From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2003 10:54:42 EST
Subject: Being and Time-section 2 Part Two



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Part two


Michael:
Both existence and essence (as ways of speaking philosophically of a being) 
allude to the ways a being stands out (from nothingness: 
> existence; from other beings: essence), irrupts from what it is not, in a 
> word: presences [I know you will cringe, but bear with me if you can...]. 
> This "standing out" is surely not identical to the being (thing, entity, 
> etc) that stands out; if it (the outstanding) is not the same as what is 
> outstanding (the being, thing, entity that is so outstanding), then it is 
> 

Jud:
You are simply employing or reverting to the etymological source of the word 
"existence" in an effort to find a way around it. As you are speaking in 
traditional philosophical language  the words you are using are all 
reifications or abstractions relating to the "ways" an entity stands out from 
nothingness.  The standing out is not at all different from the entity itself 
but is merely the behaviour of the conglomerate, nexus or Gesamptsumme of 
component parts which "get together" to enable the standing out of  what we 
recognise and label as a certain type of entity.
When you thing about it [forgetting for a moment about the different versions 
of  origins of the universe] everything that we see around us - your own hand 
and the plastic mouse that you hold - the screen before you - none of that 
came out of nothingness - it all is made of somethingness.
When the plastic mouse is stamped out and moulded in the factory and stands 
out as a plastic mouse the WAY it stands out is the WAY it is present in the 
world now, whereas earlier  "it" or the material it was made from, existed as 
a handful of plastic granules. When you die, Michael, or more properly the 
material you were made from will exist or stand out in a different way, but 
its standing out and its entitic form always corresponds. That is why in 
spite of all the constant change that entities undergo whilst they exist as 
the entities belonging to one of our categories, there is continual 
correspondence between the fact of it being present and the way that it is 
present - there is no ontological difference but absolute  entitic 
existential congruity - an entity IS its states and its modalities.

Michael:
And what is this difference between the outstanding of what stands out and 
the being that stands out? 

Jud:
None. The very mention of the standing out is a redundancy.  It is a similar  
redundancy as if we said:
"Michael Pennamacoor exists as Michael Pennamacoor." for if  the entity which 
corresponds to the name Michael Pennamacoor didn't exist we wouldn't be 
talking about him in the first place, and there is no ontological difference 
between standing out as Michael Pennamacoor and being the entity which 
corresponds to the referent name:Michael Pennamacoor.
If we simply stated: "Michael Pennamacoor exists." then we know full well 
that Michael Pennamacoor exists as Michael Pennamacoor. 
If we want to add something concerning the modality in which Michael 
Pennamacoor  exists, we may do so by employing the BE-word to say something 
like:
"Michael Pennamacoor is known as Fred Bloggs." but that is not a comment 
about the fact that  the referent of MP exists, but the manner in which he 
exists as being known as Fred Bloggs, because for Michael Pennamacoor  to be 
known as Fred Bloggs he must exist - either in reality or sententially for 
the purpose of being talked about as Michael Pennamacoor  the subject of a 
sentence


Michael:
Such a difference cannot itself stand out  
> like a being or thing that is outstanding since if it did it could not 
> provide the difference because it too would need another difference, ad 
> infinitum... So, roughly, and far-too-briefly, I fancy that in walking 
> (partly with you) your path concerning the two ways of speaking 
> philosophically concerning beings , things, etc, we have nonetheless 
> arrived in the vicinity and precincts of the ontological difference (in 
> that it is presupposed, taken for granted, engendered, etc, by such a pair 
> 


Jud:
Perhaps my comments above may provide thought for a reappraisal of this 
notion?

> >> >>> 
>>> 
>> 

Michael:
I'm sure that for reasons utterly and totally different to yours, it could be 
indeed argued that the ontological difference is not a being (is 
not some thing or matter that has ever been, now or to come), i.e., is not, 
or in your terms -- does not exist --, in my terms -- can not 'exist'/be 
because it is existence itself -- (like the untimely difference between time 
and its moments), but this does not imply that it is nothing just because it 
is not a thing; rather it could mean that the ontological difference is not 
another different thing from being and beings; it is difference as such, 
difference-qua-difference.


Jud: 
Your employment of the word "existence" is an apt example of  the promotion 
of a state [the state of existing] to that of a  something 
definite or even tangible, whereas of course it is simple a grammatical 
category to describe the state or fact  of some entity or entities, [or all 
the entities in the cosmos] as existing.  As for "time" and its "moments - I 
don't believe for one minute :-)  that either exist, other than [like "Being" 
] as mentalisations of the human mind created for our organisational 
convenience, and based upon the movements of our earth around the sun and the 
phases of the moon etc.


michael:
I don't want to get all hung up on a wrongly poised discussion of the 
'proper' meaning of terms that are used philosophically (i.e., they are a 
starting point to a questioning of things... and not the point itself) and 
not in an ordinary sense (again, we are talking philosophically and 
'ordinary' speech does not insofar as it is 'ordinary' engage in speaking 
philosophically about the beings of its concern). Would it be better if I 
said "existing" rather than "existence"? I mean to make a distinction between 
an existing thing and its very existing as the thing it is, is all.


