Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2002 22:44:13 +0200
Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?


Cologne 23-Aug-2002

Anthony Crifasi schrieb Fri, 23 Aug 2002 15:17:04 +0000:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> > > >It's enough for me that Aristotle's Physics is an investigation > >of
> >the being of movement. Because that is obviously
> > > >what it is dealing with in the Physics.
> > >
> > > But then what would first philosophy be? The investigation of the being
> >of
> > > both movement and non-movement? But physics supposedly already
> >investigated
> > > the being of movement. Or would first philosophy be the investigation of
> > > non-movement only? But Aristotle explicitly says that "the first science
> >is
> > > concerned with the objects of physics to the extent that they are
> >beings"
> > > (1061b31), so first philosophy also investigates movement insofar as it
> >is a
> > > kind of being. But again, physics supposedly already investigated the
> >being
> > > of movement. The only possible interpretation, then, is that physics
> > > strictly speaking does not investigate the being of anything - only
> >first
> > > philosophy does that. Otherwise, the distinction between Aristotles
> >physics
> > > and first philosophy is blurred, which is a strong sign that a
> > > phenomenological reading of Aristotle does not reflect what he intended.
> >
> >What you say here is incoherent. The investigation of physical beings
> >insofar as
> >they beings is not concerned with them insofar as they are in movement,
> >i.e. the
> >phenomenon of movement of various kinds is not the focus and is bracketed
> >off.
>
> Yes, but the investigation of physical beings insofar as they are in
> movement cannot be the same as the investigation of the being of movement,
> because that would make first philosophy an investigation of either the
> being of non-movement, or the being of both movement and non-movement - both
> of which cannot be the case for the above reasons. In other words, physics
> cannot possibly investigate the being of anything, because if it did, then
> it would overlap with first philosophy, since first philosophy investigates
> the being of everything.

You seem hung up on taxonomy.

