Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2002 01:22:50 +0000


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > >First philosophy investigates whether there is an "unmoving being",
> > >the being of any such being, and beings qua beings in general
> > >(but not in that order). Physical philosophy (_philosophia physikae_ 
>(Met.
> > >Epsilon 1 1026a19) investigates those beings which "have a principle of
> > >movement
> > >within themselves" (Met. Kappa 7 106415), i.e. beings insofar as they 
>are
> > >self-moving beings. It is therefore not a general philosophy, but is an
> > >investigation of self-moving beings in their being and therefore also 
>an
> > >investigation of the phenomenon of movement as a mode of being.
> >
> > AC: You say three things here:
> > 1) First philosophy investigates whether there is an "unmoving being, 
>the
> > being of any such being, and beings qua beings in general."
> > 2) Physics investigates "beings insofar as they are self-moving beings."
> > 3) Physics investigates "self-moving beings in their being."
> >
> > So if first philosophy includes the investigation of "beings qua beings 
>in
> > general," and "beings qua beings in general" includes the being of
> > self-moving beings, then how can you maintain #3 without immediately 
>making
> > first philosophy and physics overlap? The source of the problem will 
>remain
> > as long as you maintain that physics investigates anything at all in its
> > being - whether the being of self-moving beings, or the being of 
>movement
> > itself, or whatever.
>
>You need some lessons in formal logic. Investigating something, i.e. beings 
>with
>an intrinsic principle of movement, with regard to this self-movement is
>different from investigating them simply with regard to their being in 
>general.

I will take those logic lessons if you can find any place in my reply above 
where I ever claimed that those two things were the same. My argument was 
not with your statement that physics investigates self-moving beings "with 
regard to this self-movement" (#2 above), but your statement that it 
investigates "self-moving beings IN THEIR BEING" (#3 above). THAT is what 
overlaps with first philosophy as the investigation of being qua being in 
general (which includes the being of self-moving beings).

>And there is anyway nothing in Aristotle prohibiting an overlap. On the
>contrary, the example he provides of the branches of mathematics, geometry 
>and
>astonomy, employing mathematics in general, shows that such overlapping and
>interpenetration is not only admissible but entirely necessary.

The geometry and astronomy) do not overlap with mathematics in general - for 
example:

"Now as regards the number of locomotions, this should be the concern of the 
mathematical science which is closest to philosophy, and this is astronomy; 
for it is this science which is concerned with the investigation of sensible 
but eternal beings, while the others, such as arithmetic and geometry, are 
not concerned with any beings."

> > AC: Again, then substitute "first philosophy" for "metaphysics." But are 
>you
> > denying that Aristotle is saying here that the very existence of a 
>science
> > higher than physics depends specifically on the existence of immovable
> > beings?
>
>Sure I am. The investigation can turn out in the negative, i.e. that there 
>is no
>_ousia akinaetos_, and it would still be (a part of) first philosophy.

But it would then be nothing other than physics itself. Aristotle explicitly 
says that if there were no immovable beings, then the first science would 
actually be physics.

>It is simply not that simple.
>
> > AC: How can the following possibly be
> > interpreted in any other way: "if there were no beings other than those
> > formed by nature, physics would be the first science; but if there is an
> > immovable being, this would be prior, and the science of it would be 
>first
> > philosophy" (1026a28-31).
>
>Then one would have to be content with a modest 'negative theological
>philosophy'. Aristotle, to his great credit -- which marks him off from all 
>his
>later Islamic and Christian commentators/kidnappers --, at least leaves the
>question of whether there is a godly being open.

At this point yes, but he later answers the question in the affirmative, so 
the theological philosophy does not turn out to be a merely modest negative 
one.

>You don't see anything, Anthony, not even that you are concocting supposed
>contradictions and dilemmas. You seem to have imbibed too much Thomas 
>Aquinas,
>much to your detriment. I am not going to repeat myself anymore. Your 
>reading of
>SuZ seems just as narrowly blinkered and pinched as your reading of 
>Aristotle.
>
> > AC: It is one thing to say that Aristotles taxonomy is secondary, but it 
>is
> > quite another thing to propose something primary which actually 
>contradicts
> > his taxonomy. I assume you would indeed have a problem with that. I dont
> > know whether the understanding of physics as a study of something 
>(anything)
> > in its being is absolutely essential to your reading, but if it is, then 
>how
> > can it possibly not intrude upon first philosophy as the investigation 
>of
> > EVERYTHING insofar as it is a being?
>
>I am not concocting artificial distinctions and prohibitions from 
>Aristotle's
>division of his subject matter like you are. The prime concern of the texts
>collected under the title 'Metaphysics' is the investigation of the beings 
>qua
>beings. That is the focus of Aristotle's thinking, and it is high time to 
>free
>him of the ballast of centuries-old Christian and Islamic readings which 
>are
>piously obsessed with some sort of godly creator.

I have no problem with characterizing the "prime concern" of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics as the investigation of being qua being. Aquinas himself says 
that that is the prime concern of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, so what you say 
here is perfectly in accord with those "piously obsessed" Christian 
readings. But that does not change the fact that Aristotle explicitly states 
that without immovable beings, the first science would be physics, so that 
there would be no science higher than physics if there were no immovable 
beings. That means that at least a PART of first philosophy is devoted 
specifically to the question of the existence of immovable beings, which 
Aristotle answers in the affirmative.

>According to Aristotle, there could be around fifty-five godly prime 
>movers, for
>all he cares. He notes in this regard:
>_to men oun plaethos ton sphairon esto tosouton, hoste kai tas ousias kai 
>tas
>archas tas akinaetous kai tas aisthaetas tosautas eulogon hypolabein - to 
>gar
>anankaion apheistho tois ischyroterois legein_ (Met. Lambda 8 1074a14ff)
>"Accordingly the amount of spheres is so many, so that also it is well said 
>to
>suppose also so many unmoving and perceptible beings and governing starting
>points; to speak of necessity here however is left to those who are 
>stronger."
>Wonderful irony.

The only point I was making is that there has to be at least some being 
which is immovable if the first science is to be anything other than 
physics. Whether there is only one such being or fifty-five does not matter. 
All that matters is that Aristotle answers the "if" in the affirmative, so 
that according to his hypothetical, the first science must then be other 
than physics.

Anthony Crifasi

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