File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2002/heidegger.0202, message 97


Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2002 05:22:10 -0800
From: Kenneth Johnson <kenn-AT-beef.sparks.nv.us>
Subject: Re: Method - Diascendent being


>Cologne 24-Feb-2002
>
>Anthony Crifasi schrieb Sat, 23 Feb 2002 16:05:06:
>
>> Michael Eldred wrote:
>>
>> >Only the caveat has to be added: (Heidegger's) thinking cannot be
>> >methodologized. Methodology in the sense of general rules for gaining
>> >knowledge is only possible within the Cartesian casting of being (cf.
>> >Descartes'  _Regulae_).
>>
>> I have two questions regarding this. First, if logic can be considered a set
>> of general rules for gaining knowledge, then methodology in the sense you
>> describe above was around long before Descartes, going all the way back go
>> Greek philosophy. Or you are referring to rules that are more specific than
>> an empty syllogistic form, then there are still at least rules like the
>> principle of non-contradiction, which also go all the way back to Greek
>> philosophy. Secondly, concerning Heidegger's philosophy, it seems that he
>> does have a fundamental methodological rule upon which any further
>> phenomenological analysis depends - that Dasein's essence is not any
>> specific existent, but simply existence. In other words, for Heidegger,
>> phenomenology can only procede if we first suspend any and all assumptions
>> that Dasein's essence is some particular kind of existent, such as a soul,
>> matter, mind, etc. Why isn't this a fundamental "rule" of procedure, upon
>> which the entire rest of his analytic depends?
>>
>> Anthony Crifasi
>>
>
>Anthony,
>
>What I call the Cartesian casting of being, which is set out in admirable
>clarity in Descartes' _Regulae_, is more specific than the use of rules of
>logic.
>
>The general form of the rule is mathematical. Descartes expresses it in his
>_Regulae_ as Rule 14. There we read under Rules 14.3 and 14.4 inter alia:
>
>"14.3...and that the main part of what humans can do is only to bring these
>proportions [among beings] into such a form that the equality between what is
>sought and something known becomes clearly visible. 14.4 And then it must be
>noted that only that can be brought into an equation which admits of a more or
>less, and all this is comprehended under the term magnitude."
>
>With Descartes, beings are cast in the cast of their measurability, i.e.
>in how
>they can be
>grasped in the category of quantity. These quantities are put into
>relation with
>
>each other in the form of equations that can be solved to disclose more about
>how the beings concerned behave by proceeding from the known variables to
>calculate the unknown variables. This Cartesian methodology, of course,
>encompasses much more than physics or natural science, but determines what
>'acceptable' knowledge in general can be. The quantifiability of all that
>is is
>also the metaphysical presupposition (_hypothesis_, undercasting) for the
>triumph of digital technology which is unfolding before our eyes today.
>
>The only basic rule I know for phenomenological thinking is to gather and keep
>the phenomena in view in passing through them in language. In _SuZ_ Heidegger
>has the phenomenon of being in view as the "leading question" (_leitende
>Frage_
>SuZ:27). Being is the most hidden of phenomena  (SuZ:35) and also the most
>close
>at hand, so close that it is inevitably overseen and skipped over. Being has
>always already been diascended in passing through to beings. Insofar it
>would be
>more appropriate to speak of diascending being to beings instead of the
>traditional transcending beings to being, since being is not beyond, but
>rather
>too close. Diascendent being is diaphanous for the light of the phenomena
>showing themselves. Being itself is insignificant, i.e. it has no sign
>pointing
>to it plainly, but hides in incognito.
>
>Phenomenology itself is the endeavour to bring the phenomena to light by
>pointing them out in language, in _logoi_. As far as Dasein, i.e. human being,
>is concerned, phenomenological thinking presupposes that human being is
>openness
>to the phenomena. All phenomena are phenomena of being, i.e. anything that
>shows
>itself, shows itself _as_ a being. Human being is open to this apophantic
>_as_.


hello Michael E.

 "apophasis": Mentioning something by saying it will not be mentioned.

which was, i think, the word Michael P. was just asking about, ay?

btw, you always have a very much appreciated style of saying the
untrammelledly stolid obvious about H. It seems to me there is an extremely
fruitful odor of sweetness rising a few feet above all the dour sourness of
your best critic rene toward your 'casted' role as this 'keeper of the
keys' opening up toward all your faithful-to-H stolidness.

can't be too much fun for you i suppose, but then, as springsteen sings,
it's "the price you pay"

warmest regards,

kenneth

>Presupposing that human being is openness to being is a virtuous circle for
>thinking, because the way of thinking (in _SuZ_) itself shows in detail as it
>proceeds the ontological structures of human being's being-in-the-world. They
>are laid out (auslegen) to view. _Auslegung_ is interpretation, hermeneutics.
>
>For the rest, it is worth re-reading _SuZ_ Section 7 "The phenomenological
>method of the investigation".
>
>
>Michael

"you make up your mind, you choose the chance you take
you ride to where the highway ends, and the desert breaks
out onto an open road, you ride until the day
you learn to sleep at night
with the price you pay"





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