Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 23:35:55 +0000
From: Tommy Beavitt <tommy-AT-scoraig.com>
Subject: Value (was Dasein)


At 2:35 pm -0800 4/2/02, John Foster wrote:
>Values are not reducible in all cases nor commensurate. For instance
>economic values are not reducible to ethical values, and are not
>commensurate. Ethical values and economic values are do not commense with or
>from some other primary value. Ethical values are not equivalent to economic
>values; they are *essentially different*. Although some ethical values have
>economic value, ethical value (or worth) cannot be 'priced' in a market
>transaction.

There is nothing I have to disagree with here. I presume that you 
wrote this paragraph to reinforce my statements about value rather 
than to criticise them?

>Ethical values are highly subjective, as are moral judgements about the
>character of a person. Economic values are objective and express only a
>transaction price (the value which is experienced by the good or service may
>constitute the subjective value which forms the ethical, but it may be that
>the value is environmental (Hiedegger analyzed this in *The Hermenuetics of
>Facticity*), or it may mental (psychological, spiritual, intellectual,
>artistic, et cetera).

Yes, I take your point about the difference between subjective and 
objective values. Thanks for clarifying this for me. It is true that 
the market is an attempt to objectify value. Whether it can be said 
to have succeeded in this enterprise is, I think, controversial. 
Economists and politicians always celebrate when GDP is bigger, weep 
when it is smaller. Because they can attach a number to a transaction 
and aggregate these numbers together, it is said to be an objective 
measure.

>There are 'non-market transactions' which are not considered by economics;
>marriage, adoption, gifts, et cetera. Non of the non-market transactions are
>especially of any interest to economists, except in terms of policy.
>Services such as 'unpaid child care' are considered as forms of *national
>wealth* but are not considered part of the GDP....

You rightly point to all the value exchanging transactions which take 
place in a society or a community which are not objectified in this 
way. This doesn't this make them any less valuable to those who 
engage in them. But the value these transactions convey is entirely 
subjective.

>Economic values are expressed in 'prices' and modern economics does not use
>the term 'value' any longer except to describe preferences which may be
>personal and impersonal.

I am not sure that I agree with you here. Value is an extremely 
important concept in economics. It is one of those buzz words that 
when included in a pitch or job application can greatly increase the 
chances of success. I am just reading an article in the Journal of 
Japanese Trade and Industry which discusses the need for Japanese 
firms to "add value" to the goods they produce. This is a euphemism 
for "make the consumer feel better about buying this product rather 
than another one." It can be achieved by packaging, advertising, 
customer service, etc. You might, for example, have a sales assistant 
do a dance around a new TV set. That would be adding value. Or you 
might provide a karaoke machine and somebody to facilitate the 
procedure in a bar where alcohol was being consumed. That would be 
"adding value" to the alcohol.

I agree with you that this is a "description of preferences", but 
that doesn't decrease the importance of the concept to economic 
theory.

I realise that this may seem to be wandering off topic from a 
Heidegger list, but for me this represents an important distinction. 
A Sartrean would have no difficulty in using the term "value" in the 
same way that a post-industrial economist would. It is obvious that 
it pertains to both the customer and the supplier in any transaction, 
the being-for-itself, who benefits, or, at least, feels that he or 
she benefits. It is also obvious that there is nothing in principle 
wrong in attaching a number to a value transaction and aggregating 
transactions to produce abstractions such as GDP. At least, this is 
true of my interpretation of Sartre.

But it would seem that Heidegger would have difficulty with this 
concept and might seek to negate it by insisting on distinguishing 
between the value of transactions that are objectivised in an 
economist's spreadsheet and the Value that, it seems to me, is being 
claimed to exist objectively and quite apart from any subjective 
value judgement(s) and its/their quantification/aggregation.

Economists are busy applying values to environmental and social 
goods. There is even a claim that these environmental and social 
goods are universal or at least global in their application. 
Unfortunately world history seems to be taking a retrograde turn in 
this respect with avocations of unilateralism and "exceptionalism" by 
certain countries who unfortunately have a great effect on whether 
this enterprise is likely to succeed. The attainment to a single 
global perspective, much vaunted but seldom achieved, seems less 
likely, even in theory. But it is still possible to have an economic 
perspective of social and environmental value, say from the 
perspective of a particular country. This closed system of course 
breaks down at the borders which may be characterised by the import 
of environmental and social goods, the export of "bads", such as 
pollution etc., and the use of violence to maintain such a separation.

I am, obviously, hoping that some of you Heideggerians can help me 
out of this impasse. But I doubt that any claims by individuals to 
have a unversal perspective will be of any use. Also, I am not sure 
from what perspective any distinction between that value objectified 
by economists and that Value objectified by Heidegger via Dasein, 
will be meaningful.

Any comments, including those that state that I am missing the point, 
will be very welcome!

Tommy Beavitt







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