File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0303, message 484


From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2003 15:27:41 EST
Subject: Re: Being and Time-section 2



--part1_93.2c6b3f43.2bb8ad3d_boundary
Content-Language: en

In a message dated 30/03/2003 19:04:43 GMT Daylight Time,
riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au writes:


> Subj:Re: Being and Time-section 2
> Date:30/03/2003 19:04:43 GMT Daylight Time
> From:    riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au (Malcolm Riddoch)
> Sender:    owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> Reply-to: <A HREF="mailto:heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu">heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu</A>
> To:    heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>
>
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 29, 2003, at 08:40  PM, GEVANS613-AT-aol.com wrote in
> reply to my suggestion that:
>
> > we all more or less understand without even thinking about it what it
> > means to say
> > something or other 'is' something... yes?
>
>
> > Jud:
> > No. It is the basic and fundamental misunderstanding of "is" [the
> > BE-word in its many conjugational guises] that subverts the whole of
> > Heideggerianism
> > and renders all that is extrapolated from this elementary misconstrual
> > totally vacuous. Heidegger's disarray can be found in his inability to
> > understand the role of the IS-word in that it only ever applies to the
> > existential modality of entities, and NEVER corresponds to the meaning
> > of simple presence rather than non-presence, in the sense of: "Little
> > blue men exist on Mars." If we say: "There are little blue men on
> > Mars" we are using "there" as a pronoun, and the meaning of the
> > sentence is one describing the existential modality of the little blue
> > men as one of being on Mars. It does not address the simple
> > "existence" of the little blue men per se. He persists in positing a
> > spurious "ontological difference" where none exists.
>
> hmmmm... so this email text for instance, it is what it is, at least I
> assume someone called Jud is reading this and implicitly understands
> its simple existence as what it is whenever he reads it, and will
> perhaps respond and send yet more text as he has done in the past.

Jud:
Ahhhhhh yes...this text certainly exists in the modality of  email, and the
person who is referenced by and  who exists
in the existential identificatory modality of Jud implicitly understands that
the existential modality of
the text is being addressed, and not its simple existence, for otherwise you
would have typed
something to the effect that the text simply exists, rather than describing
the mode or state of its existing
as email text.

Malcolm:
> Speaking for myself I can simply read this stuff without necessarily
> needing to think that it actually is an email, I don't have to
> explicitly think about its actuality, but still it is what it is...
> whatever you might think.


Jud:
We are addressing the way the mind thinks and  talks in natural language
about entities,
in two distinct ways.  You have demonstrated perfectly my point that when the
IS-word is employed
it always addresses existential modality even in the loose, repetitive,
tautologous vernacular language above, for what your text
says in effect is: that the email text exists in the existential modality of 
email text, in the same way that Popeye used to say
in an emphatic restatement and celebration of selfhood  - a repetition of 
the same existential  modality  in recapitulatory words: "I yam whad I yam
whad I yam"
which is of course Popeye existing in the existential  state of being Popeye
>
> Malcolm:

And generally in everyday usage we don't have to consider ontological
> meanings when we refer to things - if I say 'hey jud, check out your
> computer screen... it's what it is and it's certainly something' you
> can just look at it and agree with me... yes? I'd hope so, cos it
> should be already meaningful to you as what it already is in a general,
> unexplicated yet eminently obvious everyday sense, and without getting
> philosophical. On the basis of this simple notion of the 'being' of the
> screen we can then go on to argue about how we might put this being
> into words and then argue about the grammatical structure and semantics
> of those statements. But the fact that we can talk about 'something'
> implies that 'something' is already understood by us in some way or
> another, and that 'something' is already perceptible as what it is.

Jud:
You are perfectly correct when you say that "generally in everyday usage we
don't have to consider ontological
> meanings when we refer to things" for our minds have developed that way of
> thousands of years.
> Again the unusual  tautologous example you cite of my computer screen being
> what it is does not
> mean that the screen has any "Being"  - it simply exists or is present in
> the way it exists and "has" no "Being"
> You, along with Heidegger having fallen at the first hurdle of existential
> understanding, may well proceed
> to put this non-existent and totally imagined  "Being"  into words, and
> then argue {and you Heideggerians certainly
do a lot of that amongst yourselves] about the grammatical structure and
>


>
> Malcolm:

That's where ontology starts, and Heidegger's question of being is a
> fundamental ontological question, as far as I'm concerned it's all very
> simple and quite straightforward.

Jud:
Then it's a false start, for the  trouble with Heidegger's question of
"Being"  is that there isn't any question of "Being" to question.
As far as you are concerned it may well be all very simple and quite
straightforward, but that doesn't seem
to be the case with many of your fellow list members.

