File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2002/heidegger.0210, message 35


Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2002 21:15:13 +0100
Subject: <fwd> Hyper-Heidegger


Hyper-Heidegger

by Arthur Kroker



  Uncanny Thinking
  ----------------

  Martin Heidegger is the theorist par excellence of the digital
  future.

  Probably because Heidegger's was a deeply embittered vision of the
  ruins of modernity to the extent that he wrote in a spirit of
  desolation about the "gods having abandoned the earth," retreating
  back into an impenetrable shroud of "forgetfulness," Heidegger was
  the one thinker who did not shrink from thinking through to its
  deepest depths the unfolding horizon of a culture of "pure
  technicity." While Heidegger began his writing with a deconstruction
  of conventional ontology in _Being and Time_, his lasting gift to the
  tradition of critical metaphysics was to perform in advance an
  intense, unforgiving and unremitting deconstruction of his own life
  in _The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
  Solitude_. [1] After the latter book, having nowhere to go other than
  to wander in the shadowland between a reflection on Being that in
  its retreat into forgetfulness was admittedly impossible to
  concretely realize and a future driven forward by the "will to
  technicity," Heidegger was the one thinker who literally
  deconstructed his own project to a point of self-nihilation. With
  nothing to save, no hope to dispense, and no critique that did not
  fall immediately into the dry ashes of cultural cynicism, Heidegger's
  fate was to make of his own life of thought a simulacrum of the will
  to technology. More than Marx who remained wedded to the biblical
  dream of proletarian redemption and more so than Nietzsche who
  countered the nihilism of the "will to power" with the possibilities
  of reclaimed human subjects as their own "dancing stars," Heidegger
  was the one thinker without hope in the dispensations of history.

  Not broken by the vicissitudes of history, Heidegger was and is the
  contemporary historical moment. In his thought, the new century is
  already "overcome" at the very moment of its inception. Not overcome
  in the sense of abandonment, but overcome to the extent that
  Heidegger summons up in his thinking the anxieties, fears, and
  methods of the will to technicity. A futurist without faith, a
  metaphysician without the will to believe, a philosopher opposed to
  reason, Heidegger is the perfect representative of the technological
  trajectory at the outer edge of its parabolic curvature through the
  dark spaces of the post-human future.

  If it be objected that we should not read Heidegger because of his
  political complicity with German fascism, I would enter the dissent
  that Heidegger's momentary harmony, but harmony nonetheless, with the
  politics of fascism makes of him a representative guide to the next
  phase of fascism -- virtual fascism. More than liberal critics who
  fault Heidegger for taking advantage of the fascist upsurge in
  pre-War Germany to gain a University rectorship as well as to betray
  his philosophical mentor -- Husserl -- I would go further, noting
  that in breaking with National Socialism, Heidegger did not refuse
  fascism on the grounds of an oppositional political ethics, but
  because its strictly political determination in the historically
  specific form of National Socialism in the Germany of the 1930s and
  40s was not a sufficiently "pure" type to fully represent the
  metaphysical possibility that was the German "folk." [2] For
  Heidegger, National Socialists were not sufficiently self-conscious
  metaphysically, too trapped in the particularities of politics, to be
  capable finally of realizing the ontology of the fascist moment:
  delivering the metaphysical possibilities of (German) folk-community
  into concrete historical realization. To the tribal consciousness of
  fascism, Heidegger remained a metaphysician of dasein. Ironically,
  his prescience concerning the fading away of second-order (National
  Socialist) fascism before the coming to be of first-order (virtual)
  fascism ultimately made of his thought a historical
  incommensurability: too metaphysically pure for the direct action,
  "hand to mouth" politics of German fascism; and yet too radically
  deconstructive of the claims of technological rationality to find its
  home in liberalism. "Homeless thought."