> > > It is true that Aristotle investigates motion per se in Physics III, and
> > > includes metaphysical principles (e.g., dynamis, energeia) in his very
> > > definition of motion. But at this point (i.e., Physics III), are these
> > > principles metaphysical yet? Remember that Aristotle explicitly states
> > > several times that if there were no immovable beings, there would not
> >even
> > > be a science beyond physics at all, and the existence of an immovable
> >being
> > > is not established until the very end of the Physics. Therefore, in
> >Physics
> > > III, dynamis and energeia are not yet scientifically established as
> > > metaphysical principles at all. They are still understood physically -
> >as
> > > principles of motion. Or rather, at this point, to-be means nothing more
> > > than to-be-mobile. But when an immovable being of pure actuality is
> > > discovered, then those concepts are scientifically established as more
> > > universal than just the physical, and therefore become meta-physical
> > > concepts. But until then, they are not yet established as metaphysical
> > > (though I have no doubt that Aristotle himself knew in Physics III what
> >he
> > > was going to do in later chapters).
> >
> >This sense of "meta-physical" as beyond the physical is completely unknown
> >to
> >Aristotle. It is a later invention coined more with a view to Plato's
> >so-called
> >'transcendent' 'theory of Ideas'.
> >
> >No, to understand _dynamis_ and _energeia_ in the Physics, one needs to
> >draw on
> >Met. Theta, for they are concepts of being from the start. Cf. Heidegger's
> >treatment of _kinaesis_ in his Pathmarks study (1939).
>
> But Aristotle himself explicitly states exactly what I said above - that the
> very existence of a universal first philosophy of being qua being depends
> specifically on whether or not there are any non-physical beings:
>
> "One might raise the question whether, if in any way, we should posit the
> science of being qua being as a universal science or not. Now each of the
> mathematical sciences is concerned with some one definite genus, but
> universal mathematics is common to all. If, then, natural ousiai are the
> first of things, physics will be the first of the sciences, too; but if
> there is another nature or ousia which is separate and immovable, the
> science of it, too, must be distinct from and prior to physics, and also
> universal by being prior." (Met. 1064b7-14)
>
> This is precisely what I said above - that it is precisely an immovable
> ousia which makes first philosophy a universal science distinct from
> physics. That means that before an immovable ousia is scientifically
> discovered, there is literally no such thing as a metaphysical concept yet,
> since such concepts cannot possibly be established as metaphysical if the
> very existence of any science higher than physics is not yet established at
> all.
>
> >_Archae_ in Aristotle is above all a mode of being.
>
> But Aristotle explicitly says that physics also investigates archae
> (184a11), which would be impossible if it were a mode of being, since that
> would make it a metaphysical investigation for the reason I gave earlier -
> it would overlap with first philosophy.
>
> >Heidegger does not read Aristotle in this way. And it would be a very poor
> >reading of Aristotle too which tried to ignore Aristotle's grand struggle
> >with
> >the phenomenon of being.
>
> I am saying the particular interpretation of this struggle which you are
> defending cannot be what Aristotle intended because it is not consistent
> with Aristotles description of the specific way in which physics and first
> philosophy are distinguished.
>
> > > the general point is that the denial that something is a "thing"
> > > can still retain the essential meaning of "thinghood" as something
> > > present-at-hand, even if this is not explicit. This is what I am saying
> > > about Aristotles dynamis. Dynamis is not a thing just as force was not
> > > considered a thing; but "ontologically one is still positing something
> >whose
> > > being retains the meaning of what is present-at-hand, whether it does so
> > > explicitly or not."
> >
> >Aristotle does not at all conceive _dynamis_ (or _energeia_) as
> >present-at-hand.
> >Cf. below.
> >
> >The meaning of being as presence does not reduce merely to presence-at-hand
> >(Vorhandenheit). Absence, too, has to be taken into account in the specific
> >way
> >in which Aristotle aims to capture it in his thinking, namely as
> >_steraesis_,
> >but also as _dynamis_ and _energeia_
>
> I thought presence-at-hand also included ontic ways of conceiving absence -
> for example, "potential energy" or "empty space".
>
> > > If the dynamis resides in him as a specific potency in an individual
> >thing
> > > (him), then it is still conceived ontically as a power or ability of an
> > > individual thing. In other words, "how he is" would itself be
> >interpreted
> > > ontically here - as something about some individual thing.
> >
> >i) "How" is already an ontological determination, namely, the second
> >category.
> >You will never find how lying around ontically.
> >
> >ii) The how of _dynamis_ has a deeper, complex ontological structure which
> >Aristotle lays out in detail in Met. Theta (cf. below).
> >
> >It is ALWAYS possible to miss the point and understand Aristotle in some
> >ontic
> >way, which grossly underestimates this great thinker. This applies in
> >particular
> >to Aristotle's treatment of _dynamis_, especially with regard to examples,
> >which
> >are ALWAYS somehow merely ontic and in danger of being merely ontically
> >understood. The point is to learn to see the ontological structure in
> >Aristotle's very complex and precise formulations. That is where
> >Heidegger's
> >interpretations of Aristotle are invaluable and superior to the traditional
> >readings, which invariably do not do Aristotle's formulations full justice
> >because they are blind. Through Heidegger's texts, WE can learn to read
> >Aristotle more deeply with a view to the phenomenon of being in its
> >manyfoldedness. That's what counts.
> >
> >The prime, leading formulation of _dynamis_ is without any reference to
> >ontic
> >things. It says: _archae metabolaes en alloi ae haei allo_ (1046a10f). This
> >is
> >only the start. It is not the definition of a certain kind of _dynamis_
> >such as
> >a _dynamis tou poiein_ (active force), which is then followed by
> >definitions of
> >other types of force such as _dynamis tou pathein_ (passive), but it is the
> >laying down of an ontological "ground-plan of the essence into which the
> >full
> >contents first have to be inscribed" (Grundriss GA33:90).
> >
> >Even in this first, leading determination of _dynamis_ as a kind of
> >_archae_
> >there is in the very concept of _archae_ a reference to absence, for
> >_archae_ is
> >only a starting-point for something to come, namely, the _metabolae_, the
> >change. So _dynamis_ in its very being is always referred to an absence.
> >
> >Heidegger himself points out that Aristotle himself draws attention to an
> >ambiguity in _dynamis_ between understanding it ontologically (with respect
> >to
> >the being of force) and ontically (as forces). Aristotle says _esti men hos
> >mia
> >dynamis tou poiein kai paschein ..., esti d'hos allae_ (Met. Theta 1,
> >1046a19f)
> >"active and passive force is on the one hand, one, on the other,
> >different".
> >
> >Heidegger teases out this ambiguity:
> >i) "In the being of force as a force for making, the out-of-what of the
> >makeability is also included in a certain way; the out-of-what of the
> >makeability of something however is _dynamis tou paschein_ [passive force].
> >..."
> >(GA33:105) This is the ontological structure "as one".
> >
> >ii) "The being of force, from within itself, from within its own being and
> >with
> >respect to this being, has separated in a originary way into two forces [an
> >active force and a passive force]" etc. (GA33:105) This is the ontic
> >reading of
> >_dynamis_ as a union of reciprocal forces. But "the being of force as such
> >is
> >this referral of _poiein_ to a _paschein_: the being of force is both as
> >one"
> >(ibid.)
>
> Ok, but how precisely is that reading different from the traditional
> interpretation of this as one general definition of dynamis which applies in
> both cases? What precisely is new here?

Read on...                 in GA33.

