From: HealantHenry-AT-aol.com
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 11:16:28 EST
Subject: Re: Method



In a message dated 23/02/2002 11:06:22 AM, crifasi-AT-hotmail.com writes:

<< In other words, for Heidegger, 
phenomenology can only procede if we first suspend any and all assumptions 
that Dasein's essence is some particular kind of existent, such as a soul, 
matter, mind, etc. Why isn't this a fundamental "rule" of procedure, upon 
which the entire rest of his analytic depends? >>

Anthony, isn't that what Michael means by alluding to the Cartesian 'method' 
-- ie, the particular kind of essence, mind, is no longer methodologically 
foundational? And, I am sure soul and body run into the same bottomlessness.  

My question to you: what follows from the rule you claim as methodological 
foundational for Heidegger, ie, the clear distinction of essence and 
existence, and the primordiality of the latter?

Kindest regards,
Hen


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