File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0302, message 271


From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: neither/nor (was: Righteous War? Or bluff?)
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2003 02:52:59 +0000


John Foster wrote:

>U wrote:
>
>  "For the modern environmental movement,
>care towards the planet is opposed to some other kinds of
>dealings with the
>planet (for example, the dealings of polluting,
>clear-cutting capitalists),
>and therefore takes one ontic side over another. It
>therefore cannot
>possibly be the same as Heideggerian care."
>
>This appears to be generalization, or 'over-generalization'
>and despite that I am unclear what you are referring to by
>the term "It".

By "It" I meant care towards the planet as expressed in the modern 
environmental movement.

>What do you mean here? Are you contrasting
>the 'clear-cut' industry with 'selection' foresty, or
>sustainable forestry, some practice for which an
>'environmental organization' might link with 'certified' and
>'holistic' forestry? Are you saying that one is just as bad
>as the other, and basing this judgement upon some 'ethic'
>arising from an interpretation of Heideggers'?

No, I am saying that care towards the planet as expressed in the modern 
environmental movement cannot possibly be the same as Heideggerian care, 
because Heideggerian care encompasses any kind of dealing whatsoever, 
whether the dealings of environmentalists, or the dealings of polluting 
capitalists. Care towards the planet as expressed in the modern 
environmental movement does not encompass any kind of dealing whatsoever, 
because it is opposed to some dealings: namely, it is opposed to the 
dealings of polluting capitalists. So that kind of care cannot possibly be 
the same as Heideggerian care.

>Certainly there is some reference to foresters in "The
>Question Concerning Technology", something about how trees
>and forests are treated as 'stocks' and 'standing reserve'
>but not as habitat for say an endangered species like the
>mountain caribou or Grizzly bear (which is still living in
>Eastern Europe)? The idea regarding 'capitalism' or the
>modern variant, moveable and exportable capital, totally
>liquid, is much like the idea referred to in a critical way
>by Heidegger as an 'capital' like fiber or chips  being
>nothing more than a product machined out from the 'standing
>reserve' (cellulose and lignin).

His criticism is purely in terms of the disclosure of Being, not in any way 
an ethical criticism. For Heidegger, some dealings reveal the Being of 
beings more than others, and some close off the Being of beings more than 
others. But this does not have the ontical ethical connotations and 
oppositions present in the care towards the planet as expressed in the 
modern environmental movement. For the latter, polluting capitalists are not 
merely caring in a more deprived way; rather, polluting capitalists are 
absolutely positively UN-caring and MUST be stopped! That is clearly 
oppositional, and therefore cannot possibly be the same as Heideggerian 
care.