> >Furthermore, Aristotle also deals explicitly with the phenomenon of
> >_steraesis_,
> >(withdrawal, lack, deficiency, i.e. forms of absence) with regard to
> >_dynamis_
> >at 1046a29ff. Force is prone to un-force, im-potence. Heidegger comments:
> >"_dynamis_ is exposed to and trapped by _steraesis_ in an eminent sense"
> >(GA33:112).
>
> Ok, but again how precisely does that differ from the traditional
> interpretation of this steraesis as a privation of potency?
>
> >You'd have to read Heidegger GA33 for more details if you ever want to get
> >round
> >to it. The point here is, however, that
> >i) Heidegger's readings of Aristotle show up with admirable and detailed
> >clarity
> >how Aristotle himself has the phenomenon of being clearly in view
> >ii) Aristotle's understanding of being is by no means nailed down by
> >presence-at-hand. In fact, Aristotle's discovery of the being of _dynamis_
> >and
> >_energeia_ sets him apart as being able to ontologically grasp absence from
> >an
> >underlying sense of being as presence. The concept of _steraesis_
> >(withdrawal,
> >lack, deficiency) is crucial in this ontology.
>
> But I still dont see precisely how that sets him apart. For example,
> Aquinas and many other traditional interpreters of Aristotle also say that
> privation (as a kind of non-being) is grasped through positive actual being,
> and that potency is grasped through actuality. What exactly is it about the
> reading you describe that sets Heidegger apart?
>
> Anthony Crifasi
>
> > > But I dont see why this marking off had to entail reading Aristotle as a
> > > phenomenological thinker.
> >
> >That's because you haven't studied how Heidegger painstakingly teases out
> >the
> >phenomena in his readings of Aristotle, showing just how close to the
> >phenomena
> >Aristotle thinks and how all his crucial concepts are concepts of being.
> >Your insistence, for example, on reading _dynamis_ ontically, is a case of
> >phenomenological blindness, a blindness you share with the tradition which
> >Heidegger set out to destruct, for it had led to the oblivion to being.
> >
> > > AC This is how I see the manner in which Heidegger is
> > > marked off. First, I think Aristotles philosophy was essentially an
> >ontic
> > > realism (i.e., even the question of being was essentially conceived
> > > ontically, as a tracing back of beings to a being) ultimately based on
> >the
> > > unerring truth of scientific sight (both noetic and sensory sight). And
> > > precisely because it was ontic, the modern scientists and philosophers
> >were
> > > later able to overturn it in light of new ontic discoveries which threw
> > > doubt upon the truth of scientific sight (both noetic and sensory),
> > > resulting in relativism, idealism, and ultimately transcendental
> >idealism
> > > (Husserl), cut off from the very being of the world. And HERE Heidegger
> >is
> > > marked off, with his groundbreaking proposal that scientific sight
> >(whether
> > > intellectual or sensory) is not only just one kind of sight, but also is
> > > actually subordinate to another kind of sight, by which we are ALREADY
> >in
> > > the world. This completely circumvents all the modern objections against
> > > traditional explications for how we encounter beings (i.e., traditional
> > > realisms), since all those problems were specifically with the unerring
> > > truth of scientific sight. That is how I see Heideggers philosophy as
> > > marking itself off from everything before him, and finally fulfilling
> >the
> > > promise of phenomenology to get back to the things themselves.
> >
> >I think this utterly underestimates Aristotle in his own right and also the
> >significance of his thinking for Heidegger ever learning to see the
> >question of
> >being. Heidegger learns a great deal from Aristotle in how to bring the
> >phenomenon of being to light, even in surpassing Aristotle. Heidegger
> >rediscovers an Aristotle thinking about simple phenomena in the world, such
> >as
> >making houses, uncovering their being.
> >
> >"We have to first conquer what is self-evident again as something
> >questionable.
> >...Aristotle, and any philosophy, remains closed to us if we do not surpass
> >in
> >the direction of its own origins and questions. ... Aristotle thus has to
> >be
> >surpassed, not in a forward direction in the sense of progress, but
> >backwards in
> >the direction of a more originary disclosure of what he grasped." (GA33:81,
> >82).
> >
> >Your characterization of Aristotle's thinking as "ontic realism" is just
> >one of
> >these closed readings which has nothing to offer. Such a reading is only
> >part of
> >the sterile game in the tradition played out between idealism and realism.
> >Such
> >isms always signify the suffocation of genuine philosophy.
>

Just as it is possible to read _Sein und Zeit_ ontically until the cows come
home and miss the point entirely regarding the much vaunted question of being,
it is perfectly possible to tread along the ruts of traditional readings of
Aristotle which are present in EVERY standard translation of (and commentary on)
this thinker. Perhaps you too are one of those who don't get the ontological
dimension of SuZ, the dimension of _alaetheia_?

To experience anything else, Anthony, you would have to get around to reading
some of Heidegger's phenomenological interpretations and see if you are inspired
and learn anything at all from them. I've already thrown you enough tit-bits.
Heidegger's lectures are much richer and detailed and more persuasive than I
could be sending out e-mails. GA33 Met. Theta 1-3, the lectures from Summer
Semester 1931, is a good place to start.

Michael
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