From: "Tudor Georgescu" <tgeorgescu-AT-home.nl>
Subject: RE: Value (was Dasein)
Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2002 21:29:53 +0100


> value is 'undetermined in the objective sense' except in one rare
> circumstance, and that is in the phenomenon of price.

When everything is available for being experienced, when all the
impossibilities become objectual reality, we notice its other aspect:
dynamics is virtualized. When all is available, nothing more is to be
dared. Substance escapes our grasp the more we strive to grasp it.

For substance has its own will and it shows itself only to its
protégées, which have to dare it against any formal impossibility.

To be is to become, to exist.

Jethro, Priest of On

 

Intellect Club mailgroup at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Intellect_Club


> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu [mailto:owner-
> heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu] On Behalf Of John Foster
> Sent: Tuesday, February 05 2002 20:03
> To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> Subject: Re: Value (was Dasein)
> 
> Tommy recently:
> > I realise that this may seem to be wandering off topic from a
> > Heidegger list, but for me this represents an important distinction.
> > A Sartrean would have no difficulty in using the term "value" in the
> > same way that a post-industrial economist would. It is obvious that
> > it pertains to both the customer and the supplier in any
transaction,
> > the being-for-itself, who benefits, or, at least, feels that he or
> > she benefits. It is also obvious that there is nothing in principle
> > wrong in attaching a number to a value transaction and aggregating
> > transactions to produce abstractions such as GDP. At least, this is
> > true of my interpretation of Sartre.
> 
> john here
> 
> I agree there is nothing wrong here. The monetization of value of
course
> means that some media of exchange is used, hence the price reflects a
> transaction value. But money is different. Some money or monetary
standard
> has 'intrinsic value' and a Hiedeggerian critique would entail that it
> does.
> I suspect that the value of something such as gold jewelry would have
> 'intrinsic value' which is part of the essence of this form (in the
> Aristotlean sense then intrinsic value has an opposing or opposite
meaning
> intended in the relation that exists between the person and the
object).
> The
> intrinsic value gives the object its essence or form. The substance
and
> the
> essence or integral, whereas in money the substance could be
digitized,
> paper or metal (which has some intrinsic value). Numbers do not have
any
> intrinsic value except in a purely axiological sense.
> 
> When the economist used the phrase 'adding value' she may be meaning
that
> which is intended is actually to increase the net benefit to the
> producer/owner of the means of production. Hence the labour theory of
> value
> for all economic goods and services. She just wants to get more back
in
> the
> exchange and increase 'consumer' satisfaction in a
competitive/cooperative
> sense. There is something there in the final consumption which is
'good in
> itself' or intrinsically valuable (say a good bottle of Merlot versus
a
> blend of vintages).
> 
> The juncture between instrumental and intrinsic values of course still
> remains since many goods and services which societies and environment
> provide are essentially free, gratis. Clean air, clean water, and so
on
> are
> free goods and services in many parts of the world. Of course where
they
> are
> not free, they are priced because of the nature of the 'ownership' of
> those
> resources.
> 
> Heidegger extends the notion of ownership to the 'manifold present'
who
> live
> in an environs, hermenuetically. The phenomena speak for themselves as
> Heidegger surveys his own environs and domestic situation. So in fact
the
> juncture is still very close to what Aristotle might claim to be there
> (Dasein), or being-there. The phenomena will be subjectively
interpreted
> into that which is understood, and made sensible. For that situation
which
> 'we' find ourselves 'in'  is 'already' there, interpreted for us into
two
> seperate categories of being. The idea of the 'being-in-itself' and
the
> 'being-for-itself' is this juncture, because nature does not disclose
or
> unconceal all that is situated in the surrounds both temporally and
> spatially.
> 
> In terms of the thematic content of what may be 'valuable' then there
is
> the
> personal, and there is the impersonal giving rise to the notion of
> property
> (limited common, common and private) and both the personal and the
> impersonal  are or can be expressed as 'preferences'. This is where
the
> theory of value must start or commence, but what I am suggesting is
that
> value is 'undetermined in the objective sense' except in one rare
> circumstance, and that is in the phenomenon of price. Price reflects
in
> sum
> an entirely 'objective' relation, and an entirely 'instrumental value'
> based
> on some standard of currency exchange. The economist is ultimately
bond to
> consider only prices which transpire in the markets, and is not bound
to
> consider any thing else (except in terms of 'shadow prices'). There
are
> exceptions of course in ecological, welfare and social accounting
where
> there are considerations of the positive and negative externalties of
> economic relations. There lies the neo-classic model of economics
which
> reduces all forms of valuing to prices. In fact Hayek has joking and
> seriously argued for corporations to issue there own money, or media
of
> exchange. This is carrying the idea that all economic values are
reducible
> to an objective standard of measure. The problem then is that
everything
> has
> to be owned and everything has to have a price, and that means that
all
> 'property' has to be owned or privatized. The idea of limited common
> ownership is an extension of this concept where all value (which is
> ultimately subjective) is measured and accounted for an 'infinite
calculus
> of value' - even my own death is a value (price)  if I chose to avoid
pain
> and old age.
> 
> It is rare indeed when the majority of folks who have property rights
only