  An idealist in the tradition of German nationalism, Heidegger's fate
  was to be that of the faithless thinker, ultimately disloyal to
  German fascism because it was not sufficiently metaphysical, yet
  unable to reconcile himself to western liberalism because it was, in
  his estimation, the political self-consciousness of technicity. For
  this reason, Heidegger ended the war digging ditches, having been
  ousted by German university authorities acting at the behest of state
  fascism as the University of Freiburg's "most dispensable Professor."
  It is also for this reason that Heidegger in the post-war period was,
  except for a brief period before retirement, expelled from university
  teaching. Always a metaphysician, always in transition to the next
  historical stage of the "will," always in rebellion against the
  impurities of compromised philosophical vision, Heidegger's mind was
  fully attuned to the restless stirrings of the will as its broke from
  its twin moorings in ethnic fundamentalism and industrial capitalism
  and began to project itself into world-history in the pure
  metaphysical form of the "will to will." [3] Beyond time and space,
  breaking through the skin of human culture, respecting no national
  borders, an "overcoming" that first and foremost overcomes its own
  nostalgic yearnings for a final appearance in the theatre of
  representation, the will to will, what Heidegger would come to call
  the culture of "pure technicity," was the gleam on the post-human
  horizon, and Heidegger was its most faithful reporter. In Heidegger's
  writings, the main historical trends of the 21st century have their
  prophet and doomsayer.

  Heidegger's mind lies between past and future.



  Technology as a "Danger" and a "Saving Power"
  ---------------------------------------------

  If Heidegger could write so eloquently and think so mystically about
  that which in the present era is so unmentionable -- Being -- , if
  Heidegger could say that Being "comes into presence" in the mode of
  "enframing," the animating impulse of technology, if he could speak
  of Being as containing both a "danger" and a "saving power" and speak
  evocatively of the "turning" so necessary to transform the danger
  into the saving power, perhaps that is because Heidegger's thought is
  itself a "turning," a "lightning-flash" which illuminates human
  beings to themselves, and which does so not by surrendering to
  calculative thinking or by retreating to spurious forms of idealism,
  but by looking deeply and meditatively into the danger of technology,
  by "thinking" technology to its roots in metaphysics.

  Hyper-Heidegger, then, a thinker who makes of himself both a "danger"
  and a "saving-power," who makes of the effort of reading Heidegger
  both a form of "unconcealedness" and "openness." If Heidegger could
  dismiss as illusory thinking the pretension that "man has mastery of
  technology," claiming instead the opposite that human beings are set
  in place as a condition of possibility for the development of
  technology, [4] if Heidegger could only speak of the human essence in
  terms of its deep entanglement with the question of technology, that
  is because Heidegger's thought is the "clearing" that he thought he
  was only prophesying. To read Heidegger is not so much a matter of
  meditating on the "question of technology," but the much more
  dangerous possibility of becoming entangled with the question of
  Heidegger. Not Heidegger as a historically proximate philosopher with
  a certain biography as a determinately local German thinker
  projecting the "pathways" of the Black Forest onto the "world
  picture", but Heidegger as that "glancing" taking us immediately into
  the dangerous mysteries, not of Being, but of hyper-being, into the
  impossible metaphysical claims of a form of being that only exists in
  the language of fatal oppositions: calculation versus meditation,
  world versus earth, ordering versus revealing, business versus art.
  Refusing the safety of a strictly monistic determination of the
  question of being, Heidegger was always a hyper-metaphysician, making
  of being an enigmatic sign, a crossing-over, a "solitude" between the
  identify of "world" and the difference of "earth." For him,
  ~incommensurability~ is the essence of technology, and hyper-being
  the song-line of the deeply conflicting impulses that animate
  technological destining.

  The question of Heidegger necessarily speaks to the human essence. If
  Heidegger is correct, the discourse, first of capitalism, then of
  capitalism in its hyper-phase as virtuality, is the story of the
  presencing of hyper-being, with ourselves as both its active
  participants and necessary conditions. This is not a story of
  fatalism or catastrophe, far from it since Heidegger claims that the
  latter are themselves no more than the "historiographical"
  representations of technological consciousness, but the story of
  "destining", of learning a certain "comportment towards technology"
  that draws the saving-power out of the danger of technology. In the
  strange labyrinth of history, could it be that the question of
  Heidegger is also a "turning," a way of looking deeply into the
  danger as the first tentative steps towards the presencing of another
  destiny of technology. Heidegger went to his death with the constant
  admonition that we are "uninterpreted signs." [5] Could it be that
  interpreting Heidegger is the necessary encryption of the codes of
  technology, that until now neglected interpretation of the
  "uninterpreted sign" that is digital being? But, if that is so, if
  Heidegger is the necessary interpretation of technological destining,
  then wouldn't that also make Heidegger's thought a form of "valuing,"
  a will to power projecting itself across the world picture in the
  language of thought? Wouldn't Heidegger's destiny, then, be an
  artistic one: simultaneously fully implicated in the question of
  technology while different from it, an artist of the "yes and no?"

