Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 01:42:22 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Fwd: INCONSIDERATE UPON MY PART 


--0-1460705454-1033548142=:73728


 
 APPRECIATION

 
Part 1 continued

JUD EVANS:

[being] which one hands in upon one's death. 

GARY C MOORE:

Which makes exactly the same point about the word "life" . . 

 

REVISION:  This is vague because I am trying to deal with a new formulation in my mind of what Heidegger means by being and even much more importantly Da-sein. I think Stuart Elden was right on point about Da-sein not meaning being-there. Both words revolve around the nature of personal identity. . . 

INSERT[10-2-02] as each 'person' experiences it making it the center of all experience which merely makes it a geometrical image and says nothing conceptual about what this identity is, i. e., as an 'object' that is, as  'inner,' a absolute subject,which litraly becomes a mathematical point, as a place to center around or start personal action from. But this leaves the 'I' as an imaginary object of abstraction:

To clarify the existentiality of the self, we take as our "natural" point of departure the everyday self-interpretation of Da-sein that expresses "itself" in saying-I. Utterance is not necessary. With the "I", this being means itself [marginal note: The "I"as what in a sense "nearest", in the foreground, and thus seemingly the self.The content of this expression is taken to be absolutely simple. It always means only one, and nothing further. As this simple thing, the "I" is not a defition of other things: it is itself not a predicate, but the absolute "subject". What is expressed and addressed in saying-I is always met with as the same persisting thing . . . Although Kant attempts, more strictly than his predecessors, to hold on to the phenominal content of saying I,he does,after all, slip back into the same inappropriate obtology of the substantial, which ontic foundations he theoretically rejected for the I . . . If he then calls this I a "logical subject," that does not mean that the I in general is a concept gained merely by logical means. Rather, the I is the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together. The "I think" means I bind together. All binding together is an "I  bind together." In any taking together and relating, the I always underlies-hupokeimenon . . . [Kant] conceives this I again as subject,thus in a ontologically inappropriate sense. For the ontological concept of the subject doesnot characterize the selfhood of the I qua self, but the sameness and constancy of something always already objectively present. To define the I ontologically as subject means to posit it assomething always already objectively present.The being of the I is understood as the reality * [marginal note:"Presence, constant "accompanying":] of the res cogitans . . . Does not Kant emphasize again and again that the I remains related to its representations,and would be nothing without them . . . Surely in saying-I Da-sein means the being it iself always is. But the everyday interpretation of the self has the tendancy to understand itself in terms of the "world" taken care of. When Da-sein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind of being of the being that it itself is . . . The "natural" talk about te I takes place in the they-self. What expresses itself in the I is that self that, initially and for the most part, I am not authentically. When one is absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and rapid succesion of what is taken care of,the self of the self-forgetful "I take care of" shows itself as what is constantly and identically simple, but indefite and empty. One is, after all, what one takes care of . . . "I" means the being that is concerned about the being which it is. Care expresses itself with the "I" initially and for the most part in the "fleeting" talk about the I in taking care of things . . . The everyday, fleeting saying-I must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality of being . . . Existentially, selfhood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality of care. In terms of care the constancy [Standigkeit] of the self, as the supposed persistence of the subject, gets its clarification. The phenomenon of this potentiallity- of- being . . . opens our eyes to the constancy of the self in the double sense of constancy and steadfastness is the authentic counter-possibility to the lack of constancy [Unselbst-standigkeit] or irresolute falling prey. Existentially, the constancy of the self [Selbst-standigkeit] means nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. Its ontological structure reveals the existentiality of the selfhood of the self. Da-sein is authentically itself in the mode of primordial individuation of reticent resoluteness that expects Angst [marginal note: That is, the clearing of being as being.] of itself. In keeping silent, authentic being-one's-self does not keep on saying "I", but rather "is" in reticence the thrown being that it can authentically be. The self that is revealed by the reticence of resolute existence is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question of the being of the "I" . . . Care does not need a foundation in a self . . . The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by interpreting the meaning of care which we defined as the totality of being of Da-sein. (SuZ 318-323/Stambaugh 293-297/M&R 365-370)

