Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2002 13:51:54 +0200
Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?


Cologne 08-Aug-2002

Anthony Crifasi schrieb  Thu, 08 Aug 2002 04:59:52 +0000:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> > >AC:  Perhaps I am misunderstanding you here, but if you grant that his
> > > investigation of first causes is not his analysis of the being of beings
> > > (since the latter includes physical things while the former excludes
> >them),
> > > then his metaphysical investigation of first causes is not a categorial
> > > analysis of the modes of being. How then could it be anything other than
> >an
> > > attempt to prove that there are non-physical beings that are the
> >ultimate
> > > causes of physical phenomena, which is precisely what he does at Met.
> > > 1071b3-23? And therefore how can it possibly be phenomenological in any
> > > sense whatsoever?
> >
> >ME: The phenomenon here is the movement of the sky as always present. The sky
>
> >is in
> >a mode of being, namely, that of being always in presence, _entelecheiai_.
> >Heidegger writes:
> >
> >"That which excludes the possibility of having ever not been also excludes
> >the
> >possibility of ever passing away. The presence of such a being is not
> >thought up
> >but is seen in the movement of the sky, albeit seen not merely as a matter
> >of
> >pure observation but experienced in the fear regarding whether in the end
> >this
> >ever-existing could come to a standstill, disappear from being." (GA18:297)
> >
> > >AC:  Take energeia and dynamis, for example. If Aristotles conception of
> >these
> > > were purely phenomenological, how on earth could he explicitly use these
> > > notions to prove that there is an immaterial and eternal substance which
> >is
> > > the first cause (1071b13-22)? A purely phenomenological analysis could
> >never
> > > do this. The only way he could possibly do this is if there is an ontic
> > > element (at the very least, an element) in his notions of these.
> >
> >ME: _Dynamis_, _energeia_, _entelecheia_ are three core concepts in
> Aristotle's
> >thinking signifying modes of presence, i.e. being. These concepts
> >represent,
> >among other things, Aristotle's metaphysical answer to Platonic ideas and
> >Pythagorean number because neither of these have the mode of being of
> >being-at-work, which is necessary to account for _kinaesis_.
> >
> >1071b13-22 is not concerned with finding a substance, but an _ousia_, a
> >being in
> >a mode of being. The phenomenon before Aristotle's eye is the never-ending
> >movement of the skies, _aidios kinaesis_. This motion is perfect presence,
> >i.e.
> >_entelecheia_, pure being. The governing origin (_archae_) of this
> >presence,
> >Aristotle says, must be "at work", i.e. _enegeiai_, and not merely
> >_dynamei_
> >because what is in the mode of _dynamei_ can also not be.
>
> AC: That is not all he says. He also says that that this eternal ousia must be
>
> immovable (1071b5) and immaterial (1071b21). In the next chapter he says
> that the first mover is without magnitude. And in the chapter after that, he
> actually posits a specific number of unmoved movers - 55. Such unabashedly
> ontic conclusions could never be reached through a purely phenomenological
> analysis of modes of being.
>
> >ME: Aristotle is grappling with the question:
> >_pos gar kinaethaesetai, ei maeden estai energeiai aition;_ (1071a28)
> >"How could something be moved if there were not a cause at work?"
> >This being-at-work or _energeia_ is a mode of being and THIS is the focus
> >of
> >attention. Aristotle's investigation at this point is an ontological
> >investigation of the appropriate mode of being for the ever-moving night
> >skies,
> >and by no means an ontic search for a cause, as you claim.
>
> AC: But his investigation cannot possibly be primarily aimed at the
> appropriate
> mode of being for the night skies, since neither "immovable" nor
> "immaterial" nor "without magnitude" apply to the night skies, and these are
> his ultimate conclusions in the text in question.

The conclusions Aristotle reaches come through considering the being of
_kinaesis_, movement, with regard to the never-ceasing movement of the night
skies. _Kinaesis_ is a mode of being, not a being. This mode of being/presencing
is investigated in the Physics. Here he reaches his most elaborate, third
determination of _kinaesis_ as

_entelecheia ... tou dynamei poiaetikou kai pathaetikou, haei toiouton_ (Phys.
Gamma 3, 202b25)
"perfected presence of that which is able to bring forth and to suffer insofar
as it is presencing as such"

Movement is shown to be always the being-at-work of a unity of a bringing forth
and a suffering of being brought forth, i.e. of moving and being moved.

