File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0303, message 385


Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2003 14:16:05 +0100
From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker-AT-uba.uva.nl>
Subject: Re: the o/o gulf


At 01:34 25-3-03 +0000, Anthony Crifasi wrote:
<So Being-with has absolutely NOTHING to do with the kind of FACTICAL 
>being-with that you are talking about above. As Heidegger explicitly says 
>here, even if a particular factical Dasein acts unilaterally in the factical 
>world, "IT IS IN THE WAY OF BEING-WITH" ALREADY. Being-with is a basic way 
>of being-in-the-world, and therefore underlies BOTH factical unliteral 
>action and factical consensus.
>
>Rene (sorry John, just a second...), do you see what John is doing here? You 
>cannot possibly defend this in the way you did, by characterizing this as 
>the ultimate ambiguity of the o/o distinction. John is blatantly confusing 
>even the PRELIMINARY use of the o/o distinction. That is not what Heidegger 
>was talking about in the text you cited.
>
>>In that Charter are statements which member
>>nations have agreed to such as
>>
>>'no nation shall attack another nation'
>>
>>The US chose to abandon the United Nations, act
>>unilaterally, and attack a sovereign nation which has not
>>attacked it.
>>
>>The US has mixed, or impure motives, for attacking Iraq. One
>>motive is to change regime, another is to remove weapons of
>>mass destruction, and another is to liberate Iraqi citizens,
>>and so on. There is no clear objective for this refusal to
>>work within the United Nations Security Council. The US is
>>acting in a 'one-sided' and unilateral nature in dealing
>>with political and humanitarian situation. It is in fact in
>>violation of the Geneva Conventions (another example of
>>'mitsein').
>
>Again, mitsein (as the text I quoted above explicitly states) underlies 
>factical unilateral action as much as factical consensus, like the Geneva 
>Conventions. You are interpreting mitsein completely non-ontologically, when 
>Heidedegger himself explicitly warns in the above text that mitsein "must be 
>understood as an EXISTENTIAL STATEMENT AS TO ITS [Dasein's] ESSENCE," not a 
>factical statement.
>
>>What about you anxiety over the failure of the Security
>>Council to reach consensus? This anxiety has lead your US
>>Republican Party wage a saturation bombing campaign on 4
>>million innocent lives.
>>
>>Don't you feel anxiety as a result. A state of mind is a
>>mood, and Heidegger writes this elsewhere.
>
>John look at your very words - "Don't you FEEL anxiety..." That is blatantly 
>ontic and factical, John! (Rene, do you see this?)


Yeh, Rene here. Feeling blatantly ontic and factical.
If not: how could Being ever be questionable? 
You appear to be being-in-Being, and not in-the-world
 
Heidegger, What is metaphysics?, 'Elaboration of the question':

"Befindlichkeit of mood .... is the fundamental happening of our
Da-sein. 
What we so call 'feelings', is neither a fleeting companying-appearance
of our discursive and voluntative behavior, nor a mere causing drive
to such, nor a mere occurrent state, to which we come to terms
one way or the other."  


>Heidegger explicitly says 
>that anxiety is not about any definite factical entity at all. You are 
>talking about factical ontic anxiety, not ontological anxiety! And you are 
>basing your whole anti-war worldview on this twisted interpretation!
>
>Anthony Crifasi

Anxiety does not have a definite object, is not a specific mood in the ontical
sense. You see I don't deny o/o distinction. But this is only a very
preliminary
and negative upshot. Even a bit annoying in its repetition......
In BT Heidegger writes that in anxiety world itself or: being-in-the-world
itself,
is disclosed. Now to your accusation that I would have connections to the 
Enlightenment network. Kant, the mother of Enlightenment, forbids theoretical
knowledge of the world, because, unlike the table in front of  me, 'world'
cannot
be representated, posed in front of me, vor-gestellt. It is not a possible
object
of theoretical (empirical) knowledge, although it remains to be a Gegenstand
for the Vernunft, like God and soul. We need the idea, says Kant. Right, what
is a table without a world? (Nietzsche: and what a world without a God?) 
Kant here SAVES (unknowingly) ontological difference, that is: metaphysics.
The not-knowing is nothing negative: it is a hard and time-demanding nut,
for which
most teeth are not fit.  All metaphysics is taking care of ontological
difference, it
cannot do else, because it is the ground wherein the metaphysical tree is
rooted.
That's easily said, copied, but where is the place, from where such a thing
is said? 
There are words of Heidegger for that too - the unthought - but again ......


rene











-----------------------------------
drs. Rene de Bakker
Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam
Afdeling Catalogisering 
tel. 020-5252368              


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