Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2003 03:40:36 +0800 Subject: Re: Being and Time-section 2 From: Malcolm Riddoch <riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au> On Saturday, March 29, 2003, at 03:05 AM, Anthony Crifasi wrote: > Malcolm Riddoch wrote: > >> I love the logic of this intro to BT, and I think Heidegger after >> setting up the question of being as a self-reflexive path of >> questioning never leaves this path throughout his entire career. It's >> the question concerning questioning (as Dasein)... and it's also more >> or less a faithful interpretation of Husserl's own conception of the >> starting point of phenomenology in the Logical Investigations where >> it's the analyst's own lived experience of phenomena that's in >> question. > > You should not bring that in yet, because at this point the departure > from Husserl has not come yet. For Husserl, absorbed lived experienced > is naive SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO world existence, whereas for > Heidegger, everydayness is not prejudiced SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO > world existence. Rather, for Heidegger, everydayness is naive and > "prejudiced" in a DIFFERENT way - in that it does not see its own > ontological ground, and therefore interprets itself essentially in > terms of beings. So Heidegger would flatly (and in fact does > exlicitly) deny that everydayness is prejudiced SPECIFICALLY WITH > RESPECT TO world existence (which is what Husserl's phenomenological > reduction is SPECIFICALLY about) since we are being-alonside from the > start, and he never suspends this. What he "suspends" is the > interpretation of Dasein ONTOLOGICALLY in terms of entities, by > reducing this to inauthenticity. > > Anthony Crifasi As we've discussed previously that is your interpretation and not one I share at all. The notion of a departure from Husserl is a contentious one and your argument based on a restrictive misreading of the Cartesian Meditations and following Heidegger's rather ingenuous use of Ideas 1 as a fundamental statement of Husserl's position is not particularly coherent as far as I'm concerned. I still don't know what you're on about Anthony, and both Husserl and Heidegger agree that the everyday person 'does not see its own ontological ground, and therefore interprets itself essentially in terms of beings'... as for your notions of 'prejudice' I find your arguments rather tautologically obtuse. But here we are at section 2, and in its introductory generalities as regards the starting point of the question, beginning with the existential analyst's own attempt at analysis, this is a Husserlian beginning whether you like it or not. Do you have any comments specifically about pages 5-8 of Being and Time? Regards, Malcolm --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005