In this way, when Aristotle comes to consider the movement of the night skies,
he concludes from the essential nature of movement as a mode of being that there
is a unity of a mover and moved at work also in the night skies. The origin of
never-ending movement is itself unmoved.

You miss the point entirely when you comment, as above, that

>AC: his investigation cannot possibly be primarily aimed at the appropriate
mode of being for the >night skies, since neither "immovable" nor "immaterial"
nor "without magnitude" apply to the night >skies

Even the conclusions that the mover is _aneu hylaes_, without matter, and itself
unmoved can only be understood insofar as one has Aristotle's ontology of
movement in view. Why is the prime mover without matter? Because matter is what
suffers under _poiaesis_ and is itself not _poiaetikos_. Why is the prime mover
itself unmoved? Because otherwise it would have to be moved by something else,
and would therefore not be prime. Aristotle sees all this with a view to the
skies and with regard to the being of movement which he grasps with the aid of
the concepts of _dynamis_, _energeia_ and _entelecheia_. All this is
phenomenology.

> AC: Further, in just the
> immediately preceding book (kappa), he was still leaving open the
> possibility that there is no such immovable separate ousia at all:
>
> "If, then, natural substances are the first of things, physics will be the
> first of the sciences, too; but if there is another nature or substance
> which is separate and immovable, the science of it too must be distinct from
> and prior to physics, and also universal by being prior." (1064b10-14)
>
> So it is specifically in the next book that the existence of a separate and
> immovable ousia is scientifically discovered as the first cause.

If you miss the point of the phenomenological uncovering of movement as a mode
of being, then of course you are only left with a purported ontic science. But
that is not Aristotle's main strength, the heart of his thinking, which is part
of the philosophical Greek _gigantomachia peri taes ousias_, the "gigantic
struggle over being". You yourself seem not to have the question of being at all
in view, but logic. Logic, however, is derivative, i.e. itself a phenomenon of
being.

This is how Heidegger concludes his 1924 Summer Semester lectures:

"This investigation by Aristotle of movement has a _fundamental significance for
all ontology_: basic determination of being as _energeia_, _entelecheia_ and
_dynamis_.

When _forming concepts_ the point is to characterize certain concepts. The
primary concern is to determine the regards according to fundamental characters.
Every conceptual formation, insofar as it is a proper formation, is
distinguished by the fact that it opens up anew the phenomenal area [Sachgebiet]
in the fundamental character of its being. The _properly productive conceptual
forming_ lies in _opening up the phenomenal area out of the phenomenal
character_ in such a way that the entire conceptual structure of the area of
being become visible, not only that the _phenomenon_ is captured, but also the
_how_.

The question concerning _ti to on_ is drawn from the determinations of
_poiaesis_ and _present existence_ -- _poiaesis_ as primary being-in-the-world,
_praxis_. It provides the occasion and the first regard for Greek ontology --
not ontology of nature! The later history of philosophy neglects to look at
being-in-the-world. The discovery of _energeia_ and _entelecheia_ means taking
seriously what Plato and Parmenides intended. The task is not to say anything
new, but to say what the ancients already meant." (GA18:329)

Thus is Heidegger's understanding of the task of phenomenologically
reappropriating the Greeks, especially Aristotle, in the twenties. The 1939
Physis study shows that he does not surrender this stance later on.

Whether _poiaesis_ is to be questioned in its status as the "primary
being-in-the-world" and in what way, is another issue which most would not dare
to pose, for they would have to risk putting Heidegger's _authority_ into
question. Therefore, such questions, being untimely, are posthumous, i.e. last
questions. For the time being it is probably more than enough for a rare few to
catch up to Heidegger's reopening of the question of being. The dangerous
divide, constantly prone to erring, is that expounders of Heidegger's thinking
either turn it into Weltanschauung, or bury it under scholarliness.

Michael
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-  artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art  _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_-_-_- artefact-AT-webcom.com
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_





     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---