File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0303, message 476


From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2003 13:19:11 EST
Subject: Re: Being and Time-section 2



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In a message dated 29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time, 
michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk writes:


> Subj:Re: Being and Time-section 2
> Date:29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time
> From:    michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk (michaelP)
> Sender:    owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> Reply-to: <A HREF="mailto:heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu">heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu</A>
> To:    heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jud speaking confidently of Heidegger wrote recently:
> 
> > He persists in positing a spurious "ontological difference" where none 
> exists.
> 
> Since you are so very sure of its non-existence, its non-being, pray tell 
> us what you understand of the "ontological difference" (as Heidegger and 
> some of the rest of us here on this list have struggled with) you so 
> adamantly dismiss as non-existent or nonsense, that we may see why and how 
> (given your profound understanding of it) it is as you proclaim 
> (non-existent and thus nonsense); and please, do not spare us the depths 
> and lengths of your profundity of understanding (of what Heidegger means by 
> his term) in this regard, chapter and verse please if possible (many of us 
> have lots of Heidegger texts available).

Jud:
We must first of all consider the two ways in which we talk about those 
things that exist, and here I am not referring to the so-called "ontic" and 
the so-called "ontological,"  differences, but rather the way that we 
describe on the one hand:

(1)  the fact or reality of an entity being present or existing in the 
cosmos, or "being found" [as the Swedes say] in the cosmos. Some 
philosophical  linguists refer to this as "simple existence"  or sometimes "
simple presence."  The term "simple existence" is employed in that there is 
no elaboration as to the 'way' or 'manner' or 'mode' in which the entity 
exists.  It is in fact more difficult than one supposes to make  a statement 
of this nature, and it NEVER WORKS if one attempts to employ the BE-word in 
any of its forms for this purpose, for the  BE-word ["is"  etc.] always 
addresses the WAY an entity exists, and NOT the FACT that it it simply 
exists.  It doesn't need a great deal of concentration to work out that for 
any entity to exist it must exist IN A CERTAIN  way or  number of ways or 
modalities.  In fact the modalities/states in which any entity exists, 
including the smallest microbe or single atom, are so manifold, that it would 
be impossible for any human being to describe them all, not only because of 
their uncountable number of modes, but also because they are constantly 
changing their character.  The word "exist" [which the Greeks didn't have] 
was introduced in order to differentiate between this "simple existence" and 
the "existential modalities" or the WAY entities exist, in order to avoid the 
confusion that the Greek lack of such a term imposed upon philosophical 
discussion. The persistence of people like Heidegger in restoring the term "
Being" for purposes of philosophical discussion, together with the resultant 
confusion which it reintroduces merely undoes the work of others who 
attempted to clarify discourse in this area as is amply demonstrated by the 
arguments now taking place on the list..

(2) The second way of talking about the things that exist in the world, is to 
talk about the WAY or MANNER in which they exist, their shape, their colour, 
their position, their name, what belongs to them, their number, what sort of 
things they are according to human classificational parameters, and all the 
other countless billions of things that we can say about them and the way 
that they exist, or the way that they used to exist, or the way they might 
exist in the future.  In order to describe the way entities exist we employ 
the BE-word which we morph into various conjugations (like we do with verbs) 
in order to introduce additional  temporal and numerical information.

These then are the two ways that we talk about that which exist - but there 
is no "ontological difference" involved, for once an entity is named it  is 
nominally extant  or "sententially  extant" for the purposes of  making some 
comment about it, though that of course does not mean that it actually exists 
in the real world as an actual spatial and temporal object.  Some [many] of 
these subjects of sentences are not actual entities  [either imaginary or 
real] at all, but reifications of actions, whereby something abstract is 
regarded [for communicational convenience] as a material thing. Many 
transcendentalists appear oblivious to this practice, and treat reificational 
abstractions as if they ACTUALLY EXIST, much to the frustration of most 
linguistic philosophers..
> 
> Michael:

I'm sure that for reasons utterly and totally different to yours, it could be 
indeed argued that the ontological difference is not a being (is 
> not some thing or matter that has ever been, now or to come), i.e., is not, 
> or in your terms -- does not exist --, in my terms -- can not 'exist'/be 
> because it is existence itself -- (like the untimely difference between 
> time and its moments), but this does not imply that it is nothing just 
> because it is not a thing; rather it could mean that the ontological 
> difference is not another different thing from being and beings; it is 
> difference as such, difference-qua-difference.

