Subject: Re: Persius project.
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2002 19:19:38 +0000


Jud wrote:

>The effectuation of my cognitive processes is the expressage of the nerval
>messages from my brain along the nerve fibres to my arm muscles to instruct
>them to bend my arm. People who suffer from MS have problems with the
>effectuation of the determinations of the neural activity, because the 
>myelin
>sheath that protects the integrity of the medullated nerve fibre breaks 
>down
>and the messages don't get to the targeted extremities. Contrary to your
>statement, the signals passing down the medullated nerve fibre are easily
>detectable and observable on the medical equipment designed for this task.

Yes the signal is observable, but you still have not identified the specific 
appearance of that signal being AN EFFECT. All you have so far is that you 
want to move your arm, a signal passes down a nerve, and your arm moves - 
all observable phenomena. But you have not in the least identified the 
appearance of these being EFFECTS, as opposed to just observable events. 
What exactly is the appearance of these as CONSEQUENCES of something?

>You are confusing yourself between map and territory again. A word (such as
>evil) is a series of sounds or letters which when uttered by one human
>being and heard or read by another convey or denote a certain type of human
>behaviour, which depending on your own views and/or the views of the 
>society
>that you live in is ticketed or not ticketed accordingly. A certain human
>activity is observed, (say the gassing of Kurds by Saddam Hussein.) You 
>then
>have to decide whether or not the observed actions and effects of that 
>human
>behaviour correspond with the general meaning of the word evil as it is
>viewed in your own mind and the opinion of your fellow citizens. Though one
>certainly views the observed behaviour subjectively, and a person may even
>disagree with your fellow citizens concerning the observed behaviour of
>Saddam Hussein and decide not to ticket (agree to the correspondence of 
>word
>and deed) you are absolutely wrong to associate this with the attribution 
>of
>the non-apparent - non-existent - non-observable figments of causality or
>purpose to inanimate objects non of which have any appearances whatsoever,
>whilst the activities involved in the execution of evil acts exhibits a
>bountiful supply of observable appearances of men dropping killer-gas
>canisters out of the backs of aeroplanes and children clutching teddy-bears
>and dolls lying dead in dusty alleys.

And once again, you have not identified precisely the appearance of men 
dropping killer-gas canisters and children clutching teddy-bears and dolls 
lying dead in dusty alleys AS EVIL, and if there is no such appearance of 
these AS EVIL, then I am absolutely right to associate them with the 
attribution of the non-apparent, non-observable figments of causality or 
purpose to inanimate objects none of which have any appearances whatsoever. 
I see children lying dead, but I don’t "see" specifically the appearance of 
evil of these, just as I see order in nature, but I don’t "see" these as 
purposeful. So until you specifically identify the appearance of these AS 
EVIL, then evil remains non-existent, just like causality and purpose.

>Anthony:
>What you see is an event, which you LABEL bad or good. So you would be
>imposing one of your subjective figments on religionists, which is 
>precisely
>the philosophical crime of which you accused religionists and
>transcendentalists with regard to purpose
>
>Jud
>No, not quite - Not only are you getting confused again Anthony, you are 
>also
>holding back on the full story - one sees the event and the EFFECTS of that
>event.

And yet you have failed over and over again to specify precisely the 
appearance of those events AS EFFECTS. The event itself is clearly visible, 
but what precisely is the appearance of it as CONSEQUENCE of something?

>Anthony:
>Where do you see "effect" rather than just another event?
>
>Jud:
>As I have said a couple of times in past messages the event-effect 
>dichotomy
>is for all intents and purposes instantaneous in the event of two asteroids
>colliding - though no doubt some physicist would claim that there must be a
>million millionth of a nana-second between the process?

Even if it is instantaneous, effectuation must still have a distinct 
appearance, and this cannot be the same as the appearance of the mere event, 
because all events are related to other ones as events, but not all events 
are related to other ones as effects. So there must be some distinction in 
appearance if this distinction between mere events and effects is a real 
one, not merely a subjective label. What is it?

