Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?
Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2002 02:26:58 +0000


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > > > Well, what I am specifically concerned with is whether Heideggers
> > > > reinterpretation of these reflects what Aristotle intended. That is 
>why
> > > > I am concentrating on textual interpretation.
> > >
> > >You would have to know Heidegger's reinterpretation to say anything 
>about
> > >it And in fact you do not say anything about Heidegger's 
>phenomenological
> > >interpretation, say, of _dynamis_, _energeia_ and _entelecheia_. All I 
>have
> > >done in this exchange is provide some indications and some key 
>references.
> > >You would have to follow them up and try to tear them apart.
> >
> > AC: That is what I have been doing in the following way.
>
>Which of the references to Heidegger have you studied?
>
> > AC: As I am sure you can
> > tell, I do not think that the interpretation of dynamis, energeia, and
> > entelecheia as non-ontic reflects Aristotles intention. For example, I
> > think that he saw dynamis and energeia as ontic principles in individual
> > substances (which is the traditional reading), not as modes of being. So 
>I
> > have in effect been arguing as follows. If (as you say) these notions 
>are
> > completely non-ontic,
>
>I don't follow. What do you mean by "non-ontic"?
>What do you mean by an "ontic principle"? What kinds of principles are 
>there
>other than "ontic principles"?

This what I mean:

"1071b13-22 is not concerned with finding a substance, but an _ousia_, a 
being in a mode of being. The phenomenon before Aristotle's eye is the 
never-ending movement of the skies, _aidios kinaesis_. This motion is 
perfect presence, i.e. _entelecheia_, pure being. The governing origin 
(_archae_) of this presence, Aristotle says, must be "at work", i.e. 
_enegeiai_, and not merely _dynamei_ because what is in the mode of 
_dynamei_ can also not be."

So you yourself explicitly made the connection between the non-ontic 
interpretation of Aristotle’s investigation of first causes and the 
non-ontic interpretation of enetelecheia, enegeiai, and dynamei. As soon as 
you draw that connection, then the investigation of immovable beings that he 
relegated exclusively to first philosophy at 1026a would be an analysis of 
them in terms of modes of being, not an ontic search for causal substances. 
Accordingly, the investigation of physical beings that he excluded from 
first philosophy and gave to physics in the same text would be the analysis 
of the BEING of physical beings, which directly contradicts his explicit 
insistence that it is not physics but first philosophy that investigates the 
being of physical beings (1061b30). Therefore, your non-ontic interpretation 
of dynamis, energeia, and entelecheia necessarily results in a direct 
contradiction with Aristotle’s explicit description of the respective bounds 
of first philosophy and physics.

> > I am not taking issue with the questionability of logic. I am taking 
>issue
> > with the interpretation that Aristotle also intended such a 
>questionability.
>
>Did I say anywhere that Aristotle intended to put logic into question?

Sometimes I am not sure from the way you phrase your statements whether you 
are talking about Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle or Heidegger 
himself. Sorry.

>How does the questionability of logic make itself apparent in your own 
>thinking?

I agree with the relegation of logic to a subordinate mode. I have no 
problem with that.

Anthony Crifasi

>I'm sure we'll come back to this claim of yours that Heidegger's 
>phenomenology
>does not depend on his reading of Aristotle at all.

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