> feel or value that what they own has solely one form of value, which
is
> reducible to 'instrumental value'. This is because the majority of
people
> on
> this planet do not even own their own home, nor the means of
production.
> if
> they do own their own home, they value much more that the mere
> instrumental
> value as well. There are the extremely lucky people in this world who
can
> 'trade' commodities and commodity futures which they have no direct or
> instrinsic interest in!
> 
> Most farmers value intrinsically their environment, and their social
> situation. They value their tradition of providing their own food and
> clothing, trading or selling any surplus that they do not use.
> 
> 
> But what Heidegger has critiqued is the 'totalizing efficiency' of
> modernizing technology. For instance Heidegger criticizes the
'apparatus'
> -
> not his word - called modern technology for singlarizing the Rhine
River
> for
> hydro production. He argues effectively that damning of the Rhine and
> changing the 'status' of the Rhine which consists of many forms of
> intrinsic
> values for all beings (fish, boaters, etc); changing the status of a
free
> flowing river  is something of ultimate concern because the damning of
the
> Rhine should be based on ethical judgement, not based on relative
profits
> of
> expending abstract moveable capital. Is the Rhine bad for being a free
> running river? What are the grounds for making the Rhine less than a
free
> running river? Is there any moral justification for damning the river
> other
> than for pure 'instrumental' reasons?
> 
> When asking the question concerning technology the question should be
> formulated into a review of the personal and subjective sensibility
and
> understanding that Rhine is for those whose 'environs' are located in
the
> Rhine River riparia. The question of the ethical therefore is not
asked in
> the sense that the question is asked, but rather it is assumed that
the
> nation will be better off economically with the additional energy to
run
> factories and keep homes and schools warm and lighted. The Rhine is
too
> important to be considered solely as 'means' to some very private sort
> term
> end if the dwellers there have not been able to 'represent' their
> interests
> in their environs, surrounds whether or not those interests are there.
> 
> The dasein or natural existence as expressed in the ecological and
social
> function of the Rhine is never considered (unless there is an
authentic
> environmental impact statement braced in firm ecological law such as
> endangered species legislation, social accounting, et cetera).
> 
> Thus value which may be intrinsic or extrinsic (instrumental like
money
> <kremata>) has to be critiqued from different perspectives. Notions of
> property need to be explored and extended to include free ecological
goods
> and services, but not reduced to an 'instrumental' form of value. This
is
> why conservation of natural resources is important because there are
other
> priced services which free flowing rivers provide such as tourism,
> fisheries, sources of industrial water (Poland has so little clean
water
> that industry cannot even use 10% of this water - thus industry does
not
> want to locate there). The idea of overlapping consensus in the
> consideration of the status of a free flowing river has to be asked
and
> answered by all the persons, and organisms which depend on the free
> flowing
> river. This is why there is a great interest in 'wind generation' and
> small
> scale 'river run free' hydro facilities which permit the migration of
> fish.
> 
> The Columbia River used to be the worlds largest salmon fisheries
until
> that
> later half of the last century when as many as 40 or 50 hydro dams
were
> constructed blocking the salmon (99%) from migrating to spawning beds.
> These
> anadromous fish were never considered, and neither were the many
dependent
> native people who relied on these fish for food. Their valuing was
> ignored,
> and there was little compensation - if any compensation. Many people
had
> there land and homes flooded and were not compensated in the least.
> 
> chao
> 
> john foster
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
> > But it would seem that Heidegger would have difficulty with this
> > concept and might seek to negate it by insisting on distinguishing
> > between the value of transactions that are objectivised in an
> > economist's spreadsheet and the Value that, it seems to me, is being
> > claimed to exist objectively and quite apart from any subjective
> > value judgement(s) and its/their quantification/aggregation.
> >
> > Economists are busy applying values to environmental and social
> > goods. There is even a claim that these environmental and social
> > goods are universal or at least global in their application.
> > Unfortunately world history seems to be taking a retrograde turn in
> > this respect with avocations of unilateralism and "exceptionalism"
by
> > certain countries who unfortunately have a great effect on whether
> > this enterprise is likely to succeed. The attainment to a single
> > global perspective, much vaunted but seldom achieved, seems less
> > likely, even in theory. But it is still possible to have an economic
> > perspective of social and environmental value, say from the
> > perspective of a particular country. This closed system of course
> > breaks down at the borders which may be characterised by the import
> > of environmental and social goods, the export of "bads", such as
> > pollution etc., and the use of violence to maintain such a
separation.
> >
> > I am, obviously, hoping that some of you Heideggerians can help me
> > out of this impasse. But I doubt that any claims by individuals to
> > have a unversal perspective will be of any use. Also, I am not sure
> > from what perspective any distinction between that value objectified
> > by economists and that Value objectified by Heidegger via Dasein,
> > will be meaningful.
> >
> > Any comments, including those that state that I am missing the
point,
> > will be very welcome!
> >
> > Tommy Beavitt
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >      --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> 
> 
> 
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