>Anthony:
>What you SEE is one event and another, but that is not the same as the
>appearance of one AS EFFECT of the other?
>
>Jud:
>It's entirely up to you Anthony, whether you see and describe one billiard
>ball colliding with another then bumping into a third as one event or two 
>or
>more events - or whether you describe a chain as a chain, or...link A and
>link B and link C and link D etc. is up to you. One of the uses of language
>which has assisted us to move from the caves to Cape Canaveral is the fact
>that languages allows short cuts which allows us to use one word [like 
>evil]
>to cover a large number of existential modalities which are considered to 
>be
>evil behaviour

No no, please no imprecise vague words like "cover." Either evil exists or 
not, and you claim that it is not merely a subjective label, but really 
exists - and the question is whether you can then identify the precise 
appearance of "evil," which you have consistently failed to do. By your own 
criterion, then, you must reduce "evil" to the same ash heap as purpose and 
causality.

>In order to be comprehensible when communicating the description of an
>event-effect, it is customary to bracket it off as one event - that is what
>we humans do when we talk about the world.

So it is "customary." That is the precise word Hume uses. And where does 
"custom" exist? In the mind.

>To attempt to describe the quantum
>events and effects of the molecular changes and ramifications of you 
>clapping
>your hands together just once would take billions and billions of years to
>describe and even then there would be no end to it
>
>One UNCONNECTED event can be subsequent to another without being an effect 
>of
>it, but that would be a parallel event [two pairs of cars colliding on
>different sides of the road for different reasons] at the same time, or one
>shortly after the other.

And you have not yet provided a specific appearance which would identify one 
pair as an event-effect pair, as opposed to a pair of merely parallel 
events.

>Anthony:
>So what precisely is this appearance of effect you allude?
>
>Jud:
>It differs and sometimes there is a longer period between event and effect
>[AS CONCEIVED BY THE ORDINARY MAN IN THE STREET] like what has just 
>happened
>in the Vltava River in the Czech Republic.  The event-effects of a massive
>build-up of flood water was observed hundreds of miles upstream,

No it wasn’t. The EVENT of a massive build-up of flood water was observed 
hundreds of miles upstream. You have yet to identify precisely the 
appearance of this being an effect in addition to just an event (and you 
have already granted that two events can be merely a parallel pair).

>which gave
>the city authorities of Prague sufficient time to evacuate the citizenry
>before the floodwater arrived, Much of down-town Prague in under water as I
>write. In fact the floodwater phenomena was a SERIES of event-effects as it
>moved along the river towards the Czech capital.

But all you have identified so far is a series of events, not the appearance 
of these as EFFECTS too. And you have already granted the difference between 
these.

>Jud:
>BTW
>while we are on the subject of purpose in inanimate objects please explain:
>
>(1) The mechanics of mountain popping and star hiding and Pepperpot peek a
>boo. How do they do it?
>(2) Why do they do it? What's in it for them? Are they part of some cosmic
>comedy troupe?
>
>Anthony: See below concerning Heidegger.
>
>Jud:
>I would prefer to hear YOUR OWN answer please.

Although there is no appearance of purpose, this is non-consequential for a 
philosophy which does not analyze the phenomena as "appearances." Beings, 
therefore, can exhibit purpose as long as they are not reduced to 
appearances.

>Anthony
>Which means that religion is not REALLY evil, since evil does not really
>exist, but is merely a subjective representational symbol or label in the
>mind.
>
>Jud:
>You continually confuse words with the human activity they point to.
>The map is not the territory.

And as long as you cannot identify a precise appearance of evil, then evil 
is just the map, not the territory.

>It's all in sections 13 and 15 of SuZ - a total of about only 12 pages, not 
>a
>long assignment. He basically says...
>
>Jud:
>But it is what YOU say that interests me most? But Anthony why don't you 
>tell
>me/us how YOU encounter these beings and what YOU mean when you employ the
>word encounter? I will read it of course, but I must ask you why though I
>explain what I believe in with great and often minute detail and you are so
>coy about how you encounter beings and what the word encounter means
>for you.  You could do it surely in one paragraph or maybe two?