Anthony Crifasi

>Of course forests prove to be much more servient to humanity
>and other species of mammals than for simple chips and
>fiber. A forest is essentially a metaphor for existence; a
>forest makes soils, produces water, and solitude as well as
>a myriad of other features some of which are not simply
>'utilitarian' and must be considered 'intrinsic'. This point
>was raised by Heidgger in that he refers to modern
>technology as being 'instrumental' in definition, therefore
>a 'standing reserve' to be used for the most economical,
>short term use.
>
>In Europe there has been a strong trend to not use wood for
>residences. Over the last 70 years there has been a growing
>demand and development of homes made from 'autoclaved
>aerated concrete' which last longer than wood (stick and
>mache homes made from wood) and are also safer and less
>energy consumptive. In North America we still use 'old
>growth forests' for toilet paper and stick and mache homes
>which can rot in less than 20 years.
>
>The US relies on imported wood from many places, and Canada
>is it's greatest foreign source. Even Sweden exports lumber
>to the US. Why cannot the US copy the European countries and
>make homes which last for centuries rather than only
>decades? I guess they are now, especially in the Southern
>states since there are at least 3 factories making homes
>from 'autoclaved aerated concrete' -  this new medium also
>was used to make the ancient Greek Parthenon  - so I have
>learned. It was aerated but maybe not autoclaved. The
>onto-logical aspects of living lightly on the land is
>important to Heidegger especially since he was extremely
>critical of the 'one-sided' nature of modern technology
>which 'sets upon' the earth and attempts to tame and control
>nature.
>
>chao
>
>john foster
>
>
>But when in Burckhardt we come upon a passage: "In this year
>the Venetians refused to make war upon the Milanese because
>they held that any war between buyer and seller must prove
>profitable to neither," we come upon a portent, the old
>order changes, one conception of war and the state b egins
>to decline. The Middle Ages imperceptibly give ground to the
>Renaissance." [Hugh Kenner]
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
>To: <heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu>
>Sent: Saturday, February 22, 2003 9:38 AM
>Subject: Re: neither/nor (was: Righteous War? Or bluff?)
>
>
>John Foster wrote:
>
> >What do U mean by 'ontic care'? which also begs the
>question
> >what is 'ontological care towards the planet?'
>
>Heideggerian care encompasses any kind of dealing
>whatsoever, so any
>interpretation of care which excludes some kinds of dealing
>cannot possibly
>be the same as Heideggerian care. For the modern
>environmental movement,
>care towards the planet is opposed to some other kinds of
>dealings with the
>planet (for example, the dealings of polluting,
>clear-cutting capitalists),
>and therefore takes one ontic side over another. It
>therefore cannot
>possibly be the same as Heideggerian care.
>
> >Is the
> >propsed US-invasion of Iraq an 'ontological' war or an
> >'ontic' war?
>
>A much better way to frame this awkwardly phrased question
>is the way you
>tried to frame the issue in your last post: that if there is
>no intrinsic
>end of honor or debt thereof involved, then one country has
>no right to
>invade or declare war on another. And as I pointed out, this
>presupposes
>that the only possible intrinsic end of war is honor. By
>that reasoning, the
>US military intervention in Serbia due to alleged genocide
>(which,
>incidentally, was NOT done through the UN) was unjustified,
>since there was
>no debt of honor to be repaid there. Did you protest that
>war?
>
> >Please enlighten!
> >
> >U have set up a proposition here  beginning with a belief
> >that there is a "Heideggerian notion of care". What do you
> >mean specifically by this notion. How does care become a
> >notion?
> >
> >In which sense are U casting this 'care'?
> >
> >It seems to me that this care is defined rather simply as a
> >sense arising from 'factical' life, it seems rather unclear
> >to me how care can be simply a 'notion' and confused with
> >care arising from having 'sensibility' for something
> >factical.
>
>Oh geez. To philosophically speak of a Heideggerian "notion"
>of care is not
>to reduce factical care to a notion, just as to speak of the
>your "notion"
>of care in a philosophical context (as opposed to
>Heidegger's) is not to
>reduce your dealings to a mere thought or notion. It is
>simply a term used
>in a philosophical context to compare two philosophical
>analytics. In
>factical life, of course care is not a thought or notion.
>
> >Care for Heidegger is rooted in the 'primal
> >Christian' sense of taking care of life:
> >
> >"...in its relational sense taken in the widest sense, life
> >is: caring for, being anxious for [sorgen um] one's 'daily
> >bread'. 'To go hungry', 'to be needy' [Darburg] (privatio)
> >[deprivation], carentia [going without, lack]} is the basic
> >how of the sense of being of life regarding its
> >relationality and enactment." [G61 90, 155, 148, 185, et
> >cetera.(references to the early Hiedegger].
> >
> >"The basic sense of the factical movement of life is caring
> >(curare)...."
> >
> >Regarding a possible division between the ontic and the
> >ontological, the idea U present does not provide an
>analysis
> >but an 'empty assertion'. For example there is no
> >'transcending' of 'worldly care' since care is in and
> >through 'this' 'sense of life', the
> >factical;livedcontinuously it is the having of a sense of a
> >lack, a lack value (Sartre refers to the 'lack value' as
> >well).
> >
> >Care according to Heidegger is an act for which
> >consciousness (all varieties of sense: relational, contact,
> >meaning, et cetera) is always aware:
>
>First, Heidegger never and would never cast care in those
>terms, because the
>casting of care in terms of acts, consciousness, and
>awareness is ALREADY a
>certain way of caring (i.e., a certain way of dealing with
>the phenomena).
>Care therefore cannot possibly be reduced to or defined in
>those terms; on
>the contrary, the reverse is the case for Heidegger.
>Secondly, of course (by
>definition) there is no way of factically transcending
>factical life; but
>that is different from saying that care does not transcend
>factical life in
>the sense that it is the possibility for any facticity
>whatsoever - yours or
>mine. That is why your casting of care here cannot possibly
>be the same as
>Heidegger's: yours excludes SOME ontic "sides," whereas
>Heidegger's does
>not.
>
>Anthony Crifasi
>
> >"Caring always cares for itself in some way....It cares for
> >itself in that it finds itself in a worldly manner in the
> >here that is encountered." (G63 102)
> >
> >The above statement is an 'ontological reflexion' on care
>as
> >a primary 'existential' condition of animals. To care for
> >the 'ontological' is really interesting without any
>symbols,
> >any images, or any anything, and I think that it is
> >possible, but this form of caring still requires the
> >'creature' to feel anything profund.
> >
> >J. V. Buren in "The Young Heidegger" writes that "Our
>primal
> >relation to ourselves and the world [environment] is then
> >hardly an objective theoretical 'knowing', but rather
> >'caring for the morrow,' restlessness (Unruhe), and 'worry
> >[Bekummerung] of the self for itself." [inside quotes taken
> >from Heidegger].
>
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