  Out of place in his time, a thinker sensitive to the loss of the
  autochthonous in the culture of technicity, Heidegger transformed the
  language of "rootlessness" [6] into a central premise of the strife
  in modern subjectivity. For him, the challenge and impossibility of
  the modern technical project was its starting-point in "being held
  out into the nothing." Camus' absurd. The gods have retreated into
  the shadows. The meaning of technicity lies close at hand, yet
  remains concealed in the shroud of calculative forgetfulness. No
  certain past, no actual present, only a future-time split open by the
  animating energy of the will to technology: cultural "rootlessness"
  as the central feature of modern technical being. Indeed, if
  contemporary subjectivity can move with such volatility between the
  "malice of rage" and the solace of healing, then this would only
  indicate that strife is the modern language of rootlessness. This,
  then, is the modern fate: "being held out into the nothing" with no
  clear way of returning to oneself as an abode or dwelling in
  proximity to the ancient language of the "holy." [7] And yet if we
  cannot think of the self as an abode or dwelling, then what remains
  is only the desolation of homelessness and its certain result -- the
  "malice of rage". For Heidegger, as earlier for Nietzsche who in _On
  the Genealogy of Morals_, spoke evocatively of modern being rubbing
  itself raw on the bars of "civilized" culture, the "malice of rage"
  is the true malignancy of technological culture. That this malignancy
  can sometimes be distracted, even to the point of forgetfulness, in
  the form of technological exteriorizations of the human sensorium
  and, at other times, temporarily appeased in the sacrificial language
  of ethnic scapegoating, does not dispense with the sense of strife
  central to technical being. If we are an "uninterpreted sign"
  projected into the future and concealed from the past, then the
  malignancy at the core of technicity might itself, if intensified by
  thinking, be compelled to reveal its essence. Which is, of course,
  the value of contemplating Heidegger: a thinker so proximate to the
  contemporary technical condition that his thought is itself a field
  of strife, motivated from within by a malice of rage directed against
  his own expulsion from the polity of conventional political opinion
  and yet, who in the bitterness of this exile and undoubtedly against
  his own preference for the rootedness of the "German folk," became a
  vehicle by which the forgotten language of metaphysics -- the
  homeward-bound language of the pre-Socratics -- speaks again to
  beings held out into the nothing.

  In contemplating Heidegger, we also return to ourselves as
  "uninterpreted signs." His writing is the future of the past.



  Philosophy of Technology
  ------------------------

  All that is merely technological never arrives at the essence of
  technology. It cannot even recognize its outer precincts. [8]

  Make no mistake. Heidegger does not "think" technology within its own
  terms. Quite the contrary. Repeatedly he insists that technology
  cannot be understood technologically because, in opening ourselves up
  to the question of technology, we are suddenly brought into the
  presence of that which has always been allowed to lie silent because
  it is the overshadowing default condition of our technical existence.
  Heidegger is relentless in making visible that which would prefer to
  remain in the shadows as the regulating architecture of contemporary
  existence. For example, Heidegger notes that today, we can only think
  technology from the midst of the howling center of the technological
  vortex, that while we can note that the dominant tendency of
  technology is towards the "objectification of earth" and the
  "objectification of (technical) consciousness" [9], we can never be
  confident that in thinking the consequences of technologies of
  objectification that our thought itself has not already been set in
  place as a necessary "turning" of the technological spiral. And while
  Heidegger will note that the key ethical consequence of the
  relentless objectification of earth and sky and water and flesh is
  "injurious neglect of the thing," [10] he always makes the parallel
  claim that thought itself always has about it a form of neglect, that
  thought, however critical, always conceals and unconceals, that
  "injurious neglect of the thing" in the mode of order of willing and
  doing may also have about it the doubled language of human destining.
  Thinking Heidegger from the virtual present, from the perspective of
  the "shadow cast ahead by the advent of this turning," [11] that he
  could only intimate who cannot be fully ambivalent on the ultimate
  meaning of technology as "injurious neglect of the thing." Who, that
  is, cannot brush thought against that doubled possibility of
  injurious neglect, that such injurious neglect may be, in equal
  parts, a brutalizing consequence of the dynamic language of
  (technical) ordering and willing and the deepest seduction of
  technology? In this case, if the price to be paid for the unfolding
  of (our) technological destiny is "injurious neglect of the thing" to
  the point of gutting human subjectivity of its silences, its most
  essential elements of individual reflection, of thoughtfulness, then
  is it not now manifest that such injurious neglect of oneself is the
  deepest fascination and most charismatic promotional feature of
  virtual capitalism? The virtual self, therefore, as a wireless game
  with accelerated technical consciousness moving at the speed of
  injurious neglect.

