Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2002 14:15:45 +0200
Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?


Cologne 10-Aug-2002

Anthony Crifasi schrieb Sat, 10 Aug 2002 05:41:43 +0000:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> > > >ME: the conclusions that the mover is _aneu hylaes_, without matter, and
> >itself
> > > >unmoved can only be understood insofar as one has Aristotle's ontology
> >of
> > > >movement in view. Why is the prime mover without matter? Because matter
> >is
> > > >what suffers under _poiaesis_ and is itself not _poiaetikos_.
> > >
> > > AC:But even if he thought that the prime mover was a specific ontic
> >substance,
> > > he could still argue that it is immaterial from what the very nature of
> > > matter entails. So why would he procedure here, even in the way you cast
> >it
> > > above, be any indication that Aristotles conclusion here is not ontic?
> >
> >ME: ALL the concepts involved here, such as matter, poiaesis, pathaesis,
> >movement,
> >being-at-work, etc, are ontological concepts. Don't you see that? I am
> >surprised, because the uncovering of Aristotle's concepts as concepts of
> >BEING
> >belongs to the heartland of Heidegger's achievements.
> >
> > > AC: Why is it phenomenology just because his argument is from the very
> >nature of
> > > movement? Again, even if Aristotle thought that the prime mover was an
> >ontic
> > > substance, he could still argue in precisely the same way that it is
> >unmoved
> > > from what the very nature of movement entails.
> >
> >ME: The "very nature of movement entails" indeed allows Aristotle's first
> >conclusions regarding an immaterial, unmoved mover. The "very nature of
> >movement" is synonymous with "the being of movement", a phenomenon which
> >Aristotle analyzes in depth in his Physics. This analysis is one of
> >Aristotle's
> >key discoveries. His ground-breaking concepts of _dynamis_, _energeia_ and
> >_entelecheia_, the latter two being his own coinings, are revolutionary in
> >coming to terms with phenomena on which his predecessors came to grief.
> >
> >The "very nature of matter and motion" already entails ontological
> >questions. I
> >indicated these ontological arguments in my last posting. For details, cf.
> >Heidegger's interpretation in GA18 and elsewhere.
>
> AC: But my question is, EVEN IF these are ontological concepts and deal with
> the
> very being of matter and movement, why couldn't Aristotle argue from what is
> entailed in the very being of matter and movement that the first cause as an
> ontic substance must be without matter and movement? For example, let's say
> I am thinking of the computer screen in front of me as an ontic substance,
> and I want to argue that it is necessarily sensible merely from its material
> being (a connection which Aristotle draws in the Physics). If I could
> analyze what is necessarily entailed in material being per se, and that that
> sensibility is one of the things that is so entailed, then I could conclude
> that this ontic substance in front of me is sensible from an analysis of
> material being, using the very procedure which you call ontological here. So
> if this is perfectly possible, then why is this procedure evidence at all
> that Aristotle's conclusion is not to a characteristic of an ontic
> substance? Aristotle could just as well be thinking of the prime mover as an
> occuring substance, and argue from what is entailed by materiality per se
> that the first cause cannot be material, on pain of contradiction. How is
> this possibility ruled out by Aristotle's procedure, even as you describe
> it?
>

I don't know if I am getting your subtlety here, nor what you are aiming at.

Aristotle factually does not proceed in the way you describe. His analysis of
the being of _kinaesis_, which draws on his analysis of _poiaesis_, _pathaesis_,
etc. in terms of _dynamis_, _energeia_ and _entelecheia_, is all brought into
play in considering the question of a prime mover. It requires more than an
understanding of the being of matter (_hylae_) alone to draw conclusions about
whether the prime mover is material or not.

Or, put another way, the understanding of the being of matter itself arises from
the ontological analysis of _poiaesis_ which in turn provides the key to
understanding the being of physical beings in terms of _hylae_, _morphae_ and
_steraesis_. That is, _hylae_ is not an isolated concept.

The crucial first step in Aristotle's consideration of the never-ceasing
movement of the skies (a state of being of perfected presence, _entelecheia_,
being pure and simple) is that this never-ceasing movement implies a mover which
must be unceasingly at work, i.e. in the state of being of _energeia_, i.e.
bringing itself into presence. But he can only argue in this way because he has
already analyzed the being of movement in the Physics which culminates in the
pairing of bringing-forth and suffering-being-brought-forth as mover-being and
moved being (not 'substance'), _kinoun_ and _kinoumenon_.

Heidegger opens up the interpretation of Aristotle again (after two and a half
millennia) by bringing all considerations back into the practical world of
everyday life. Thus, simple phenomena like building houses and making tables and
treating illnesses are the basis on which Aristotle develops his key ontological
concepts.

Michael
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