Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2002 06:30:19 +0000


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > Let's say, hypothetically, Aristotle saw the first mover as an ontic
> > substance, and he wanted to prove that this ontic substance must be
> > without matter. One of the ways to do this (if not the ONLY way) is
> > to argue precisely that material being per se entails something that
> > contradicts what being a first cause entails. Even if he brings in
> > those other concepts too, like dynamis and the being of movement, he
> > can still argue that these entail something that contradicts what
> > being a first cause entails, and thereby conclude that the first
> > cause as an ontic substance must be without dynamis or movement. So
> > my point is that all this would be demonstrative procedure even if
> > he saw the first cause as an ontic substance, so I do not see why
> > this procedure is evidence that Aristotle cannot be concluding
> > something ontic here.
>
>Maybe I'm being thick here, but aren't you meaning by "ontic
>substance" a being?

But "a being" in the specific sense which you denied Aristotle was talking 
about, when you kept saying that he wasn't concluding to any "substance". In 
other words, he would be concluding to the existence of a specific 
substance, and that two of the characteristics of this substance is that it 
is absolutely changeless and immaterial. My point is that the way you casted 
Aristotle's argument (arguing from what is entailed in certain ontological 
concepts) is not evidence that Aristotle's enterprise here is non-ontic, 
because he would still argue precisely the same way even if (hypothetically) 
he did consider the immovable ousia to be a specific immovable substance. In 
other words, why must the first cause as a specific substance be without 
motion? Because what is entailed per se in being movable contradicts 
something that is entailed in being a first cause. Therefore, the first 
cause must be a specific substance which is absolutely changeless. Again, 
why must the first cause as a specific substance be immaterial? Because what 
is entailed in materiality itself contradicts something that is entailed in 
being a first cause. Therefore, the first cause must be a specific 
immaterial substance. That is simply the old traditional reading of 
Aristotle, and it employs precisely the procedure which you gave as evidence 
against that reading.

Anthony Crifasi

>If so, then of course Aristotle is concluding something about a being
>called prime mover -- pure energy.

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