Subject: Re: "metaphysical and not phenomenology"?
Date: Mon, 05 Aug 2002 17:06:23 +0000


Michael Eldred wrote:

> > But the point is that insofar as metaphysics considers the being of 
>beings,
> > the domain is NOT restricted at all, since everything (mobile AND 
>immobile)
> > is a being:
>
>"mobile" is a lousy rendering of _kinaetos_ since it signifies only 
>_kinaesis
>kata phora_.
>
> > "physics investigates the attributes and the principles of things qua in
> > motion and not qua being. But we said that the first science IS 
>CONCERNED
> > WITH THE OBJECTS OF PHYSICS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE BEINGS, and not 
>qua
> > some other thing." (1061b29-32)
>
>Precisely.
>
> > So unless he is blatantly contradicting himself, the metaphysical
> > investigation of first causes cannot possibly be the same as the 
>analysis of
> > the being of beings, since he explicitly excludes physical beings from 
>the
> > former investigation (1026a8-23), while explicitly including them in the
> > latter here. So first philosophy has TWO enterprises: (1) the analysis 
>of
> > being qua being, which includes physical things (but only insofar as 
>they
> > are beings), and (2) the investigation of first causes, which excludes
> > physical things (1026a8-23), since the first causes are not mobile.
>
>The unmoving "first causes" are only of interest insofar as they are 
>postulated
>as the governing origins of _to on katholou_, i.e. beings taken as a whole,
>including physical beings.

Yes, but the point is that they are not the governing origins in the 
categorial sense, since the latter sense is what is investigated in the 
OTHER metaphysical enterprise - the analysis of being qua being and the 
various modes of being. Therefore they are the governing origins of beings 
in the ontic causal sense, and this cannot possibly be phenomenological.

> > So according to Aristotle himself, it is NOT the task of physics or
> > mathematics to consider the BEING of their objects.
>
>Of course not. The sciences of mathematics and physics (et al) presuppose 
>an
>understanding of the being of their specific subjects of investigation. 
>They
>take the being of the beings they investigate unquestioningly for granted.
>Metaphysics goes back deeper in asking for the _being_ of, for instance,
>mathematical and physical entities.
>
> > AC: That task is reserved
> > for "the first science," which is first philosophy. Mathematics 
>considers
> > its objects qua continuous, while physics considers its objects qua 
>mobile.
>
>And the metaphysics of mathematics and the metaphysics of physics uncover, 
>for
>instance, the MODES OF BEING called continuity (_synechaes_), sequence
>(_ephexaes_) and movement (_kinaesis_), change ( _metabolae_), alteration
>(_alloiosis_), etc.. Aristotle provides such a metaphysics. No metaphysics,
>physics or mathematics after Aristotle has ever approached the depth of
>phenomenological investigation of these modes of being.
>
>Look up, for instance, Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of
>Aristotle's treatment of mathematical entities in GA19 Sophist. And, for 
>the
>sake of disappointment, read a standard interpretation of the same 
>Aristotelean
>texts.
>
> > AC: Physics is therefore concerned with the principles of motion, not 
>the
> > principles of being. It may turn out that the principles of motion (such 
>as
> > form and matter) are also principles of the being of physical things, 
>but
> > that question is answered by metaphysics, not by physics.
>
>The key to understanding Aristotle is to understand the categories and
>_dynamis_/_energeia_/_entelecheia_ as the governing MODES OF BEING in all
>domains of beings.

Yes, but that is not the same as the other metaphysical enterprise - the 
investigation of first causes, again because the latter excludes physical 
beings while his analysis of the being of beings does not. The metaphysical 
investigation of first causes, therefore, cannot possibly be 
phenomenological in any sense whatsoever, since it is an ontic search for an 
cause, not an analysis of modes of being.

>For this reason, they permeate Aristotle's thinking entirely,
>and insofar, _all_ of Aristotle's thinking is metaphysical. The sense of 
>being
>underlying all the categories as well as _dynamis_/_energeia_/_entelecheia_ 
>is
>presence, including its negation, absence (cf. _steraesis_). That is why 
>the
>leading signification of being in Aristotle is _ousia_, beingness as 
>presence.

Yes, and what does Heidegger do with the mode of presence? He subordinates 
it because it is not how beings are encountered for the most part. So 
Aristotle’s metaphysics is not Heideggerian on two counts: (1) Aristotle’s 
metaphysical investigation of first causes is purely an ontic search for 
cause, and is therefore not phenomenological in any sense whatsoever, 
Husserlian or Heideggerian, and (2) his OTHER metaphysical enterprise (the 
analysis of being qua being and the governing modes of being) proceeds in 
the mode of presence, so that to the extent that it is phenomenological, it 
is closer to Husserl’s phenomenology than to Heidegger’s.

Anthony Crifasi

>In everyday Greek in Aristotle's time, _ousia_ meant simply 'estate', i.e. 
>all
>the property and possessions owned by somebody and thus present and 
>available
>for use. The _hypokeimenon_ is that which literally 'lies before' and
>'underlies' and is available in presence.
>
>Even in English there is still a trace of being in the word 'estate' [OF. 
>estat
>(= Pr. estat, Sp. and Pg. estado, It. stato), ad. L. status state, f. 
>sta-re to
>stand.], which means a state of being which has come to stand in presence. 
>In
>German, the adequate translation of _ousia_ is Anwesen, which means both
>'estate' and simply, 'presencing'.
>
>The _logos_, too, has to be understood from the categories as ways in which
>beings are addressed (_katagorein_) and brought to stand in presence. I.e. 
>logic
>can never be the basis of philosophy, despite the overbearing prejudice of 
>the
>philosophical tradition to the present day.

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