  Consequently, Heidegger's specific contribution to understanding
  technology consists of a unique, evocative and comprehensive
  description of technological experience as a single human process
  originating in the metaphysics of "enframing," driven forward by the
  animating energy of the "will to will," resulting in a culture of
  "profound boredom," [12] and possessing art as its possible
  "turning." Folding together future and past, Heidegger's theory of
  technology assumes the form of a general theory of civilization
  which, beginning with the basic assumption that technology cannot be
  understood solely in the language of the technological, traces the
  genealogy of "planetary technicity" to its ancient roots in a way of
  being that, expanding from its origins in the mythic legacy of the
  west, comes to represent human destiny. As human destiny, technology
  can neither be refused nor simply affirmed because of its
  inextricably ambivalent nature. Left unquestioned, technological
  experience reduces life to a "standing-reserve," in the
  "unconditional service" of the will to technique. And yet if the
  "question of technology" cannot be asked without a fundamental
  inquiry into the mythic roots of technology as destiny, then it must
  also be said that the (hyper)reality of technology cannot be denied
  without a fateful loss of that which is fundamental to humans qua
  humans. For better and for worse, in boredom as well as in anxiety,
  the question of technology as destiny means that it is only by
  intensifying technology, by "thinking" technique to its roots in
  ancient mythology and, thereupon, to its future in the expanding
  empire of "planetary technicity" that we can hope to elucidate the
  dangers and possibilities of being human in the dawning age of the
  post-human. Heidegger's "question of technology" is also a way of
  coming home to the neglected question of the meaning of life in the
  technodrome.



  The Politics of the "Standing-Reserve"
  --------------------------------------

  Heidegger's famous essay, "The Question Concerning Technology," can
  only be read now in terms of philosophical anthropology. Against its
  own intentions which were focused on stripping away history from the
  question of technology and, thereupon, grounding the question of
  technology in the language of its founding metaphysics, this essay
  has in the forty years since its authorship been reclaimed by the
  riddle of history. Reclaimed, that is, not in the sense of
  obsolescence -- a theory of technology now superceded by accelerating
  developments in the present age of wireless and bio-genetic invention
  -- but reclaimed in the deeply anthropological sense that Heidegger's
  analysis of the question of technology is an uncannily accurate
  diagnosis of the present human situation.

  Writing from the perspective of a mid-twentieth century historical
  period bracketed by the rise to dominance of mechanical technologies
  of extraction and the overpowering presence of atomic weapons,
  Heidegger's view of technology, while focused on mechanical culture,
  only finds real theoretical and ethical purchase with the advent of
  electronic and, thereupon, digital culture. In a way that foreshadows
  contemporary theories of technology, from Virilio's vision of
  cybernetic technology as a "war machine" operating in the language of
  the control of "eyeball culture" and McLuhan's grim vision of the
  "externalization" of the central nervous system in electronic culture
  to Baudrillard's theorisation of the mass simulation of human desire,
  Heidegger does that which is most difficult. Almost as a precession
  of his own theory, his analysis ~presences~ technology, drawing out
  the animating impulses of techno-culture in such a way as to compel
  the "world picture" of technology to fully reveal itself. Refusing to
  think technology separately from the question of human destiny,
  Heidegger's thought always hovers around two conflicting impulses in
  the technological world picture: first, the tendency towards
  "enframing" by which the dominating impulse of contemporary
  technology pirates the human sensorium on behalf of a globally
  hegemonic technical apparatus; and, second, the tendency toward
  "poeisis" by which an art of technology, variously expressed in
  language, poetry, the visual arts, speed writing, an aesthetics of
  digital dirt, and new media art could draw out of the world picture
  of technology as destining a different future for techne, a future in
  which technology once again has something to say, to "unconceal,"
  about the relationship between technology and alethia (truth).[13]

  Indeed, what is so inspiring about Heidegger's doubled vision of
  technology is its uniqueness in simultaneously running parallel to
  the cutting edge of new digital technologies and doing so in such a
  way as to plunge the "question concerning technology" back into its
  classical origins as a essential expression of being itself. While
  other theorists have "thought" technology within and against the
  modernist and now, postmodern, epistemes, Heidegger's special gift to
  those intent on deciphering the question of technology is a dramatic
  double refusal: refusing, at first, to think technology within
  strictly contemporary terms by insisting that the language of
  technique is derivative from another, more hidden, "presencing" of
  being that hides itself in the shadows of thought; and refusing to
  think technology as technology, insisting that technology is at its
  inception never strictly technological but metaphysical.

