From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2003 13:19:11 EST Subject: Re: Being and Time-section 2 --part1_25.368d3321.2bb73d9f_boundary In a message dated 29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time, michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk writes: > Subj:Re: Being and Time-section 2 > Date:29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time > From: michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk (michaelP) > Sender: owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu > Reply-to: <A HREF="mailto:heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu">heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu</A> > To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu > > > > > Jud speaking confidently of Heidegger wrote recently: > > > He persists in positing a spurious "ontological difference" where none > exists. > > Since you are so very sure of its non-existence, its non-being, pray tell > us what you understand of the "ontological difference" (as Heidegger and > some of the rest of us here on this list have struggled with) you so > adamantly dismiss as non-existent or nonsense, that we may see why and how > (given your profound understanding of it) it is as you proclaim > (non-existent and thus nonsense); and please, do not spare us the depths > and lengths of your profundity of understanding (of what Heidegger means by > his term) in this regard, chapter and verse please if possible (many of us > have lots of Heidegger texts available). Jud: We must first of all consider the two ways in which we talk about those things that exist, and here I am not referring to the so-called "ontic" and the so-called "ontological," differences, but rather the way that we describe on the one hand: (1) the fact or reality of an entity being present or existing in the cosmos, or "being found" [as the Swedes say] in the cosmos. Some philosophical linguists refer to this as "simple existence" or sometimes " simple presence." The term "simple existence" is employed in that there is no elaboration as to the 'way' or 'manner' or 'mode' in which the entity exists. It is in fact more difficult than one supposes to make a statement of this nature, and it NEVER WORKS if one attempts to employ the BE-word in any of its forms for this purpose, for the BE-word ["is" etc.] always addresses the WAY an entity exists, and NOT the FACT that it it simply exists. It doesn't need a great deal of concentration to work out that for any entity to exist it must exist IN A CERTAIN way or number of ways or modalities. In fact the modalities/states in which any entity exists, including the smallest microbe or single atom, are so manifold, that it would be impossible for any human being to describe them all, not only because of their uncountable number of modes, but also because they are constantly changing their character. The word "exist" [which the Greeks didn't have] was introduced in order to differentiate between this "simple existence" and the "existential modalities" or the WAY entities exist, in order to avoid the confusion that the Greek lack of such a term imposed upon philosophical discussion. The persistence of people like Heidegger in restoring the term " Being" for purposes of philosophical discussion, together with the resultant confusion which it reintroduces merely undoes the work of others who attempted to clarify discourse in this area as is amply demonstrated by the arguments now taking place on the list.. (2) The second way of talking about the things that exist in the world, is to talk about the WAY or MANNER in which they exist, their shape, their colour, their position, their name, what belongs to them, their number, what sort of things they are according to human classificational parameters, and all the other countless billions of things that we can say about them and the way that they exist, or the way that they used to exist, or the way they might exist in the future. In order to describe the way entities exist we employ the BE-word which we morph into various conjugations (like we do with verbs) in order to introduce additional temporal and numerical information. These then are the two ways that we talk about that which exist - but there is no "ontological difference" involved, for once an entity is named it is nominally extant or "sententially extant" for the purposes of making some comment about it, though that of course does not mean that it actually exists in the real world as an actual spatial and temporal object. Some [many] of these subjects of sentences are not actual entities [either imaginary or real] at all, but reifications of actions, whereby something abstract is regarded [for communicational convenience] as a material thing. Many transcendentalists appear oblivious to this practice, and treat reificational abstractions as if they ACTUALLY EXIST, much to the frustration of most linguistic philosophers.. > > Michael: I'm sure that for reasons utterly and totally different to yours, it could be indeed argued that the ontological difference is not a being (is > not some thing or matter that has ever been, now or to come), i.e., is not, > or in your terms -- does not exist --, in my terms -- can not 'exist'/be > because it is existence itself -- (like the untimely difference between > time and its moments), but this does not imply that it is nothing just > because it is not a thing; rather it could mean that the ontological > difference is not another different thing from being and beings; it is > difference as such, difference-qua-difference. Jud: Your employment of the word "existence" is an apt example of the promotion of a state [the state of existing] to that of a something definite or even tangible, whereas of course it is simple a grammatical category to describe the state or fact of some entity or entiities, [or all the entities in the cosmos] as existing. As for "time" and its "moments - I don't believe for one minute :-) that either exist, other than [like "Being" ] as mentalisations of the human mind created for our organisational convenience, and based upon the movements of our earth around the sun and the phases of the moon etc. Michael: > It could be argued that there is no difference between being and beings and > that such a collapse means that only beings are in any sense and that > therefore the being of any being is just that being and nothing else (and > remember, oh sophon, that a being is anything whatsoever that can be said > to be, to have been or to yet be), Jud: You may argue that there is no difference between being and beings, but it is all contingent upon what you mean when you employ the word being and beings. If you mean by being, the material or basic building-blocks of matter [material-energy] of which all the entities in the universe are composed then you may well be right, but there still remains the fact that all beings are different, and not one entity in the cosmos is exactly the same as another, and it is precisely to describe these existential differentations that we have the BE-word which we use in our {SVO] sentences to signal that what come next is particular information regarding a subject's former, present or future way of being the entity it is or existing in that particular molecular format. Michael: and this is the view that positivists and scientists and others hold to whilst nonetheless employing the very resource of such a > difference between beings and their being in even recognising beings as such > and as they are. But, sorry, I digress... over to you. > Jud: The bottom line? Heidegger is totally confused as to the different uses of "BE" and "EXIST." This may have come about because although the BE-word is never employed to address "simple existence" and is restricted to signalling the attribution of predicational information regarding the MANNER in which a subject exists, the EXIST-word is sometimes employed to do both tasks as in: "The American Marines exist as a well-trained combat force ready for instant action in any emergency." Here it is the little "as" word that is the enabler of existential modality and transforms the mechanism of "simple existence" to the way the Marines exist. It doesn't work both ways, for the BE-word operates indicatively of state or modality only, and we are find ourselves in the existential doo-doo immediately if we try: "The American Marines are." "The theological "God is," is an exception in that it bespeaks of God's total Gesamtsumme [nexus] as being "God." [God exists in the state of being God.] To use this form of speech for anything else other than the Godhead results in total confusion with responses such as: "The American Marines are...what?" > Cheers, Jud. <A HREF="http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/ ">http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/</A> Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY. <A HREF="http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com">http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com</A> --part1_25.368d3321.2bb73d9f_boundary
HTML VERSION:
Subj:Re: Being and Time-section 2Jud speaking confidently of Heidegger wrote recently:
Date:29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time
From: michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk (michaelP)
Sender: owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Reply-to: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
To: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Michael:
not some thing=20or matter that has ever been, now or to come), i.e., is not, or in your terms -- does not exist --, in my terms -- can not 'exist'/be because it is existence itself -- (like the untimely difference between time and its moments), but this does not imply that it is nothing just because it is not a thing;=20rather it could mean that the ontological difference is not another different thing from being and beings; it is difference as such, difference-qua-difference.
It could be argued that there is no difference between being and beings and that such a collapse means that only beings are in any sense and that therefore the being of any being is just that being and nothing else (and remember, oh sophon, that a being is anything whatsoever that can be said to be, to have been or to yet be),
difference between beings and their being in even recognising beings as such and as they are. But, sorry, I digress... over to you.
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005