Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?
Date: Fri, 02 Aug 2002 18:06:41 +0000


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > "Mathematics is a theoretical science; but whether its objects are 
>immovable
> > and separate is not at present clear. It is clear, however, that some
> > mathematical sciences investigate their objects qua immovable and qua
> > separate. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and
> > separate, the knowledge of it evidently belongs to a theoretical 
>science,
> > not however to physics (for physics is concerned with certain movable
> > things) nor to mathematics, but to a science which is prior to both. For
> > physics is concerned with SEPARABLE BUT NOT IMMOVABLE things, and
> > mathematics is concerned with some immovable things ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT
> > SEPARABLE but as in matter. The first science, however, is concerned 
>with
> > things which are BOTH SEPARATE AND IMMOVABLE. Now all **CAUSES** must be
> > eternal, and these most of all; for these are the CAUSES of what is 
>visible
> > among THINGS DIVINE. Hence, there should be three theoretical 
>philosophies,
> > mathematics, physics, and theology. For it is clear that if the divine 
>is
> > present anywhere, it would be present in a nature of this sort, and the 
>most
> > honorable science should be concerned with the most honorable genus of
> > things. So, the theoretical sciences are to be preferred over the other
> > sciences, but theology is to be preferred over the other theoretical
> > sciences." (Met. 1026a7-23)
> >
> > So Aristotle says specifically that first philosophy is specifically
> > "concerned with things which are both separate and immovable," that 
>these
> > are "CAUSES" of everything else, and that they are "eternal" and 
>"divine."
> > Yes Aristotle is trying to uncover the highest archai, but in the mode 
>of
> > scientific knowledge - ie, by finding their first CAUSES, which are 
>separate
> > and immovable SUBSTANCES. That is clearly not phenomenology! Neither
> > Heidegger nor Husserl uncovers the being of beings by finding the 
>substances
> > which "cause" them. Husserl brackets all such questions altogether, 
>while
> > Heidegger subordinates them to another mode which is prior to knowing.
>
>I am concerned here only with Heidegger's phenomenology, not with Husserl's 
>or
>Hegel's.
>
>There is no reference to substance in the passage you cite. However, we 
>read
>that "the most estimable science must be of the most estimable genus" 
>(1026a21)
>What is _genos_? It is Herkunft, origin from which something is descended. 
>The
>descent of beings as such is from being. And how does Aristotle uncover 
>this
>descent? Beings descend from the categories, and from _dynamis_ and
>_entelecheia_, which are MODES OF BEING, not 'substances' or some such
>nonsense.

Just 6 lines after the text I quote above:

"if there were no substances other than those formed by nature, physics 
would be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, this 
would be prior, and the science of it would be first philosophy and would be 
universal in this manner, in view of the fact that it is first." 
(1026a28-32)

So he explicitly says here that first philosophy is the science of the 
highest substances, and it is not physics if the highest substances are not 
movable. So he is explicitly saying in these immediately proximate texts 
that first philosophy is first precisely because it investigates the 
"substances" which are the first "causes" of everything else, and that these 
substances are not movable ones. That cannot possibly be phenomenology of 
any kind whatsoever! Heidegger’s analytic has absolutely nothing to do with 
finding the substances which are the first causes. It is true that Aristotle 
says in the very next line that first philosophy also investigates being qua 
being:

"And it would be the concern of this science, too, to investigate being qua 
being, both what being is and what belongs to it qua being." (1026a32-33)

but what makes first philosophy knowledge is not this, but specifically the 
former - the investigation of the first CAUSE:

"We think that we know each [thing] without qualification … when we think 
that we know (A) the cause through which the thing exists as being the cause 
of that thing and (B) that the thing cannot be other than what it is." 
(Post. An. 71b10-13)

