Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2002 00:57:22 +0200
Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?


Cologne 22-Aug-2002

Anthony Crifasi schrieb Wed, 21 Aug 2002 16:26:50 +0000:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> >ME: It's enough for me that Aristotle's Physics is an investigation of the
> >being of
> >movement. Because that is obviously what it is dealing with in the Physics.
>
> AC: But then what would first philosophy be? The investigation of the being of
>
> both movement and non-movement? But physics supposedly already investigated
> the being of movement. Or would first philosophy be the investigation of
> non-movement only? But Aristotle explicitly says that "the first science is
> concerned with the objects of physics to the extent that they are beings"
> (1061b31), so first philosophy also investigates movement insofar as it is a
> kind of being. But again, physics supposedly already investigated the being
> of movement. The only possible interpretation, then, is that physics
> strictly speaking does not investigate the being of anything - only first
> philosophy does that. Otherwise, the distinction between Aristotles physics
> and first philosophy is blurred, which is a strong sign that a
> phenomenological reading of Aristotle does not reflect what he intended.

What you say here is incoherent. The investigation of physical beings insofar as
they beings is not concerned with them insofar as they are in movement, i.e. the
phenomenon of movement of various kinds is not the focus and is bracketed off.

> AC: But how, then, to explain Aristotles treatment of movement in the Physics?
>
> It is true that Aristotle investigates motion per se in Physics III, and
> includes metaphysical principles (e.g., dynamis, energeia) in his very
> definition of motion. But at this point (i.e., Physics III), are these
> principles metaphysical yet? Remember that Aristotle explicitly states
> several times that if there were no immovable beings, there would not even
> be a science beyond physics at all, and the existence of an immovable being
> is not established until the very end of the Physics. Therefore, in Physics
> III, dynamis and energeia are not yet scientifically established as
> metaphysical principles at all. They are still understood physically - as
> principles of motion. Or rather, at this point, to-be means nothing more
> than to-be-mobile. But when an immovable being of pure actuality is
> discovered, then those concepts are scientifically established as more
> universal than just the physical, and therefore become meta-physical
> concepts. But until then, they are not yet established as metaphysical
> (though I have no doubt that Aristotle himself knew in Physics III what he
> was going to do in later chapters).

This sense of "meta-physical" as beyond the physical is completely unknown to
Aristotle. It is a later invention coined more with a view to Plato's so-called
'transcendent' 'theory of Ideas'.
No, to understand _dynamis_ and _energeia_ in the Physics, one needs to draw on
Met. Theta, for they are concepts of being from the start. Cf. Heidegger's
treatment of _kinaesis_ in his Pathmarks study (1939).

> >ME: That is a very restricted understanding of _archae_ in Aristotle. Even a
> >superficial reading of Met. Delta 1 makes that apparent, for there, several
> >different meanings of _archae_ are laid out. _Archae_ in Aristotle does not
> >just mean the beginning of a story!

_Archae_ in Aristotle is above all a mode of being.

> >ME: The allusion in this passage from SuZ you have cited is to Plato's
> >criticism of
> >those who merely "tell stories" about being, not to Aristotle.
>
> AC: Heidegger is criticizing the usual treatment of the problem, which merely
> traces beings back to some other being, by alluding to Platos criticism of
> certain pre-socratic philosophers (including Parmenides) whose philosophical
> explications of the phenomena look more like childrens stories with
> colorful characters like Friendship and Strife, Love and Enmity. So I know
> that Heidegger is alluding to Platos criticism, but I am saying that
> Aristotles investigation of first causes falls precisely into the very
> category he criticizes (i.e., tracing beings back to a being).

Heidegger does not read Aristotle in this way. And it would be a very poor
reading of Aristotle too which tried to ignore Aristotle's grand struggle with
the phenomenon of being.

> >ME: Now you're mixing up the Middle Ages and the modern age with the Greek.
> >Heidegger is highly critical of the translation of _ousia_ as "substance".
> >And "consciousness" is the problematic of the modern age.
>
> AC: Yes but the general point is that the denial that something is a "thing"
> can
> still retain the essential meaning of "thinghood" as something
> present-at-hand, even if this is not explicit. This is what I am saying
> about Aristotles dynamis. Dynamis is not a thing just as force was not
> considered a thing; but "ontologically one is still positing something whose
> being retains the meaning of what is present-at-hand, whether it does so
> explicitly or not."

Aristotle does not at all conceive _dynamis_ (or _energeia_) as present-at-hand.
Cf. below.

> >ME: In any case, you have not answered my question: Aren't you admitting that
>
> >the mode of being of a "principle" is different from the mode of being of a
> >thing?
>
> AC: As Aristotle understands "thing," yes, but not as Heidegger understands
> thinghood. I am saying that for Aristotle, a thing is an individual
> substance, so not all principles (like act and potency) are "things." But
> they still implicitly retain the meaning of something present-at-hand,
> because I am saying that Aristotle considered such principles to be specific
> sources of change or of being belonging to specific individual existing
> things. So this would still fall under the rubric of mere "thinghood" in
> Heideggers philosophy.