Jud:
Your employment of the word "existence"  is an apt example of  the promotion 
of a state [the state of existing] to that of a  something
definite or even tangible, whereas of course it is simple a grammatical 
category to describe the state or fact  of some entity or entiities, [or all 
the entities in the cosmos] as existing.  As for "time" and its "moments - I 
don't believe for one minute :-)  that either exist, other than [like "Being" 
] as mentalisations of the human mind created for our organisational 
convenience, and based upon the movements of our earth around the sun and the 
phases of the moon etc.  

Michael:
> It could be argued that there is no difference between being and beings and 
> that such a collapse means that only beings are in any sense and that 
> therefore the being of any being is just that being and nothing else (and 
> remember, oh sophon, that a being is anything whatsoever that can be said 
> to be, to have been or to yet be), 

Jud:
You may argue that there is no difference between being and beings, but it is 
all contingent upon what you mean when you employ the 
word being and beings. If you mean by being, the material  or basic 
building-blocks of matter [material-energy] of which all the entities in the 
universe are composed then you may well be right, but there still remains the 
fact that all beings are different, and not one entity in the cosmos is 
exactly the same as another, and it is precisely to describe these 
existential differentations that we have the BE-word which we use in our 
{SVO] sentences to signal that what come next is particular  information 
regarding a subject's former,  present or future way of being the entity it 
is or existing in that particular  molecular format.


Michael:
and this is the view that positivists and scientists and others hold to 
whilst nonetheless employing the very resource of such a 
> difference between beings and their being in even recognising beings as such 
> and as they are. But, sorry, I digress... over to you.
> 

Jud:
The bottom line?  Heidegger is totally confused as to the different uses of 
"BE" and "EXIST."  This may have come about  because although the BE-word is 
never employed to address "simple existence" and is restricted to signalling 
the attribution of predicational information regarding the MANNER in which a 
subject exists, the EXIST-word is sometimes employed to do both tasks as in:
"The American Marines exist as a well-trained combat force ready for instant 
action in any emergency."  Here it is the little "as" word that is the 
enabler of existential modality and transforms the mechanism of  "simple 
existence"  to the way the Marines exist.
It doesn't work both ways, for the BE-word operates indicatively of state or 
modality only,  and we are find ourselves in the existential doo-doo 
immediately if we try: "The American Marines are."   "The theological "God 
is," is an exception in that it bespeaks of God's total Gesamtsumme [nexus] 
as being "God."  [God exists in the state of being God.]  To use this form of 
speech for anything else other than the Godhead results in total confusion 
with responses such as: "The American Marines are...what?"

>  
Cheers,

Jud.

<A HREF="http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/ ">http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/</A> 
Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
<A HREF="http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com">http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com</A>

--part1_25.368d3321.2bb73d9f_boundary

HTML VERSION:

In a message dated 29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time, michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk writes:


Subj:Re: Being and Time-section 2
Date:29/03/2003 15:34:33 GMT Standard Time
From:    michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk (michaelP)
Sender:    owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Reply-to: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
To:    heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu




Jud speaking confidently of Heidegger wrote recently:

> He persists in positing a spurious "ontological difference"=20where none exists.

Since you are so very sure of its non-existence, its non-being, pray tell us what you understand of the "ontological difference" (as Heidegger and some of the rest of us here on this list have struggled with) you so adamantly dismiss as non-existent or nonsense, that we may see why and how (given your profound understanding of it) it is as you proclaim (non-existent and thus nonsense); and please, do not spare us the depths and lengths=20of your profundity of understanding (of what Heidegger means by his term) in this regard, chapter and verse please if possible (many of us have lots of=20Heidegger texts available).


Jud:
We must first of all consider the two ways in which we talk about those=20things that exist, and here I am not referring to the so-called "ontic" and the so-called "ontological,"  differences, but rather the way that we describe on the one hand:

(1)  the fact or reality of an entity being present or existing in=20the cosmos, or "being found" [as the Swedes say] in the cosmos. Some=20philosophical  linguists refer to this as "simple existence"  or sometimes "simple presence."  The term "simple existence" is employed in that there is no elaboration as to the 'way' or 'manner' or 'mode' in which the entity exists.  It is in fact more difficult=20than one supposes to make  a statement of this nature, and it NEVER WORKS if one attempts to employ the BE-word in any of its forms for this purpose, for the
 BE-word ["is"  etc.] always addresses the WAY an entity exists, and NOT the FACT that it it simply exists.  It doesn't need a great deal of concentration to work out that for any entity to exist it must exist IN A CERTAIN  way or  number of ways or modalities.  In fact the modalities/states in which any entity exists, including the smallest microbe or single atom, are so manifold, that it would be impossible for any human being to describe them all, not only because of their uncountable number of modes, but also because they are constantly changing their character.  The word "exist" [which the Greeks didn't have] was introduced in order to differentiate between this "simple existence" and the "existential modalities" or the WAY entities exist, in order to avoid the confusion that the Greek lack of such a term imposed upon philosophical discussion. The persistence of people like Heidegger in restoring the term "Being" for purposes of philosophical discussion, together with the resultant confusion which it reintroduces merely undoes the work of others who attempted to clarify discourse in this area as is amply demonstrated by the arguments now taking place on the list..

