Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2002 03:02:55 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: EMPSUKA Part 2


--0-268808144-1028800975=:38097

 
PART 2:

¶ Logos does not mean reason. The Aristotelian problem makes sense only if logos has a certain kinship with aesthesis. This kinship lies in the fact that both – the exploring and being-conversant as well as the perceiving—in some way uncover and unconceal that toward which they are directed. Both aesthesis and logos are connected with aletheuein (which at first has nothing to do with knowledge in the sense of theoretical comprehension and intention. ¶ The extent to which Aristotle also intends in a certain sense to ascribe to animals logos – conversance in the sense of a circumspection which knows its way around –can be seen in Met. A 1, where Aristotle attributes to some animals the possibility of phronimoteron and thus a certain pronesis (something like circumspection) (980b21). Here it should be noted that besides ethical and practical behavior, phronesis also signifies the self-sensing of human beings. On this point, I am leaving aside the difficult passage (De an. B 12, 424a26ff.) where aisthesis directly designated as logos tis [Can anyone comment upon this? I do not understand what Heidegger sees as a problem precisely because, as he says, it is a “difficult passage”.].  We should understand logos in this passage neither merely as relationship, nor simply as reason or discourse in the sense of language; rather, what is in fact meant by the logos tis is the perceiving exploration of . . . , and the conversant relating to . . . , the relation which takes cognizance of its surroundings, the relation to what presents itself in the surroundings as lying opposite, as antikeimenon. ¶ We have thereby clarified, to the extent necessary to us, the relationship of the two divisions: apsuxon—empsuxon and alogon—logon exon. Now let us return to our text (Met. Theta 2, 1046a36ff., “Since, then, some (those forces understood with respect to movement) are present in beings without soul by way of belonging to them and co-constituting them, whereas others are present in the besouled, that is, in the soul as such, indeed, in the kind of soul that has in itself a discourse, it is thereby evident that some of the forces are also without a discourse, whereas others are with a discourse (directed by such a discourse).” We are now in a position to read with more precision and to observe that Aristotle has already taken into account everything just said. With ai men—ai de, he is not simply setting apart apsuxa and empsuxa, soulless and besouled; rather, he defines more closely in what respect he means empsuxa when he says; kai en psuxe (a37), and indeed the besouled, that is, the besouled body taken only according to its besouledness (“in the soul as such”). Thus the bodily is thereby excluded. This is in fact not identical with corporeality in the sense of a constitution of a material thing of nature, but it nevertheless

displays processes, for example physico-chemical processes, which are able to be grasped within certain limits without observing the besouledness. In this excluded realm, which nonetheless belongs to the besouled, there is aloga. But not even en te psuxe is an unequivocal determination; besouledness is also the specific life form of plants, which (although they have soul) are always nevertheless alogon. Only when the besouled in its besouledness is taken in an entirely different way—as the besouled being that has logos—only then is the empsuxon the opposite of the alogon. ¶ When we speak of the besouled being who has logos, we do not mean that logos, conversance (discourse), is merely added on; rather, this exein, having, has the meaning of being. It means that humans conduct themselves, carry themselves, and comport themselves in the way they do on the basis of this having. The exeinn means having in the sense of governing over . . . ; to be empowered for conversance and above all through conversance (logos) means: to be conversant in oneself and from out of oneself. ¶ This logon exon is again doubled (Nic. Eth. Z 2, 1139a12) into the epistemonikon and the logistikon; episteme means a versatile understanding of something, being familiar with something and having knowledge of it; logismos means circumspective calculationand deliberation. It is therefore related to choice and decision. Both belong to logos as conversance, on the basis of which human beings are aware of things and investigate them. At the same time, they are aware of their own possibilities and necessities. Whenever this conversance addresses itself to things and discusses them, it is a conversance which deliberates with both itself and others; a conversance which bebates with itself and calls itself into account. It is an “I” saying. “Language” is understood here in the broadest sense of logos as a conversant gathering, as a gatheredness of beings in “one”; in Dasein, which is at the same time a dissemination. ¶

 

END OF PART 2: OUT OF TIME __ WILL CONTINUE TOMMORROW IF STILL ALIVE


 


> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> GARY:
> Such "formal indication" (formale Anzeige) Heidegger says in a number of 
> places in the early lectures is all Da-sein really does with 
> conceptualization. (B&T, I.iv.25, Stambaugh 108/M&R 150/SuZ 114; Stam 
> 109/M&R 151-2/SuZ 116; Stam 110/M&R 152/SuZ 117; especially Stam 219-20/M&R 
> 279-80/SuZ 236; and esp. Stam 289-291/M&R 361-3/SuZ 313-15).  It is always 
> in a process of becoming, being open and always incomplete. The only 
> difference, I say once again, between animals and humans is that humans, for 
> better or worse, have words. That is a big difference, in some ways 
> advantageous, in some ways disastrous. Or are you saying that Heidegger is 
> completely wrong?
> <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
> 
> Regarding the references, SuZ 114-117 is about Dasein as They versus the 
> "I," and I could not find any discussion specifically about what 
> conceptualization for Dasein consists in. SuZ 236 is about how Dasein, as 
> Being-there, never fully actualizes its possibilities, but always has 
> possibilities outstanding. I am not sure how this supports your point 
> concerning "formal indication" and conceptualization. And SuZ 313-15 deals 
> with Daseins projection ahead of itself. I can see what this has to do with 
> understanding, but how does it support your point about animals, Dasein, and 
> Aristotle?
> 
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >ANTHONY CRIFASI:
> >But he does not say in that chapter that any animal
> >besides humans have the ability to take that last step and conceive a
> >universal from sensation and memory.
> >
> >GARY C MOORE:
> >"And this evidently belongs to all animals; for they have a connate 
> >discriminatory capacity, which is called perception. And if perception is 
> >present in them, in some animals the retention of the percept comes about, 
> >but in others it does not come about. Now for those in which it does not 
> >come about, there is no knowledge outside perceiving (either none at all, 
> >or none with regard to that of which there is no retention); but for some 
> >perceivers, it is possible for them to grasp it in their minds. And when 
> >many such things come about, then a difference comes about, so that some 
> >come to have an account from the retention of such things, and others do 
> >not.
> >
> >"So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory 
> >(which occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for 
> >memories that are many in number from a single experience. And from 
> >experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul 
> >(the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those 
> >things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding -- of skill 
> >if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with 
> >what is the case.
> >
> >"Thus the states neither belong to us in a determinate form, nor come about 
> >from other states that are more cognitive; but they come about from 
> >perception -- as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one man takes a stand 
> >another does and then another, until a position of strength is reached . 
> >And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.
> >
> >"What we have just said but not said clearly, let us say again: when one of 
> >the undifferentiated things makes a stand, there is a primitive universal 
> >in the mind (for though one perceives the particular, perception is of the 
> >universal -- e.g. of man but not of Callias the man); again a stand is made 
> >in these, until what has no parts and is universal stands -- e.g. such and 
> >such an animal stands, until animal does, and in this a stand is made in 
> >the same way. Thus it is clear that it is necessary for us to become 
> >familiar with the primitives by induction; for perception too instills the 
> >universal in this way." POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, Bk II, 19, 99b35-100b5, trans. 
> >Johnathan Barnes, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, Princeton/Bollingen, 
> >1991, pp. 165-6.
> >
> >I think the actual text says exactly the opposite to what you would have 
> >Aristotle say.
> <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
> 
> Where exactly? He says that perception belongs to all animals, and the 
> retention of the percept belongs to some animals. Where does he say that 
> "the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from 
> the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things)" belongs to any 
> animal other than man?
> 
> Anthony Crifasi
> 




---------------------------------
Do You Yahoo!?
HotJobs, a Yahoo! service - Search Thousands of New Jobs
--0-268808144-1028800975=:38097

HTML VERSION:

PART 2:

¶ Logos does not mean reason. The Aristotelian problem makes sense only if logos has a certain kinship with aesthesis. This kinship lies in the fact that both – the exploring and being-conversant as well as the perceiving—in some way uncover and unconceal that toward which they are directed. Both aesthesis and logos are connected with aletheuein (which at first has nothing to do with knowledge in the sense of theoretical comprehension and intention. ¶ The extent to which Aristotle also intends in a certain sense to ascribe to animals logos – conversance in the sense of a circumspection which knows its way around –can be seen in Met. A 1, where Aristotle attributes to some animals the possibility of phronimoteron and thus a certain pronesis (something like circumspection) (980b21). Here it should be noted that besides ethical and practical behavior, phronesis also signifies the self-sensing of human beings. On this point, I am leaving aside the difficult passage (De an. B 12, 424a26ff.) where aisthesis directly designated as logos tis [Can anyone comment upon this? I do not understand what Heidegger sees as a problem precisely because, as he says, it is a “difficult passage”.].  We should understand logos in this passage neither merely as relationship, nor simply as reason or discourse in the sense of language; rather, what is in fact meant by the logos tis is the perceiving exploration of . . . , and the conversant relating to . . . , the relation which takes cognizance of its surroundings, the relation to what presents itself in the surroundings as lying opposite, as antikeimenon. ¶ We have thereby clarified, to the extent necessary to us, the relationship of the two divisions: apsuxon—empsuxon and alogon—logon exon. Now let us return to our text (Met. Theta 2, 1046a36ff., “Since, then, some (those forces understood with respect to movement) are present in beings without soul by way of belonging to them and co-constituting them, whereas others are present in the besouled, that is, in the soul as such, indeed, in the kind of soul that has in itself a discourse, it is thereby evident that some of the forces are also without a discourse, whereas others are with a discourse (directed by such a discourse).” We are now in a position to read with more precision and to observe that Aristotle has already taken into account everything just said. With ai men—ai de, he is not simply setting apart apsuxa and empsuxa, soulless and besouled; rather, he defines more closely in what respect he means empsuxa when he says; kai en psuxe (a37), and indeed the besouled, that is, the besouled body taken only according to its besouledness (“in the soul as such”). Thus the bodily is thereby excluded. This is in fact not identical with corporeality in the sense of a constitution of a material thing of nature, but it nevertheless

