From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: Method - Diascendent being
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 18:10:25 


Sorry Michael, I must have accidentally deleted your reply. I found it in 
Kenneth's reply.

Michael Eldred wrote:

> >What I call the Cartesian casting of being, which is set out in
> >admirable clarity in Descartes' _Regulae_, is more specific than the
> >use of rules of logic.
> >
> >The general form of the rule is mathematical. Descartes expresses it
> >in his _Regulae_ as Rule 14. There we read under Rules 14.3 and 14.4
> >inter alia:
> >
> >"14.3...and that the main part of what humans can do is only to bring
> >these proportions [among beings] into such a form that the equality
> >between what is sought and something known becomes clearly visible.
> >14.4 And then it must be noted that only that can be brought into an
> >equation which admits of a more or less, and all this is comprehended
> >under the term magnitude."
> >
> >With Descartes, beings are cast in the cast of their measurability,
> >i.e. in how they can be grasped in the category of quantity. These
> >quantities are put into relation with
> >each other in the form of equations that can be solved to disclose
> >more about how the beings concerned behave by proceeding from the
> >known variables to calculate the unknown variables. This Cartesian
> >methodology, of course, encompasses much more than physics or natural
> >science, but determines what 'acceptable' knowledge in general can
> >be. The quantifiability of all that is is also the metaphysical
> >presupposition (_hypothesis_, undercasting) for the triumph of
> >digital technology which is unfolding before our eyes today.

I think you've discussed this with me before, so I don't want to 
unnecessarily beat dead horses, but I would very much appreciate it if you 
would discuss it with me again because the current topic of my dissertation 
is precisely the foundation of Cartesian philosophy. In short, I don't see 
why the rule you cite above implies a different casting of being from that 
of Aristotle because the emphasis on quantifiable measurability around 
Descartes' time was the result of numerous new scientific findings which 
discredited certain long-standing positions that Aristotle argued through 
non-quantifying techniques. Although "new scientific findings" of course 
cannot be simply pasted from one casting of being to another, this is 
possible within essentially the same casting of being. In this case, 
Aristotle's scientific method included BOTH quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable techniques. A prime example of this is Aristotle's explicit 
description of place (Phyics 4?) as having not only mathematical position, 
but also power (the power to draw things to their natural place). He 
explicitly says both. But after certain observations (esp. by Galileo) 
discredited the idea that things move due to a tendency towards their 
natural ending place, the only thing left was place as mathematical 
position. So such mathematical analyses are simply the remnants of 
Aristotelian philosophy after specific conclusions resulting from his 
non-quantifiable techniques were rejected due to certain observations. 
Examples like this are what make me think that Descartes' emphasis on 
mathematical precision was not the result of an essentially different 
casting of being, but of new scientific findings within essentially the same 
casting of being.

> >The only basic rule I know for phenomenological thinking is to gather
> >and keep the phenomena in view in passing through them in language.
> >In _SuZ_ Heidegger has the phenomenon of being in view as the
> >"leading question" (_leitende Frage_ SuZ:27). Being is the most
> >hidden of phenomena  (SuZ:35) and also the most close at hand, so
> >close that it is inevitably overseen and skipped over. Being has
> >always already been diascended in passing through to beings. Insofar
> >it would be more appropriate to speak of diascending being to beings
> >instead of the traditional transcending beings to being, since being
> >is not beyond, but rather too close. Diascendent being is diaphanous
> >for the light of the phenomena showing themselves. Being itself is
> >insignificant, i.e. it has no sign pointing to it plainly, but hides
> >in incognito.
> >
> >Phenomenology itself is the endeavour to bring the phenomena to light
> >by pointing them out in language, in _logoi_. As far as Dasein, i.e.
> >human being, is concerned, phenomenological thinking presupposes that
> >human being is openness to the phenomena. All phenomena are phenomena
> >of being, i.e. anything that shows itself, shows itself _as_ a being.
> >Human being is open to this apophantic _as_.
>
> >Presupposing that human being is openness to being is a virtuous
> >circle for thinking, because the way of thinking (in _SuZ_) itself
> >shows in detail as it proceeds the ontological structures of human
> >being's being-in-the-world.

Yes, but presupposing that human being is openness to being (in the sense 
Heidegger means) is still opposed to presupposing that human being is 
someTHING that IS OPEN to being, as many philosophers before Heidegger held. 
So although there is no vicious circle, there still seems to be a rule 
besides simply "to gather and keep the phenomena in view in passing through 
them in language," because the specific question is precisely whether or not 
there is anything in the phenomena which demands that our essence is an 
existent (or not). Heidegger clearly believes that there is nothing in the 
phenomena which demands that our essence is an existent, but this is 
nevertheless his specific "stance," and it seems to me to be directly 
opposed to the previously long-standing explication of our essence as some 
kind of existent.

Anthony Crifasi

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