Jud:
The word "existing" is preferable in the sense that it is unambiguous having 
the meaning of  " being continuously present "  En passant I have often felt 
that the terminology of philosophy to a large extent gets in the way of 
philosophical discussion, and that ordinary folk do think and talk about 
philosophical questions much more than is supposed - they just use a simpler 
and in many cases clearer language. Increasingly...particularly with the 
popularisation of philosophy the gap between "us and them" is closing rapidly.


> >> Michael: 
>> It could be argued that there is no difference between being and beings 
>> and that such a collapse means that only beings are in any sense and that 
>> therefore the being of any being is just that being and nothing else (and 
>> remember, oh sophon, that a being is anything whatsoever that can be said 
>> to be, to have been or to yet be), 
>> 
>> 
>> Jud: 
>> You may argue that there is no difference between being and beings, but it 
>> is all contingent upon what you mean when you employ the 
>> word being and beings. If you mean by being, the material  or basic 
>> building-blocks of matter [material-energy] of which all the entities in 
>> the universe are composed then you may well be right, but there still 
>> remains the fact that all beings are different, and not one entity in the 
>> cosmos is exactly the same as another, and it is precisely to describe 
>> these existential differentiations that we have the BE-word which we use 
>> in our {SVO] sentences to signal that what come next is particular  
>> information regarding a subject's former,  present or future way of being 
>> the entity it is or existing in that particular  molecular format.
>> 
>> 
> 
michael:
michael-qua-michael is not arguing for the collapse of the difference between 
being and beings: I was walking your way of ways in order to see where it 
leads, is all.

Seeing being as mattergy or substance (as you describe above) is precisely 
the making over of being as one (kind of) being and once again presupposes 
the distinction we are discussing.


Jud:
Do I take it that we are agreed that there is only one kind of basic 
component and that is mattergy?  


> >> 
>> 
>> Michael: 
>> and this is the view that positivists and scientists and others hold to 
>> whilst nonetheless employing the very resource of such a 
>> >>> difference between beings and their being in even recognising beings as 
>>> such and as they are. But, sorry, I digress... over to you. 
>>> 
>> 

Jud: 
The bottom line?  Heidegger is totally confused as to the different uses of 
"BE" and "EXIST."  This may have come about  because although the BE-word is 
never employed to address "simple existence" and is restricted to signalling 
the attribution of predicational information regarding the MANNER in which a 
subject exists, the EXIST-word is sometimes employed to do both tasks as in: 
"The American Marines exist as a well-trained combat force ready for instant 
action in any emergency." Here it is the little "as" word that is the enabler 
of existential modality and transforms the mechanism of  "simple existence"  
to the way the Marines exist. 
It doesn't work both ways, for the BE-word operates indicatively of state or 
modality only,  and we are find ourselves in the existential doo-doo 
immediately if we try: "The American Marines are."   "The theological "God 
is," is an exception in that it bespeaks of God's total Gesamtsumme [nexus] 
as being "God."  [God exists in the state of being God.]  To use this form of 
speech for anything else other than the Godhead results in total confusion 
with responses such as: "The American Marines are...what?" 


michael:
Here you are just once more iterating what you always say or imply about 
Heidegger's 'mistakes' in his use of what you call "the BE-word" etc. What 
you have not answered is my basic question concerning why you deny the 
ontological difference, and even though you have iterated once more such a 
denial, you have not shown how, given your thorough understanding of this 
Heideggerian term, such a denial should be admitted into philosophical 
discussion, and, you have not shown your understanding of this term in order 
to reason its not-existing that you have stated. 

Jud:
I have indicated in quite some detail that the "ontological difference" is 
posited on a misunderstanding of the BE-word in relation to the EXIST-word 
which is compounded by Heidegger  in error by the actualisation of 
reifications and abstractions of verbs converted and treated as if they 
really existed - words like "Being" existence, existentia, essentia, and many 
more. 

Michael:
So far, in attempting to follow you once more you have only led me into the 
precincts of the traditional metaphysics I'm sure you would cringe 
> and rave at as "transcendentalist" etc. Somewhere, Heidegger has performed 
> an extraordinary analysis of Aristotle (of 'The Metaphysics') in his 
> speaking of the primordial distinction between whatness and thatness (as 
> different kinds of the same...). [Does anyone know where? it could open up 
> this discussion much further if we could pore over the text. I know I have 
> 

Jud:
For me it is inconceivable that "whatness" and "thatness"  can be different - 
it is impossible for an entity to exist in any other way than the way it 
exists - there is no ontological dichotomy between existing and existing the 
way you are - it is precisely the same thing.

> 
> 


Jud.



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Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
<A HREF="http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com/">http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com</A>



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