File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2002/heidegger.0208, message 328


Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2002 12:47:29 +0200
Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?


Cologne 26-Aug-2002

Anthony Crifasi schrieb Sun, 25 Aug 2002 22:53:50 +0000:

> Michael Eldred wrote:
>
> >This understanding of "metaphysical" as 'beyond the physical' is foreign to
> >Aristotle. It's a later invention influenced by the Christian appropriation
> >of Greek philosophy.
>
> AC: Cf. below
>
> > > You have disputed several translations in the course of our discussion,
> > > but as far as I remember, you have not disputed the following:
> > >
> > > 1) Aristotle says that first philosophy studies everything insofar as it
> >is
> > > a being (which means that no science besides first philosophy can
> > > investigate the being of anything without overlapping with first
> > > philosophy).
> >
> >ME: "which means" does not follow. First philosophy investigates whether
> there
> >is an
> >"unmoving being", the being of any such being, and beings qua beings in
> >general
> >(but not in that order). Physical philosophy (_philosophia physikae_ (Met.
> >Epsilon 1 1026a19) investigates those beings which "have a principle of
> >movement
> >within themselves" (Met. Kappa 7 106415), i.e. beings insofar as they are
> >self-moving beings. It is therefore not a general philosophy, but is an
> >investigation of self-moving beings in their being and therefore also an
> >investigation of the phenomenon of movement as a mode of being.
>
> AC: You say three things here:
> 1) First philosophy investigates whether there is an "unmoving being, the
> being of any such being, and beings qua beings in general."
> 2) Physics investigates "beings insofar as they are self-moving beings."
> 3) Physics investigates "self-moving beings in their being."
>
> So if first philosophy includes the investigation of "beings qua beings in
> general," and "beings qua beings in general" includes the being of
> self-moving beings, then how can you maintain #3 without immediately making
> first philosophy and physics overlap? The source of the problem will remain
> as long as you maintain that physics investigates anything at all in its
> being - whether the being of self-moving beings, or the being of movement
> itself, or whatever.

You need some lessons in formal logic. Investigating something, i.e. beings with
an intrinsic principle of movement, with regard to this self-movement is
different from investigating them simply with regard to their being in general.
And there is anyway nothing in Aristotle prohibiting an overlap. On the
contrary, the example he provides of the branches of mathematics, geometry and
astonomy, employing mathematics in general, shows that such overlapping and
interpenetration is not only admissible but entirely necessary.

> > > AC: 2) Aristotle says that there would be no science higher than physics
> >if
> > > there were no immovable beings (which means that the concepts involved
> >in
> > > his treatment of motion in Physics III are not yet established as
> > > metaphysical, even though they later will be).
> >
> >Again, this understanding of "metaphysical" is foreign to Aristotle. The
> >word
> >does not even occur in Aristotle.
>
> AC: Again, then substitute "first philosophy" for "metaphysics." But are you
> denying that Aristotle is saying here that the very existence of a science
> higher than physics depends specifically on the existence of immovable
> beings?

Sure I am. The investigation can turn out in the negative, i.e. that there is no
_ousia akinaetos_, and it would still be (a part of) first philosophy.

> AC: Because if not, then I do not see how you can possibly deny that
> Aristotle is using "first philosophy" precisely in the sense of
> "metaphysical" that I am defending. If no immovable beings, then no science
> higher than physics. It is that simple.

It is simply not that simple.

> AC: How can the following possibly be
> interpreted in any other way: "if there were no beings other than those
> formed by nature, physics would be the first science; but if there is an
> immovable being, this would be prior, and the science of it would be first
> philosophy" (1026a28-31).

Then one would have to be content with a modest 'negative theological
philosophy'. Aristotle, to his great credit -- which marks him off from all his
later Islamic and Christian commentators/kidnappers --, at least leaves the
question of whether there is a godly being open.

> > > AC: As for SuZ, there is one critical point which makes it impossible to
> > > interpret anything else in the work in terms of traditional ontic
> >categories
> > > - his insistence that circumspection has a different kind of sight which
> > > cannot be reduced to scientific sight (either noetic or sensory).
> >
> >This does not hinder the ontic misunderstanding of SuZ. Witness all the
> >readings
> >of this tractatus which miss the point.
>
> AC: Any misunderstanding of Heideggers distinction between scientific sight
> and
> circumspective sight will immediately contradict Heideggers explicit claim
> that circumspective sight is not ultimately based on scientific sight
> (whether noetic or sensory), because such misunderstandings inevitably try
> to somehow base circumspective sight on either sensory or noetic sight at
> bottom. Regarding Aristotle, however, I have yet to see any explicit text
> which contradicts my reading; and in addition, there are least two explicit
> texts which I think contradict your reading - namely, that first philosophy
> is the study of the being of everything, and that there would be no science
> beyond physics if there were no immovable beings.

You don't see anything, Anthony, not even that you are concocting supposed
contradictions and dilemmas. You seem to have imbibed too much Thomas Aquinas,
much to your detriment. I am not going to repeat myself anymore. Your reading of
SuZ seems just as narrowly blinkered and pinched as your reading of Aristotle.

> >ME: There is no "explicit statement" of anything in Aristotle or anywhere
> else
> >without the understanding that interprets the text.
> >
> >I don't have any problems with Aristotle's taxonomy, and it is in any case
> >secondary. What is primary is to understand the depths of Aristotle's
> >investigations of the being of beings, whether in general or in a
> >restricted
> >region, and to learn from Heidegger's phenomenological interpretations of
> >these
> >investigations which, at least in my estimation, are quite astounding. But
> >we
> >are speaking here of ghosts because you do not know Heidegger's
> >phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle.
>
> AC: It is one thing to say that Aristotles taxonomy is secondary, but it is
> quite another thing to propose something primary which actually contradicts
> his taxonomy. I assume you would indeed have a problem with that. I dont
> know whether the understanding of physics as a study of something (anything)
> in its being is absolutely essential to your reading, but if it is, then how
> can it possibly not intrude upon first philosophy as the investigation of
> EVERYTHING insofar as it is a being?

I am not concocting artificial distinctions and prohibitions from Aristotle's
division of his subject matter like you are. The prime concern of the texts
collected under the title 'Metaphysics' is the investigation of the beings qua
beings. That is the focus of Aristotle's thinking, and it is high time to free
him of the ballast of centuries-old Christian and Islamic readings which are
piously obsessed with some sort of godly creator.

According to Aristotle, there could be around fifty-five godly prime movers, for
all he cares. He notes in this regard:
_to men oun plaethos ton sphairon esto tosouton, hoste kai tas ousias kai tas
archas tas akinaetous kai tas aisthaetas tosautas eulogon hypolabein - to gar
anankaion apheistho tois ischyroterois legein_ (Met. Lambda 8 1074a14ff)
"Accordingly the amount of spheres is so many, so that also it is well said to
suppose also so many unmoving and perceptible beings and governing starting
points; to speak of necessity here however is left to those who are stronger."
Wonderful irony.

Michael
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