I disagree. _Dynamis_ does not have the mode of being as presence-at-hand. Cf.
below.

> >ME: Then you go along with an underlying meaning of being as presence in
> >Aristotle?
>
> AC: Yes, but the problem I am having is that Heidegger says this, but then
> also
> criticizes modern philosophies for treating the phenomena as if the mode of
> presence were primary. Wouldnt this criticism apply to Aristotle too, if
> the underlying meaning of being for Aristotle is presence? Wouldnt
> Aristotle then be just "telling a story" too?

The meaning of being as presence does not reduce merely to presence-at-hand
(Vorhandenheit). Absence, too, has to be taken into account in the specific way
in which Aristotle aims to capture it in his thinking, namely as _steraesis_,
but also as _dynamis_ and _energeia_

> >ME: If such reformulations are possible, doesn't that mean that no strict
> line
> >can
> >be drawn between what something is and how it is, at least in the sense of
> >ontic
> >on the one hand and non-ontic or ontological on the other? Isn't saying
> >what
> >something is (ontically) already an ontological determination (what it is)?
> >Put another way: If a human is a builder, doesn't that mean that the
> >_dynamis_
> >of the art of building resides in him and that is how he is, his _pos_ (the
> >second category)?
>
> AC: If the dynamis resides in him as a specific potency in an individual thing
>
> (him), then it is still conceived ontically as a power or ability of an
> individual thing. In other words, "how he is" would itself be interpreted
> ontically here - as something about some individual thing.

i) "How" is already an ontological determination, namely, the second category.
You will never find how lying around ontically.

ii) The how of _dynamis_ has a deeper, complex ontological structure which
Aristotle lays out in detail in Met. Theta (cf. below).

> >ME: Then we come back to the question of how _dynamis_ (and _energeia_ and
> >_entelecheia_) are to be understood.
> >
> >Aristotle says that we say all meanings of _dynamis_ _pros to auto eidos_,
> >i.e.
> >"with respect to the same image" (Met. Theta 1046a9) and that all
> >_dynameis_ are
> >_archai tines_, i.e. "some sort of principle" (1046a9). This guiding or
> >primary
> >meaning of _dynamis_ is _archae metabolaes en alloi ae haei allo_, i.e.
> >"starting point for a change, which starting point as such is in another
> >being
> >than the changing being itself or, if the originating being and the
> >changing
> >being are the same, they are so in different respects" (1046a10f). The
> >corresponding formulation in Met. Delta is _archae kinaeseos ae metabolaes
> >en
> >heteroi ae haei heteron_, i.e "starting point for a movement or change..."
> >(Met. Delta. 1019a15) (cf. Heidegger GA33:68)
> >
> >The examples of the art of building and the medical physician's art are
> >relevant
> >here for making clear what the definition means in a palpable, phenomenal
> >way.
>
> AC: I agree, but I dont see how this particular text supports or weakens an
> ontic reading. The latter also states that the starting point for a change
> is in another being, or if in the same being, they are so in different
> respect. According to the traditional reading, this simply means that no
> individual thing can move itself, unless it does so in a different respect
> than the way in which it is moved.

It is ALWAYS possible to miss the point and understand Aristotle in some ontic
way, which grossly underestimates this great thinker. This applies in particular
to Aristotle's treatment of _dynamis_, especially with regard to examples, which
are ALWAYS somehow merely ontic and in danger of being merely ontically
understood. The point is to learn to see the ontological structure in
Aristotle's very complex and precise formulations. That is where Heidegger's
interpretations of Aristotle are invaluable and superior to the traditional
readings, which invariably do not do Aristotle's formulations full justice
because they are blind. Through Heidegger's texts, WE can learn to read
Aristotle more deeply with a view to the phenomenon of being in its
manyfoldedness. That's what counts.

The prime, leading formulation of _dynamis_ is without any reference to ontic
things. It says: _archae metabolaes en alloi ae haei allo_ (1046a10f). This is
only the start. It is not the definition of a certain kind of _dynamis_ such as
a _dynamis tou poiein_ (active force), which is then followed by definitions of
other types of force such as _dynamis tou pathein_ (passive), but it is the
laying down of an ontological "ground-plan of the essence into which the full
contents first have to be inscribed" (Grundriss GA33:90).

Even in this first, leading determination of _dynamis_ as a kind of _archae_
there is in the very concept of _archae_ a reference to absence, for _archae_ is
only a starting-point for something to come, namely, the _metabolae_, the
change. So _dynamis_ in its very being is always referred to an absence.