This passage reveals the emptiness and unimportance of the ontic self. It " is taken to be absolutely simple." And "If he then calls this I a "logical subject," . . .  the I is the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together," then it is essentially a logical sypher, an imaginary mathematical point, a topos or place that situates the world where "the I remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them . . ." Therefore "the self of the self-forgetful 'I take care of' shows itself as what is constantly and identically simple, but indefite and empty." Selfhood is merely the expression of something even more premordial and fundamental: "Existentially, selfhood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality of care." This is  why ontological "attunement" and ontic "moods" or "states of mind" are so important in Heidegger phenomenolgy. The self,instead of being an object, a something or someone, is just an intention, a potentially that exists only as going into the futre. And it must be an intention it sticks to and stays "on course" with. "Existentially, the constancy of the self means nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness." NOTHING OTHER than "anticipation" and "resolution" to do a specific act. The self needs care, but care is not dependent upon aself. "Care does not need a foundation in a self . . . The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of selfhood." Each self is the center of experience, but such a self is 'merely' an orienting factor and location from which action starts. And even that is just an axiom, a necessary (?) resupposition demanded by the logic in the grammar of western languages, and even within them differs considerably from language to language. And with some non-European languages is dispensed with altogether. So one might ligitimately propose that the self is merely a linguistic ghost, a philosophical/logical myth considered even as such by philosophers as a necessary lie. But it is alie only when it is considered as a concept, a word, a logical assertion of an objective truth. Because no one, including aZen Buddhist monk, operates without assuming, one way or another, than they have a real self. The point is, it must be considered in some other fashion, as experience. But what exactly can we say in logical language (a redundancy: one always expects language to have a logic behind it even if one has no idea what it is) that disects down to almost nothing, a logical sypher, a mathematical point, under logical analysis? Obviously it is a 'feeling'. But how can you analyse a feeling while being within that feeling, while BEING that feeling?

. . . or rather its questionableness as something that can be easily nailed down as an object of any sort



---------------------------------
Do you Yahoo!?
New DSL Internet Access from SBC & Yahoo!
--0-1460705454-1033548142=:73728

HTML VERSION:

APPRECIATION

 
Part 1 continued

JUD EVANS:

[being] which one hands in upon one's death.

GARY C MOORE:

Which makes exactly the same point about the word "life" . .

 

REVISION:  This is vague because I am trying to deal with a new formulation in my mind of what Heidegger means by being and even much more importantly Da-sein. I think Stuart Elden was right on point about Da-sein not meaning being-there. Both words revolve around the nature of personal identity. . . 

INSERT[10-2-02] as each 'person' experiences it making it the center of all experience which merely makes it a geometrical image and says nothing conceptual about what this identity is, i. e., as an 'object' that is, as  'inner,' a absolute subject,which litraly becomes a mathematical point, as a place to center around or start personal action from. But this leaves the 'I' as an imaginary object of abstraction:

