Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2002 13:47:04 +0100 From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker-AT-uba.uva.nl> Subject: Re: heidegger-AT-lists Shall we Dance? At 14:23 27-2-02 EST, Jud wrote: Shall we Dance? If we are to accept that Heidegger's meaning of the term 'Dasein' stands for 'a human being's existence' then it should be possible (if the term is to be taken at all seriously) to substitute the term with what it stands for. I came across this snippet the other day which admirably reveals the unworkability of the term - here it is: "All philosophical stories of the essence of humanity are present-at-hand, but can be revealed more clearly, concretely, and in fact helpfully, when placed against the background of circumspective concern as a human's existence's mode of existence." The semantic inoperability and sheer silliness of the term: ' a human being's existence's mode of existence' which can be compared to: 'a human being's dancing's mode of dancing.' Patently it is the human being which exists and not the human being's existence, and a human being that dances and not the human being's dancing? Hands up anyone who has been to a dance-hall and seen a dancing dancing? Comments? Jud, In order to rebuke such fantastic doublings, Heidegger wrote many clarifications -here is one of them- of the meaning of 'Dasein' and Existenz' in BT. You can find the complete text here: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegg2.htm (edited slightly) What does "existence" mean in B.&T.? The word designates a mode of Being; specifically, the Being of that being who stands open for the openness of Being in which it stands, by standing it. [ausstehen] This "standing it," this enduring, is experienced under the name of "care." The ecstatic essence of being there is approached by way of care, and, conversely, care is experienced adequately only in its ecstatic essence. "Standing it", experienced in this manner, is the essence of the ekstasis, which must be comprehended here. The ecstatic essence of existence is therefore still understood inadequately as long as one thinks of it as merely "standing out," while interpreting the "out" as meaning "away from" the inside of an immanence of consciousness and spirit ; for in this manner, existence would still be understood in terms of "subjectivity" and "substance"; while, in fact, the "out" ought to be understood in terms of the openness of Being itself, as its asunder. The stasis of the ecstatic consists, strange as it may sound, in the standing-in in the "out" and "there" [Da] of unconcealedness as which Being itself essences. [west] What is to be thought by "existence", when the word is used within the thinking that is directed toward, and prompted by the truth of Being, can be most beautifully designated by the word "instancy [Instandigkeit]." We must think at the same time, however, the standing-in in the openness of Being, the enduring and carrying-out of the standing-in [das Austragen des Innestehens] (care), and the out-braving [Ausdauer] the utmost (Being toward death); for it is only together that they constitute the full essence of existence. The being that exists [litt.: that is in the way of existence] is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist. God is, but he does not exist. The proposition "man alone exists" does not mean by any means that man alone is a real being while all other beings are unreal and mere appearances or human ideas. The proposition "man exists" means: man is that being whose Being is distinguished by the open-standing standing-in in the unconcealedness of Being, from Being, in Being. The existential being [Wesen] of man is the reason why man can represent beings as such, and why he can be conscious of these representations. All consciousness presupposes the ecstatically understood existence as the essentia of man - essentia meaning that as which man is present insofar as he is man. But consciousness does not itself create the openness of beings, nor is it consciousness that makes it possible for man to stand open for beings. Whither and whence and in what free dimension could the intentionality of consciousness move, if instancy were not the essence of man in the first instance? What else could be the meaning if anybody has ever seriously thought about this of the word sein in the [German] words Bewusstsein ["consciousness"; literally: "being conscious"] and Selbstbewusstsein ["self-consciousness"] if it did not designate the existential nature of that which is in the mode of existence? To be a self is admittedly one feature of the nature of that being which exists; but existence does not consist in being a self, nor can it be defined in such terms. We are faced with the fact that metaphysical thinking understands man's selfhood in terms of substance or-and at bottom this amounts to the same- in terms of the subject. It is for this reason that the first way which leads away from metaphysics to the ecstatic existential nature of man must lead through the metaphysical conception of human selfhood (B.&T., §§63 and 64). from: Introduction to "What is metaphysics" (1949) rene NB The German 'Da' doesn't simply mean: 'there'. 'There" is 'dort' The glass on the table in front of me, is 'dort', namely there on the table, it is also 'da', to which I can't point with my finger, because the 'da' of the Dasein, that is my being, is co-indicated. When I leave the room, the glass is still there, but no longer 'da'. Heidegger says in Zoll. Sem, that then it is waiting for the feast of Dasein. The feast, yes. NB2 for dummies: Heidegger is not stating that God is. ----------------------------------- drs. René de Bakker Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam Afdeling Catalogisering tel. 020-5252309 --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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