  Consequently, the curiosity: Heidegger's "The Question Concerning
  Technology" makes of the dynamic drive to planetary technicity a
  probe for unconcealing a more fundamental "mode of being," a mode of
  being which, until now, may have purposively retreated into the
  shadows in the spectral form of "oblivion of being," but which under
  the artistic "revealing" that is Heidegger's method is finally forced
  to confess its ancient secrets. In Heidegger's vision of technology,
  we are always standing midway between the unfolding future of the
  drive to technological domination and the revelation of the classical
  genealogy of the question of technology. Both genealogist and
  futurist -- artist and craftsman -- Heidegger's probe of the "world
  picture of technology" is always enunciated in the doubled language
  of that which he seeks to expose -- the twin words of provocation and
  revelation, "challenging-forth" and "poeisis." He is instructive to
  meditate upon not simply for his dramatic political and cultural
  conclusions concerning the destiny of technology, but, more
  decisively, for the deep method of his thought. Always equal to the
  object of his writing -- planetary technicity -- ,Heidegger not only
  claimed that technological experience was, above all, a ~method,~ but
  in his own writing paralleled the world picture of technology as
  method by making of his own thought a method of technological
  revelation. In meditating upon Heidegger, we are suddenly brought
  (technically) close to that which is (metaphysically) distant. His
  mind splits the atom of technology. His thought sequences the DNA of
  the question of technology.

  In Heidegger's thought, the twin elements composing the atom of
  technology in its classical origins and which, until now have
  wandered the "desolation of the earth" separate and at war, these
  twin elements of provocation and poeting, calculation and meditation,
  space and time, are finally reunited in a new experimental moment of
  fusion. The Heideggerian method solves the riddle that it sought only
  to reveal and, in doing so, provides an ethics of technology, an
  ethics that has something fundamental to say about the unfolding
  future of planetary technicity because the Heideggerian project is
  technology. Beyond the specific historical details populating each of
  Heidegger's writings on technology, from the atomic weaponry of "The
  Question Concerning Technology" and the theoretical physics of "What
  is Metaphysics?" to the bio-genetics of _The Fundamental Concepts of
  Metaphysics_, Heidegger brings to the project of thinking technology
  a mode of expression simultaneously ancient and post-human, equally
  at home in the question of being and not-being. And if at the end of
  his life, Heidegger abandons the comfortable illusions of
  existentialism that are the condition of possibility of _Being and
  Time_, that is only because faithful to the method of
  "challenging-forth into the ordering of the standing-reserve" [14]
  that is the hallmark of the technological surgery upon the human
  condition, Heidegger does not, in the end, spare his own thought from
  the bitter lessons of his diagnosis. This is one thinker with the
  courage to make of his own theory of technology a model of technicity
  with such intensity and determination that his thought challenges
  technology to the death. Challenges, that is, the world picture of
  technology to circle back on itself, to engage the conflicting
  impulses towards "harvesting" and "poiesis" in their most primary
  expression of being in Heidegger's "way of thinking." Without
  exaggeration, the ~alethia~ -- the truth -- of Heidegger is, at once,
  the ~alethia~ of technology. Resolving the limits and creative
  intensities of Heidegger's vision of technology is much more than
  another perspective external to technology. To think Heidegger is
  also to presence the interior limits of a mode of (technical) being
  that seduces by its radical impossibility: revelation without
  actualization, calculation by abandoning justice to the oblivion of
  being. The question of Heidegger is proximate to understanding the
  twenty-first century.



  Notes:
  ------

  [1] Heidegger, _The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World,
  Finitude, Solitude_. In this text, Heidegger provides the theory of
  completed nihilism: its fundamental attunement -- "profound boredom;"
  its method -- the disciplinary practices of bio-genetics; its
  dominant cultural sign -- terminal drifting towards generalized
  "indifference."