displays processes, for example physico-chemical processes, which are able to be grasped within certain limits without observing the besouledness. In this excluded realm, which nonetheless belongs to the besouled, there is aloga. But not even en te psuxe is an unequivocal determination; besouledness is also the specific life form of plants, which (although they have soul) are always nevertheless alogon. Only when the besouled in its besouledness is taken in an entirely different way—as the besouled being that has logos—only then is the empsuxon the opposite of the alogon. ¶ When we speak of the besouled being who has logos, we do not mean that logos, conversance (discourse), is merely added on; rather, this exein, having, has the meaning of being. It means that humans conduct themselves, carry themselves, and comport themselves in the way they do on the basis of this having. The exeinn means having in the sense of governing over . . . ; to be empowered for conversance and above all through conversance (logos) means: to be conversant in oneself and from out of oneself. ¶ This logon exon is again doubled (Nic. Eth. Z 2, 1139a12) into the epistemonikon and the logistikon; episteme means a versatile understanding of something, being familiar with something and having knowledge of it; logismos means circumspective calculationand deliberation. It is therefore related to choice and decision. Both belong to logos as conversance, on the basis of which human beings are aware of things and investigate them. At the same time, they are aware of their own possibilities and necessities. Whenever this conversance addresses itself to things and discusses them, it is a conversance which deliberates with both itself and others; a conversance which bebates with itself and calls itself into account. It is an “I” saying. “Language” is understood here in the broadest sense of logos as a conversant gathering, as a gatheredness of beings in “one”; in Dasein, which is at the same time a dissemination. ¶

END OF PART 2: OUT OF TIME __ WILL CONTINUE TOMMORROW IF STILL ALIVE

> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> GARY:
> Such "formal indication" (formale Anzeige) Heidegger says in a number of
> places in the early lectures is all Da-sein really does with
> conceptualization. (B&T, I.iv.25, Stambaugh 108/M&R 150/SuZ 114; Stam
> 109/M&R 151-2/SuZ 116; Stam 110/M&R 152/SuZ 117; especially Stam 219-20/M&R
> 279-80/SuZ 236; and esp. Stam 289-291/M&R 361-3/SuZ 313-15).  It is always
> in a process of becoming, being open and always incomplete. The only
> difference, I say once again, between animals and humans is that humans, for
> better or worse, have words. That is a big difference, in some ways
> advantageous, in some ways disastrous. Or are you saying that Heidegger is
> completely wrong?
> <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>
> Regarding the references, SuZ 114-117 is about Dasein as They versus the
> "I," and I could not find any discussion specifically about what
> conceptualization for Dasein consists in. SuZ 236 is about how Dasein, as
> Being-there, never fully actualizes its possibilities, but always has
> possibilities outstanding. I am not sure how this supports your point
> concerning "formal indication" and conceptualization. And SuZ 313-15 deals
> with Daseins projection ahead of itself. I can see what this has to do with
> understanding, but how does it support your point about animals, Dasein, and
> Aristotle?
>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
> >ANTHONY CRIFASI:
> >But he does not say in that chapter that any animal
> >besides humans have the ability to take that last step and conceive a
> >universal from sensation and memory.
> >
> >GARY C MOORE:
> >"And this evidently belongs to all animals; for they have a connate
> >discriminatory capacity, which is called perception. And if perception is
> >present in them, in some animals the retention of the percept comes about,
> >but in others it does not come about. Now for those in which it does not
> >come about, there is no knowledge outside perceiving (either none at all,
> >or none with regard to that of which there is no retention); but for some
> >perceivers, it is possible for them to grasp it in their minds. And when
> >many such things come about, then a difference comes about, so that some
> >come to have an account from the retention of such things, and others do
> >not.
> >
> >"So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory
> >(which occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for
> >memories that are many in number from a single experience. And from
> >experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul
> >(the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those
> >things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding -- of skill
> >if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with
> >what is the case.
> >
> >"Thus the states neither belong to us in a determinate form, nor come about
> >from other states that are more cognitive; but they come about from
> >perception -- as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one man takes a stand
> >another does and then another, until a position of strength is reached .
> >And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.
> >
> >"What we have just said but not said clearly, let us say again: when one of
> >the undifferentiated things makes a stand, there is a primitive universal
> >in the mind (for though one perceives the particular, perception is of the
> >universal -- e.g. of man but not of Callias the man); again a stand is made
> >in these, until what has no parts and is universal stands -- e.g. such and
> >such an animal stands, until animal does, and in this a stand is made in
> >the same way. Thus it is clear that it is necessary for us to become
> >familiar with the primitives by induction; for perception too instills the
> >universal in this way." POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, Bk II, 19, 99b35-100b5, trans.
> >Johnathan Barnes, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, Princeton/Bollingen,
> >1991, pp. 165-6.
> >
> >I think the actual text says exactly the opposite to what you would have
> >Aristotle say.
> <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>
> Where exactly? He says that perception belongs to all animals, and the
> retention of the percept belongs to some animals. Where does he say that
> "the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from
> the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things)" belongs to any
> animal other than man?
>
> Anthony Crifasi
>