First, you have specifically avoided detail when you continually avoid 
providing a precise appearance for effect or appearance. Secondly, beings 
ready-to-hand are encountered purely as good for this, good for that - not 
as someTHING that is good for this or someTHING that is good for that. All 
the usual categories go out the window in this mode. A hammer is not first a 
piece of wood attached to a piece of metal that which makes it suitable for 
hitting. A hammer is at first purely good for hammering.

>Jud:
>Though I am not surprised at the typical Heidegger Women's Magazine Advice
>Page baloney that you quote, which would be summarised by any humble
>non-philosopher as:
>
>Generally we just use people and they only become noticeable as actual
>individuals if we decide to know them better

You are right that this is precisely the summary one would expect from a 
non-philosopher. It is not that we just use people and then later become 
noticeable as individuals if we decide to know them better, because this 
says absolutely nothing about things themselves, but only how we "notice" 
them. You should read the section of SuZ on Being-with. It’s only 10 pages - 
section 26.

>You don't need TWELVE PAGES to say that. All this just confirms my point
>that I made many moons ago on this list, that things do not themselves 
>APPEAR
>to us - they come into sight or view and their APPEARANCE is something that
>WE transact NOT THEM.

And yet you use appearance as the criterion of whether something actually 
exists, such as purpose. Contradictions everywhere.

>To say Anthony seems happy is not telling us that
>Anthony is engaged in a form of activity called seeming. Anthony's mood
>[modality] seems to US.  An actor can behave in a certain way in order to
>give a certain impression or have a certain outward aspect ACCEPTED by the
>audience as seeming to be a Greek Hero but the determination regarding the
>outward appearance of the actor is always explained as: It seems to me or
>it seemed to my wife. You would never say: It seemed to the actor that he
>was a Greek warrior UNLESS by certain acting methodology, he had 
>brainwashed
>himself [method acting - getting into the role etc] that he was ACTUALLY a
>Greek warrior.  Heidegger annoys me because he doesn't think DEEPLY enough
>about these things - it's all surface gloss with him.

This from someone who continually fails to provide an appearance for evil 
and effect, even though you rejected purpose and causality due to their 
non-appearance.

>But it is what YOU say that interests me most Anthony?  If you say that you
>agree with him then that is OK but you don't why is that?

The reason is precisely the problems with YOUR position, Jud. I was once 
just like you, contradicting myself by accepting matter but rejecting 
causality, accepting "events" but rejecting purpose. You are being slowly 
driving straight towards Heidegger, whether you know it or not.

>And what about
>the explanation for the tricks of the famous peek - a - boo mountains and 
>pop
>up and down lighthouses and hide and seek stars?  Heidegger does not 
>mention
>that either.  I await the pleasure of you answers to my questions.
>Here they are again with a couple more tacked onto the end in case they
>slipped your mind.
>
>How do you explain the
>
>(1) The mechanics of mountain popping and star hiding and Pepperpot peek a
>boo. How do they do it?

Because there is no reason why they can’t. The one reason you have given 
(lack of appearance) is itself turning out to be a total farce, as is clear 
from your frantic revisions of your own position to account for the 
resulting blatant contradictions with "evil" and "effect." Unless you can 
provide such a reason, then your objection falls completely apart.

>(2) Why do they do it? What's in it for them? Are they part of some cosmic
>comedy troupe? Do they do it when nobody else is around?  Do they do it for
>each other or only humans? Do they undergo ant changes whilst they are 
>doing
>it?  If so are these changes measurable? What are the limitations of 
>movement
>of the mountains etc.?  How are these limitations imposed?  Who imposes 
>them?
>Why?  How? Do the conduct themselves this way for ALL human beings or only 
>a
>selected group?  Who selects this group? Why?  How?

The answer to all these questions is that there is no reason stopping them. 
The one reason you have given falls apart - unless, that is, you can find an 
appearance of "evil" and "effect" which would immediately remove the blatant 
contradiction from your position.

Anthony Crifasi

_________________________________________________________________
Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com



     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---