Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2003 14:16:05 +0100 From: Rene de Bakker <rene.de.bakker-AT-uba.uva.nl> Subject: Re: the o/o gulf At 01:34 25-3-03 +0000, Anthony Crifasi wrote: <So Being-with has absolutely NOTHING to do with the kind of FACTICAL >being-with that you are talking about above. As Heidegger explicitly says >here, even if a particular factical Dasein acts unilaterally in the factical >world, "IT IS IN THE WAY OF BEING-WITH" ALREADY. Being-with is a basic way >of being-in-the-world, and therefore underlies BOTH factical unliteral >action and factical consensus. > >Rene (sorry John, just a second...), do you see what John is doing here? You >cannot possibly defend this in the way you did, by characterizing this as >the ultimate ambiguity of the o/o distinction. John is blatantly confusing >even the PRELIMINARY use of the o/o distinction. That is not what Heidegger >was talking about in the text you cited. > >>In that Charter are statements which member >>nations have agreed to such as >> >>'no nation shall attack another nation' >> >>The US chose to abandon the United Nations, act >>unilaterally, and attack a sovereign nation which has not >>attacked it. >> >>The US has mixed, or impure motives, for attacking Iraq. One >>motive is to change regime, another is to remove weapons of >>mass destruction, and another is to liberate Iraqi citizens, >>and so on. There is no clear objective for this refusal to >>work within the United Nations Security Council. The US is >>acting in a 'one-sided' and unilateral nature in dealing >>with political and humanitarian situation. It is in fact in >>violation of the Geneva Conventions (another example of >>'mitsein'). > >Again, mitsein (as the text I quoted above explicitly states) underlies >factical unilateral action as much as factical consensus, like the Geneva >Conventions. You are interpreting mitsein completely non-ontologically, when >Heidedegger himself explicitly warns in the above text that mitsein "must be >understood as an EXISTENTIAL STATEMENT AS TO ITS [Dasein's] ESSENCE," not a >factical statement. > >>What about you anxiety over the failure of the Security >>Council to reach consensus? This anxiety has lead your US >>Republican Party wage a saturation bombing campaign on 4 >>million innocent lives. >> >>Don't you feel anxiety as a result. A state of mind is a >>mood, and Heidegger writes this elsewhere. > >John look at your very words - "Don't you FEEL anxiety..." That is blatantly >ontic and factical, John! (Rene, do you see this?) Yeh, Rene here. Feeling blatantly ontic and factical. If not: how could Being ever be questionable? You appear to be being-in-Being, and not in-the-world Heidegger, What is metaphysics?, 'Elaboration of the question': "Befindlichkeit of mood .... is the fundamental happening of our Da-sein. What we so call 'feelings', is neither a fleeting companying-appearance of our discursive and voluntative behavior, nor a mere causing drive to such, nor a mere occurrent state, to which we come to terms one way or the other." >Heidegger explicitly says >that anxiety is not about any definite factical entity at all. You are >talking about factical ontic anxiety, not ontological anxiety! And you are >basing your whole anti-war worldview on this twisted interpretation! > >Anthony Crifasi Anxiety does not have a definite object, is not a specific mood in the ontical sense. You see I don't deny o/o distinction. But this is only a very preliminary and negative upshot. Even a bit annoying in its repetition...... In BT Heidegger writes that in anxiety world itself or: being-in-the-world itself, is disclosed. Now to your accusation that I would have connections to the Enlightenment network. Kant, the mother of Enlightenment, forbids theoretical knowledge of the world, because, unlike the table in front of me, 'world' cannot be representated, posed in front of me, vor-gestellt. It is not a possible object of theoretical (empirical) knowledge, although it remains to be a Gegenstand for the Vernunft, like God and soul. We need the idea, says Kant. Right, what is a table without a world? (Nietzsche: and what a world without a God?) Kant here SAVES (unknowingly) ontological difference, that is: metaphysics. The not-knowing is nothing negative: it is a hard and time-demanding nut, for which most teeth are not fit. All metaphysics is taking care of ontological difference, it cannot do else, because it is the ground wherein the metaphysical tree is rooted. That's easily said, copied, but where is the place, from where such a thing is said? There are words of Heidegger for that too - the unthought - but again ...... rene ----------------------------------- drs. Rene de Bakker Universiteitsbibliotheek Amsterdam Afdeling Catalogisering tel. 020-5252368 --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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