To clarify the existentiality of the self, we take as our "natural" point of departure the everyday self-interpretation of Da-sein that expresses "itself" in saying-I. Utterance is not necessary. With the "I", this being means itself [marginal note: The "I"as what in a sense "nearest", in the foreground, and thus seemingly the self.The content of this expression is taken to be absolutely simple. It always means only one, and nothing further. As this simple thing, the "I" is not a defition of other things: it is itself not a predicate, but the absolute "subject". What is expressed and addressed in saying-I is always met with as the same persisting thing . . . Although Kant attempts, more strictly than his predecessors, to hold on to the phenominal content of saying I,he does,after all, slip back into the same inappropriate obtology of the substantial, which ontic foundations he theoretically rejected for the I . . . If he then calls this I a "logical subject," that does not mean that the I in general is a concept gained merely by logical means. Rather, the I is the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together. The "I think" means I bind together. All binding together is an "I  bind together." In any taking together and relating, the I always underlies-hupokeimenon . . . [Kant] conceives this I again as subject,thus in a ontologically inappropriate sense. For the ontological concept of the subject doesnot characterize the selfhood of the I qua self, but the sameness and constancy of something always already objectively present. To define the I ontologically as subject means to posit it assomething always already objectively present.The being of the I is understood as the reality * [marginal note:"Presence, constant "accompanying":] of the res cogitans . . . Does not Kant emphasize again and again that the I remains related to its representations,and would be nothing without them . . . Surely in saying-I Da-sein means the being it iself always is. But the everyday interpretation of the self has the tendancy to understand itself in terms of the "world" taken care of. When Da-sein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind of being of the being that it itself is . . . The "natural" talk about te I takes place in the they-self. What expresses itself in the I is that self that, initially and for the most part, I am not authentically. When one is absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and rapid succesion of what is taken care of,the self of the self-forgetful "I take care of" shows itself as what is constantly and identically simple, but indefite and empty. One is, after all, what one takes care of . . . "I" means the being that is concerned about the being which it is. Care expresses itself with the "I" initially and for the most part in the "fleeting" talk about the I in taking care of things . . . The everyday, fleeting saying-I must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality of being . . . Existentially, selfhood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality of care. In terms of care the constancy [Standigkeit] of the self, as the supposed persistence of the subject, gets its clarification. The phenomenon of this potentiallity- of- being . . . opens our eyes to the constancy of the self in the double sense of constancy and steadfastness is the authentic counter-possibility to the lack of constancy [Unselbst-standigkeit] or irresolute falling prey. Existentially, the constancy of the self [Selbst-standigkeit] means nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. Its ontological structure reveals the existentiality of the selfhood of the self. Da-sein is authentically itself in the mode of primordial individuation of reticent resoluteness that expects Angst [marginal note: That is, the clearing of being as being.] of itself. In keeping silent, authentic being-one's-self does not keep on saying "I", but rather "is" in reticence the thrown being that it can authentically be. The self that is revealed by the reticence of resolute existence is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question of the being of the "I" . . . Care does not need a foundation in a self . . . The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by interpreting the meaning of care which we defined as the totality of being of Da-sein. (SuZ 318-323/Stambaugh 293-297/M&R 365-370)

This passage reveals the emptiness and unimportance of the ontic self. It " is taken to be absolutely simple." And "If he then calls this I a "logical subject," . . .  the I is the subject of logical behaviour, of binding together," then it is essentially a logical sypher, an imaginary mathematical point, a topos or place that situates the world where "the I remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them . . ." Therefore "the self of the self-forgetful 'I take care of' shows itself as what is constantly and identically simple, but indefite and empty." Selfhood is merely the expression of something even more premordial and fundamental: "Existentially, selfhood is only to be found in the authentic potentiality of care." This is  why ontological "attunement" and ontic "moods" or "states of mind" are so important in Heidegger phenomenolgy. The self,instead of being an object, a something or someone, is just an intention, a potentially that exists only as going into the futre. And it must be an intention it sticks to and stays "on course" with. "Existentially, the constancy of the self means nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness." NOTHING OTHER than "anticipation" and "resolution" to do a specific act. The self needs care, but care is not dependent upon aself. "Care does not need a foundation in a self . . . The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of selfhood." Each self is the center of experience, but such a self is 'merely' an orienting factor and location from which action starts. And even that is just an axiom, a necessary (?) resupposition demanded by the logic in the grammar of western languages, and even within them differs considerably from language to language. And with some non-European languages is dispensed with altogether. So one might ligitimately propose that the self is merely a linguistic ghost, a philosophical/logical myth considered even as such by philosophers as a necessary lie. But it is alie only when it is considered as a concept, a word, a logical assertion of an objective truth. Because no one, including aZen Buddhist monk, operates without assuming, one way or another, than they have a real self. The point is, it must be considered in some other fashion, as experience. But what exactly can we say in logical language (a redundancy: one always expects language to have a logic behind it even if one has no idea what it is) that disects down to almost nothing, a logical sypher, a mathematical point, under logical analysis? Obviously it is a 'feeling'. But how can you analyse a feeling while being within that feeling, while BEING that feeling?

. . . or rather its questionableness as something that can be easily nailed down as an object of any sort