(2) The second way of talking about the things that exist in the world,=20is to talk about the WAY or MANNER in which they exist, their shape, their colour, their position, their name, what belongs to them, their number, what=20sort of things they are according to human classificational parameters, and=20all the other countless billions of things that we can say about them and the way that they exist, or the way that they used to exist, or the way they might exist in the future.  In order to describe the way entities exist=20we employ the BE-word which we morph into various conjugations (like we do with verbs) in order to introduce additional  temporal and numerical information.

These then are the two ways that we talk about that which exist - but there is no "ontological difference" involved, for once an entity is named it  is nominally extant  or "sententially  extant" for the purposes of  making some comment about it, though that of course does not mean that it actually exists in the real world as an actual spatial and temporal object.  Some [many] of these subjects of sentences are not actual entities  [either imaginary or real] at all, but reifications of actions, whereby something abstract is regarded [for communicational convenience] as a material thing. Many transcendentalists appear oblivious to this practice, and treat reificational abstractions as if they ACTUALLY EXIST, much to the frustration of most linguistic philosophers..


Michael:


I'm sure that for reasons utterly and totally different to yours, it could be indeed argued that the ontological difference is not a being (is
not some thing=20or matter that has ever been, now or to come), i.e., is not, or in your terms -- does not exist --, in my terms -- can not 'exist'/be because it is existence itself -- (like the untimely difference between time and its moments), but this does not imply that it is nothing just because it is not a thing;=20rather it could mean that the ontological difference is not another different thing from being and beings; it is difference as such, difference-qua-difference.


Jud:
Your employment of the word "existence"  is an apt example of  the promotion of a state [the state of existing] to that of a  something
definite or even tangible, whereas of course it is simple a grammatical=20category to describe the state or fact  of some entity or entiities, [or all the entities in the cosmos] as existing.  As for "time" and its "moments - I don't believe for one minute :-)  that either exist, other than [like "Being" ] as mentalisations of the human mind created for=20our organisational convenience, and based upon the movements of our earth around the sun and the phases of the moon etc.  


Michael:

It could be argued that there is no difference between being and beings and that such a collapse means that only beings are in any sense and that therefore the being of any being is just that being and nothing else (and remember, oh sophon, that a being is anything whatsoever that can be said to be, to have been or to yet be),


Jud:
You may argue that there is no difference between being and beings, but=20it is all contingent upon what you mean when you employ the
word being and beings. If you mean by being, the material  or basic building-blocks of matter [material-energy] of which all the entities in the universe are composed then you may well be right, but there still remains=20the fact that all beings are different, and not one entity in the cosmos is=20exactly the same as another, and it is precisely to describe these existential differentations that we have the BE-word which we use in our {SVO] sentences to signal that what come next is particular  information regarding=20a subject's former,  present or future way of being the entity it is or existing in that particular  molecular format.



Michael:
and this is the view that positivists and scientists and others hold to=20whilst nonetheless employing the very resource of such a

difference between beings and their being in even recognising beings as such and as they are. But, sorry, I digress... over to you.


Jud:
The bottom line?  Heidegger is totally confused as to the different uses of "BE" and "EXIST."  This may have come about  because although the BE-word is never employed to address "simple existence" and is restricted to signalling the attribution of predicational information regarding=20the MANNER in which a subject exists, the EXIST-word is sometimes employed to do both tasks as in:
"The American Marines exist as a well-trained combat force ready for=20instant action in any emergency."  Here it is the little "as" word=20that is the enabler of existential modality and transforms the mechanism of=20 "simple existence"  to the way the Marines exist.
It doesn't work both ways, for the BE-word operates indicatively of state or modality only,  and we are find ourselves in the existential doo-doo immediately if we try: "The American Marines are."   "The theological "God is," is an exception in that it bespeaks of God's=20total Gesamtsumme [nexus] as being "God."  [God exists in the state of=20being God.]  To use this form of speech for anything else other than the Godhead results in total confusion with responses such as: "The American Marines are...what?"



Cheers,

Jud.

http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/
Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com
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