic than the metaphysics of Nietzsche." 

As with all Heidegger publications, the composition of the Nietzsche volumes
is well taken care of.
Of the Nietzsche interpretations of vol. 1, he says in the GA edition, that
they don't show directly anything of his own ways. (Contributions)
In order to possibly understand  the motives of these, a thinking through
of Nietzsche is a sine qua non. But vice versa: understanding Nietzsche
presupposes understanding metaphysics, and its fundamental perspectives
(Hinsichten)  -  essence and existence, possibility-actuality, onto-theology.

This (hermeneutical) circle cannot be passed by, so one better steps right
into it. 

(Heidegger stresses again and again: Geschichte is not history. Plato's
thinking
IS still, not because it is remembered and fixed in texts, it is there, first,
in its radicalization (reversement) by Nietzsche, and, second, maybe, 
it is something that is still waiting for us. (that is, when metaphysics is
thought
from Being))

What does nihilism, the uninvited guest, mean, asks Nietzsche? That the
highest
values are devaluating. Bringing in new values doesn't help, as long as
the principle of positing values remains the same, and that is that they are
BELIEVED as the real reality. Nietzsche's perfect nihilist states with irony.

What does nihilism mean to Heidegger? That, with Being, it is nothing.  How
long 
is it already nothing with Being? As long as being (on, ens) is 'open' as
being, since Plato
and Aristoteles, since the 'leading' question.
Since then Being stays out. Does this mean that there is something like
Being that then
stays out? No, says H, the staying out of Being, is Being itself. 
But then, the staying out of Being is nothing negative, but would
correspond to its Wesen,
the way it is, west. And here is a chance again to see, why there isn't the
remotest trace
of reproach in the statement, that metaphysics doesn't think Being itself:
it thinks the 
Being of beings (as such, and as a whole). Departing from that which is, it
asks for
what it is, its essence, and from this existing essence, the whole of that
which is,
appears in a new light.

Also Nietzsche thinks along these lines, when he overcomes metaphysical ideals
by unmasking them as the needs of a self-conceiting power. The word "Sein"
doesn't
refer to a reality, but is the highest value of an essentially
(de)valuating will, which is
printed upon what only really is: becoming.
It is not so, that Heidegger says, that Nietzsche doesn't think radically
enough. 
It is so radical, that no perspectives are left anymore for a 'new'
metaphysics. 
But it is the radical, last consequence of what Plato started: the letting
out of Being,
as that which is already taken for granted BEFORE the question for the ens
qua ens
can be posed. 

Now, the impossibility of metaphysics, is necessary, with regards to a new
beginning.
As long as one thinks that metaphysics is still possible, in whatever
(nihilistic) form, 
the staying-out of Being is not allowed. In German: Das Auslassen des
Ausbleibens. 

As long as the staying-out is not acknowledged, the circling in the
dried-out schemes
of metaphysics, remains unavoidable. In order to acknowledge it,
metaphysics should
be recognized as (essential) nihilism, in H's sense. And for this, it is
necessary to
think through Nietzsche's perfect nihilism, nihilism in Nietzsche's sense,
who himself
traced its history back to Plato, in "History of an error".

Ad reproaching: that Plato or Nietzsche think Being as Being of beings, is
not their
philosophical idea, it's the way Being gives itself, and that was their
'task', as H.
always says. But let's not worry about THEIR task, and how they fullfilled
it, but
about the not allowing of the staying out of Being that is happening now in a 
raging silence, so that even the talk of a task only seems ephemer.

Jan, I hope there is still some logic left in the above, I'll just push
send now,

Rene




















  













-----------------------------------
drs. René de Bakker
Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
Afdeling Catalogisering 
tel. 020-5252309              


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