From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: Method
Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 18:31:48 


>From: HealantHenry-AT-aol.com
>Reply-To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>Subject: Re: Method
>Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 11:16:28 EST
>
>
>In a message dated 23/02/2002 11:06:22 AM, crifasi-AT-hotmail.com writes:
>
><< In other words, for Heidegger,
>phenomenology can only procede if we first suspend any and all assumptions
>that Dasein's essence is some particular kind of existent, such as a soul,
>matter, mind, etc. Why isn't this a fundamental "rule" of procedure, upon
>which the entire rest of his analytic depends? >>
>
>Anthony, isn't that what Michael means by alluding to the Cartesian 
>'method'
>-- ie, the particular kind of essence, mind, is no longer methodologically
>foundational? And, I am sure soul and body run into the same 
>bottomlessness.
>
>My question to you: what follows from the rule you claim as methodological
>foundational for Heidegger, ie, the clear distinction of essence and
>existence, and the primordiality of the latter?

What seems to follow is that there is indeed a very specific and 
foundational methodological principle in Heidegger's phenomenology - that 
Dasein's essence is NOT an existent (but only existence). I don't see how 
that is any less of a foundational rule than the opposite - that Dasein's 
essence is an existent, such as soul, mind, matter, etc. This directly bears 
on the question of whether there is a methodology of rules to Heidegger's 
phenomenology. In other words, I do not see how one can claim that 
Heidegger's phenomenology is free of methodological rules if this is the 
case. Some philosophers choose the principle that our essence is an 
existent, while Heidegger chooses the principle that our essence is not. 
Either way, it seems to me to be a beginning rule of methodology upon which 
the rest of the analytic depends.

Anthony Crifasi

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