Heidegger himself points out that Aristotle himself draws attention to an
ambiguity in _dynamis_ between understanding it ontologically (with respect to
the being of force) and ontically (as forces). Aristotle says _esti men hos mia
dynamis tou poiein kai paschein ..., esti d'hos allae_ (Met. Theta 1, 1046a19f)
"active and passive force is on the one hand, one, on the other, different".

Heidegger teases out this ambiguity:
i) "In the being of force as a force for making, the out-of-what of the
makeability is also included in a certain way; the out-of-what of the
makeability of something however is _dynamis tou paschein_ [passive force]. ..."
(GA33:105) This is the ontological structure "as one".

ii) "The being of force, from within itself, from within its own being and with
respect to this being, has separated in a originary way into two forces [an
active force and a passive force]" etc. (GA33:105) This is the ontic reading of
_dynamis_ as a union of reciprocal forces. But "the being of force as such is
this referral of _poiein_ to a _paschein_: the being of force is both as one"
(ibid.)

Furthermore, Aristotle also deals explicitly with the phenomenon of _steraesis_,
(withdrawal, lack, deficiency, i.e. forms of absence) with regard to _dynamis_
at 1046a29ff. Force is prone to un-force, im-potence. Heidegger comments:
"_dynamis_ is exposed to and trapped by _steraesis_ in an eminent sense"
(GA33:112).

You'd have to read Heidegger GA33 for more details if you ever want to get round
to it. The point here is, however, that
i) Heidegger's readings of Aristotle show up with admirable and detailed clarity
how Aristotle himself has the phenomenon of being clearly in view
ii) Aristotle's understanding of being is by no means nailed down by
presence-at-hand. In fact, Aristotle's discovery of the being of _dynamis_ and
_energeia_ sets him apart as being able to ontologically grasp absence from an
underlying sense of being as presence. The concept of _steraesis_ (withdrawal,
lack, deficiency) is crucial in this ontology.


> >ME:More than that, Heidegger himself could only win his understanding of the
> >being
> >of human being in the world through his critical engagement with Aristotle
> >above
> >all. To do this, he had to learn to read Aristotle as a phenomenological
> >thinker whose key concepts were won from everyday being-in-the-world.
>
> AC: But I dont see why this marking off had to entail reading Aristotle as a
> phenomenological thinker.

That's because you haven't studied how Heidegger painstakingly teases out the
phenomena in his readings of Aristotle, showing just how close to the phenomena
Aristotle thinks and how all his crucial concepts are concepts of being.
Your insistence, for example, on reading _dynamis_ ontically, is a case of
phenomenological blindness, a blindness you share with the tradition which
Heidegger set out to destruct, for it had led to the oblivion to being.

> AC This is how I see the manner in which Heidegger is
> marked off. First, I think Aristotles philosophy was essentially an ontic
> realism (i.e., even the question of being was essentially conceived
> ontically, as a tracing back of beings to a being) ultimately based on the
> unerring truth of scientific sight (both noetic and sensory sight). And
> precisely because it was ontic, the modern scientists and philosophers were
> later able to overturn it in light of new ontic discoveries which threw
> doubt upon the truth of scientific sight (both noetic and sensory),
> resulting in relativism, idealism, and ultimately transcendental idealism
> (Husserl), cut off from the very being of the world. And HERE Heidegger is
> marked off, with his groundbreaking proposal that scientific sight (whether
> intellectual or sensory) is not only just one kind of sight, but also is
> actually subordinate to another kind of sight, by which we are ALREADY in
> the world. This completely circumvents all the modern objections against
> traditional explications for how we encounter beings (i.e., traditional
> realisms), since all those problems were specifically with the unerring
> truth of scientific sight. That is how I see Heideggers philosophy as
> marking itself off from everything before him, and finally fulfilling the
> promise of phenomenology to get back to the things themselves.

I think this utterly underestimates Aristotle in his own right and also the
significance of his thinking for Heidegger ever learning to see the question of
being. Heidegger learns a great deal from Aristotle in how to bring the
phenomenon of being to light, even in surpassing Aristotle. Heidegger
rediscovers an Aristotle thinking about simple phenomena in the world, such as
making houses, uncovering their being.

"We have to first conquer what is self-evident again as something questionable.
...Aristotle, and any philosophy, remains closed to us if we do not surpass in
the direction of its own origins and questions. ... Aristotle thus has to be
surpassed, not in a forward direction in the sense of progress, but backwards in
the direction of a more originary disclosure of what he grasped." (GA33:81, 82).

Your characterization of Aristotle's thinking as "ontic realism" is just one of
these closed readings which has nothing to offer. Such a reading is only part of
the sterile game in the tradition played out between idealism and realism. Such
isms always signify the suffocation of genuine philosophy.

Michael
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-  artefact text and translation _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- made by art  _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ _-_-_-_-_-_- artefact-AT-webcom.com
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ Dr Michael Eldred -_-_-
_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_





     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---