  [2] See in particular, Heidegger's reflections on the historical
  destiny of the German "folk," in his _Die Selbstbehauptung der
  deutschen Universitat_, "Rektoratsrede," Breslau: W.G. Korn, 1933.

  [3] Martin Heidegger, _The Question Concerning Technology_, "The Word
  of Nietzsche," p.102. "In the willing of this will, however, there
  comes upon man the condition that he concomitantly will the
  conditions, the requirements, of such a willing. That means: to posit
  values and to ascribe worth to everything in keeping with values. In
  such a manner does value determine all that is in its Being."

  [4] Martin Heidegger, _Nietzsche, "The Will to Power"_ p.197. Beyond
  the question of technology, Heidegger argues that the will to will
  that is the essence of technological destining always requires that
  human and non-human nature be reduced to the function of
  "standing-reserve." Thus, for example, in Nietzsche, Heidegger
  describes the essential movement of the will to power as gathering
  into itself means for the "preservation" of power. "Therefore,
  enhancement of power is at the same time in itself the preservation
  of power." In is in this sense that Heidegger describes the technical
  condition of human subjectivity as "standing-reserve" in _The
  Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays_, p. 23. In his
  essay, "On the Question of Being," Heidegger notes: "The reduction
  that can be ascertained within beings rests on the production of
  being, namely, on the unfolding of the will to power into the
  unconditional will to will," _Pathmarks_, p. 312.

  [5] Martin Heidegger, _Basic Writings_, "The Origin of the Work of
  Art," pp. 140-212. For Heidegger, the importance of art in the
  technological milieu was precisely to open the question of technology
  to a different form of interpretation, not only the logic of
  "calculability" but also the revelation of poetry.

  [6] Martin Heidegger, _Pathways_, p.258. "Homelessness so understood
  consists in the abandonment of beings by being. Homelessness is the
  symptom of the oblivion of being. Because of it the truth of being
  remains unthought."

  [7] Ibid; "What is Metaphysics," p.93. "Being held out into the
  nothing -- as Dasein is -- on the ground of concealed anxiety makes
  the human being a lieutenant of the nothing."

  [8] Martin Heidegger, _The Question Concerning Technology and Other
  Essays_, p.44.

  [9] Ibid., p.100. In "The Word of Nietzsche," Heidegger draws the
  conclusion from technological objectification as destiny: "Man,
  within the subjectness belonging to whatever is, rises up into the
  subjectivity of his essence. Man enters into insurrection. The world
  changes into object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything
  that is, the earth, that which first of all must be put at the
  disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into the midst of
  human positing and analyzing. The earth can show itself only as an
  object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, establishes
  itself as unconditional objectification."

  [10] Ibid., p.48.

  [11] Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," in _The Question Concerning
  Technology and Other Essays_, p.41.

  [12] Martin Heidegger, _The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics_,
  p.162. "Profound boredom, its being left empty, means being delivered
  over to beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole. It is thus
  emptiness as a whole." Intensifying Nietzsche's admonition that man
  has grown tired of himself, Heidegger asks: "Has man in the end
  become boring to himself? -- as the question in which we ready
  ourselves for a fundamental attunement of our Dasein." (FCM, p. 161.)

  [13] Writing of the "grounding-attunement," Heidegger states: "In the
  first beginning: deep wonder. In another beginning: deep foreboding."
  Martin Heidegger, _Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)_,
  translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington and
  Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. (p.15).

  [14] Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," p.20.



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  * 3. Event-scenes in politics, culture and the mediascape.
  *
  * 4. Interviews with significant theorists, artists, and writers.
  *
  * 5. Multimedia theme issues and projects.
  *
  *
  * Special thanks to Concordia University.
  *
  * No commercial use of CTHEORY articles without permission.
  *
  * Mailing address: CTHEORY, Concordia University, 1455 de
  *   Maisonneuve, O., Montreal, Canada, H3G 1M8.
  *
  * Full text and microform versions are available from UMI, Ann Arbor,
  *   Michigan; and Canadian Periodical Index/Gale Canada, Toronto.
  *
  * Indexed in: International Political Science Abstracts/
  *   Documentation politique international; Sociological Abstract
  *   Inc.; Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and
  *   Government; Canadian Periodical Index; Film and Literature Index.

  ____________________________




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