Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2002 20:16:24 +0000


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > Well, what I am specifically concerned with is whether Heideggers
> > reinterpretation of these reflects what Aristotle intended. That is why 
>I am
> > concentrating on textual interpretation.
>
>You would have to know Heidegger's reinterpretation to say anything about 
>it.
>And in fact you do not say anything about Heidegger's phenomenological
>interpretation, say, of _dynamis_, _energeia_ and _entelecheia_. All I have 
>done
>in this exchange is provide some indications and some key references. You 
>would
>have to follow them up and try to tear them apart.

That is what I have been doing in the following way. As I am sure you can 
tell, I do not think that the interpretation of dynamis, energeia, and 
entelecheia as non-ontic reflects Aristotle’s intention. For example, I 
think that he saw dynamis and energeia as ontic principles in individual 
substances (which is the traditional reading), not as modes of being. So I 
have in effect been arguing as follows. If (as you say) these notions are 
completely non-ontic, then what I have been calling the ontic strands of 
first philosophy are actually analyses of the being of the first causes, not 
an ontic search for specific substances as causes. But I argued that if his 
investigation of the first causes is an analysis of their being, then what 
he would be excluding from first philosophy and giving to physics would be 
the analysis of the being of physical beings (1026a), which would directly 
contradict his explicit insistence that it is not physics but first 
philosophy that investigates the being of physical beings (1061b30). 
Therefore, your non-ontic interpretation of dynamis, energeia, and 
entelecheia necessarily results in a direct contradiction with Aristotle’s 
explicit description of the respective bounds of first philosophy and 
physics. That is how my argument so far has direct bearing on the non-ontic 
interpretation of dynamis, energeia, and entelecheia.

>As usual, you ignore these comments of mine and instead concentrate on
>formalities.
>
> > And yet in this text (1026a) he explicitly gives that analysis to 
>physics
> > and excludes it from first philosophy. Therefore, according to your
> > interpretation, the analysis of the being of physical beings would 
>belong to
> > physics and not to first philosophy,
>
>What nonsense. The labels _protae epistaemae_, _sophia_, _protae
>philosophia_etc. are not what is important, but what and how Aristotle 
>uncovers
>the being of beings. So you are concerned with whether the analysis of the 
>being
>of physical beings could be termed "first" in some way? And you call that
>philosophy? It is extremely poor, inane philology.

My previous argument concerning the bounds of first philosophy did have 
necessary bearing on your interpretation of Aristotle’s analysis of the 
being of beings, in the manner I describe above. It just wasn’t an immediate 
bearing, but it is unavoidable.

> > which he explicitly denies in the other
> > text (1061b30) where he says that it is specifically first philosophy 
>and
> > not physics which investigates the being of physical beings. Your
> > interpretation, therefore, cannot possibly reflect what Aristotle 
>intended,
> > unless he blatantly contradicted himself on this matter.
>
>This is philology at its worst. You are opining about classifications 
>without
>saying a word about the phenomena which Aristotle deals with and how he 
>deals
>with them.

I am arguing that your interpretation of Aristotle’s analysis of the 
phenomena leads to a direct contradiction with Aristotle’s explicit 
statement about first philosophy. That is the connection, so it is not mere 
philology.

> > >ME: This is formalistic hogwash inspired by formal logic.
> >
> > I am not trying to logically prove some "fact" about physical beings or
> > the first mover.
>
>You're not trying to show anything at all about physical beings or a prime
>mover. That's the problem. You just keep using the vacuous phrase "ontic 
>search
>for a first cause" and the like.
>
>To know what he intended requires following through with the phenomena he 
>had in
>view and being guided by those leading insights. I.e. it means being moved 
>by
>the _gigantomachia taes ousias_.

But the accusation you are making assumes the very interpretation I am 
questioning in the first place. If the interpretation you are defending does 
end up necessarily contradicting Aristotle’s explicit statement of the 
bounds of first philosophy and physics, then you cannot simply reply that I 
am not addressing the phenomena Aristotle has in view, because it is 
precisely your interpretation of those Aristotelian phenomena which I am 
calling in to question.

> > AC: Whether or
> > not the "contradiction" here is in terms of formal logic, the point is 
>that
> > Aristotle denies what you are having him say - ie, your interpretation 
>of
> > the 1026a text has him saying that the analysis of the being of physical
> > beings belongs to physics and not to first philosophy, which he 
>explicitly
> > denies at 1061b30.
>
>That is a sophistic twist. I have not been concerned with the definition 
>and
>precise compass of "first science" at all, but instead with outlining some
>contents of Aristotle's analyses.
>
>You have not said a word about the truth of Aristotle's thinking, what it 
>has in
>view, what it uncovers, the questions and concerns by which it is moved. 
>Your
>formal, logical way of doing philology is more akin to algebra than to
>philosophy.

But I argued precisely that your outline of those contents depends on a 
certain interpretation which ultimately results in a direct contradiction 
with Aristotle’s explicit statement about the bounds of first philosophy and 
physics. That is the connection between the “first science” issue and your 
outline of the contents of Aristotle’s analysis.

>You have construed some definitional dilemma here about first philosophy,
>metaphysics, physics which has nothing to do with what I have been saying.

This is simply not true. What you have been saying about dynamis, energeia, 
and entelecheia has direct bearing on whether the investigation of the being 
of physical beings belongs to physics or to first philosophy, which in turn 
can be directly compared with Aristotle’s explicit statement that the 
investigation of the being of physical beings belongs first philosophy and 
not to physics. There is therefore a necessary connection here.

>As if
>I had been merely posing definitions and putting investigations into slots!
>
>Figuring out whether the investigation of the being of physical beings can
>justifiably be called "first science" seems like a major question you can 
>while
>away your life with! Why don't you take up an interesting question for a 
>change
>such as whether Heidegger's interpretation of the understanding of being in
>Aristotle as standing presence is justified? For that is the key to his
>interpretation of Aristotle, and in this exchange I have only been 
>indicating
>some salient features of Heidegger's interpretation. But you don't engage 
>with
>it.
>
>Logic for Heidegger is one of the most questionable things in philosophy 
>(if not
>THE questionability which he endeavours to show up), and he put logic into
>question in his lectures from the early twenties on. And yet you continue 
>to
>talk decades down the road, completely unperturbed, as if logic were the
>unquestionable foundation for philosophizing. That's why you continue to do
>metaphysics and have little notion of phenomenology as Heidegger exercised 
>it in
>his lectures and elsewhere.

I am not taking issue with the questionability of logic. I am taking issue 
with the interpretation that Aristotle also intended such a questionability. 
I do not see why, if I question the latter interpretation, that therefore I 
must be questioning the former. I can accept Heidegger’s phenomenology 
without accepting with his reading of Aristotle, because the former does not 
depend on the latter at all.

Anthony Crifasi

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