>Such uncovering is purest phenomenology in Heidegger's sense,
>uncovering the descent of beings from being. Heidegger shows in detail how
>Aristotle practises this uncovering in the first three books of his 
>Physics.
>Physical beings, the physical 'substances' (a misleading translation of 
>_ousia_
>and _hypokeimenon_) are defined by _kinaesis_, and this _kinaesis_ has to 
>be
>investigated with regard to its _archai_, which are the categories and 
>_dynamis_
>and _entelecheia_, in order to uncover physical beings in their being as 
>beings
>in motion.
>
>Your interpretation reduces Aristotle's metaphysics to an ontic science in 
>which
>some such thing as 'causal substances' are discovered. You've wrongheadedly 
>got
>it completely the wrong way round -- the _hypokeimena_ themselves are 
>ADDRESSED
>(_katagorein_) WITH REGARD TO their mode of being. They themselves have to 
>be
>uncovered in where they come from in the fourfold of being, and the 
>"causes" are
>the _archai_, i.e. the governing origins in the modes of being.

I agree that he intends these causes to be causes of the being of physical 
things in four ways, but this is not the same as categorial governing 
origins, as is clear from the first two chapters of Metaphysics Delta, the 
first second of which deals specifically with the meanings of "a cause." The 
specific examples he gives there for each of the four kinds of causes 
clearly indicate that he means "cause" in the ontic sense, not in some 
categorial sense. For example, "bronze" and "silver" (1013a25) are causes of 
"a statue" and a "cup" as "that from which, as a constituent, something is 
GENERATED" (1013a24), not in the categorial sense. He is simply talking 
about four factors that go into the generation of a physical thing, not the 
categories.

> > >"The being is addressed in itself with regard to from where it comes,
> > >_genos_,
> > >and, within its origins, with regard to what it is, _eidos_. The whole
> > >connection in being of _genos_ and _eidos_ is the _to ti aen einai_: 
>_ti
> > >aen_ > > >_genos_, _to einai_ = _eidos_. Insofar as the being is placed in 
>regards
> > >from
> > >which it is defined, an uncovering research has the task of uncovering 
>this
> > >where-from. This where-from are the _archai_. The _archai_ are the 
>basic
> > >regards
> > >with respect to which the concrete being is seen in itself and 
>explicated.
> > >Insofar as the _hexis_ of _alaetheuein_ is taken seriously, it means: 
>The
> > >_logos_ becomes one which pushes forward to the _archai_. The concrete
> > >execution
> > >of the _hexis_ is _epistaemae_, and the 'science' which has to do with 
>the
> > >_archai_ is _protae philosophia_, in short, _sophia_.
> >
> > Yes, but for Aristotle, wisdom specifically deals with finding the 
>highest
> > CAUSES and SUBSTANCES - specifically, immovable and separate substances.
> > That immediately distinguishes Aristotles metaphysics from phenomenology 
>of
> > any kind whatsoever, whether that of Husserl or of Heidegger.
>
>Your "yes, but" here shows that you haven't understood a single word.

I understand what sophia means, but I am pointing out that Aristotle 
explicitly specifies sophia as something that is not phenomenological - ie, 
the knowledge of the highest substances which are the first causes.

>Substances are not the causes of being.
>Rather, quite the converse, the modes of being are the _archai_ and 
>_akrotatas
>aitias_ (1003a26) of the _hypokeimena_ understood as _ousiai_.
>
>It was Heidegger's readings especially of Aristotle in the early twenties 
>which
>established his reputation and even fame as a lecturer. Finally, 
>Aristotle's
>thinking could be seen grappling with the phenomenon of the being of 
>beings.
>Heidegger had to clear away the distortions of the traditional readings of
>Aristotle, such as you represent, to regain a living Aristotle engaged 
>lucidly
>with questions of being. You need to read for starters GA18, GA19 Sophist, 
>GA33
>Met. Theta, the _physis_ paper in _Pathmarks_ to catch up a bit.

I will definitely read those. But in what I have written so far, I have 
simply been going by what you have said, and the text is very clear - 
Aristotle explicitly says that first philosophy deals with the "immovable 
substances" which are the first "causes". I can't know whether Heidegger 
denies this until I read the texts you cite here, but you do seem to be 
denying this.

Anthony Crifasi

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