There are entities in the world which are present, and there are no entities
in the world which are not present.
Those entities in the world which are present, are present in a certain way
or ways which we call states, modes, manners and ways, etc.,
they "have" no accompanying  reificational attachments - no spiritous
gerundial adherences - no metaphysical fellow-travellers or non-figurative
collaborators,
they are simply present in the world and exist as they exist, being in the
world unencumbered by any  "Being"  in the world in the way that they exist.
The only dancing-partner a dancer has is his or her  dancing partner, he or
she  doesn't have a "Dancing" or a "Being" too. There is no
 ectoplasmic substance oozing or  emanating from their heels and the top of
their heads, slyly shadowing them like some non-objective, ontological
marionette  - just the dancers and the music -  existing as they exist
swaying to the beat of the rhythm  -  out there "Beingless" on the
dance-floor.



Shall we dance?  :-)

And there they danced on Sunnan Isle to R=C3=B6nnerdahl=E2=80=99s violin,

With wind, with waves and last years snow, and memories of sin.

They danced until the silvery dawn suffused the morning sky,

And the southern cuckoo's magic call had witched away the night.

And R=C3=B6nnerdahl applied his bow, his eyes were raised above,

His mind was full of olden days and escapades of love.





And little Eva danced outside with Ensign Rosenberg,

Her face was red, her eyes ashine, her breathing fast and heavy,

But R=C3=B6nnerdahl's intensely pale, and getting in his stride,

His soul is riding on a cloud where Eva is his bride,

He soars above lustrous mists on music's golden wing,

To a land love and tenderness - where lies eternal spring.



>From   The Dance on Sunnan Isle By Nils.  B. S=C3=B6derstr=C3=B6m
(R=C3=B6nnerdahl is the blind, beingless violist)
translated by Jud Evans.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Jud.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

--part1_93.2c6b3f43.2bb8ad3d_boundary

HTML VERSION:

Content-Language: en In a message dated 30/03/2003 19:04:43 GMT Daylight Time, riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au writes:


Subj:Re: Being and Time-section 2
Date:30/03/2003 19:04:43 GMT Daylight Time
From:    riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au (Malcolm Riddoch)
Sender:    owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Reply-to: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
To:    heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu





On Saturday, March 29, 2003, at 08:40  PM, GEVANS613-AT-aol.com wrote=20in
reply to my suggestion that:

> we all more or less understand without even thinking about it what=20it
> means to say
> something or other 'is' something... yes?


> Jud:
> No. It is the basic and fundamental misunderstanding of "is" [the
> BE-word in its many conjugational guises] that subverts the whole of
> Heideggerianism
> and renders all that is extrapolated from this elementary misconstrual
> totally vacuous. Heidegger's disarray can be found in his inability to
> understand the role of the IS-word in that it only ever applies to=20the
> existential modality of entities, and NEVER corresponds to the meaning
> of simple presence rather than non-presence, in the sense of: "Little
> blue men exist on Mars." If we say: "There are little blue men on
> Mars" we are using "there" as a pronoun, and the meaning of the
> sentence is one describing the existential modality of the little blue
> men as one of being on Mars. It does not address the simple
> "existence" of the little blue men per se. He persists in positing=20a
> spurious "ontological difference" where none exists.

hmmmm... so this email text for instance, it is what it is, at least I
assume someone called Jud is reading this and implicitly understands
its simple existence as what it is whenever he reads it, and will
perhaps respond and send yet more text as he has done in the past.


Jud:
Ahhhhhh yes...this text certainly exists in the modality of  email, and the person who is referenced by and  who exists
in the existential identificatory modality of Jud implicitly understands that the existential modality of
the text is being addressed, and not its simple existence, for otherwise you would have typed
something to the effect that the text simply exists, rather than describing the mode or state of its existing
as email text.

Malcolm:
Speaking for myself I can simply read this stuff without necessarily
needing to think that it actually is an email, I don't have to
explicitly think about its actuality, but still it is what it is...
whatever you might think.



Jud:
We are addressing the way the mind thinks and  talks in natural language about entities,
in two distinct ways.  You have demonstrated perfectly my point that when the IS-word is employed
it always addresses existential modality even in the loose, repetitive,=20tautologous vernacular language above, for what your text
says in effect is: that the email text exists in the existential modality of  email text, in the same way that Popeye used to say
in an emphatic restatement and celebration of selfhood  - a repetition of  the same existential  modality  in recapitulatory words: "I yam whad I yam whad I yam"
which is of course Popeye existing in the existential  state of being Popeye.


Malcolm:


And generally in everyday usage we don't have to consider ontological
meanings when we refer to things - if I say 'hey jud, check out your
computer screen... it's what it is and it's certainly something' you
can just look at it and agree with me... yes? I'd hope so, cos it
should be already meaningful to you as what it already is in a general,
unexplicated yet eminently obvious everyday sense, and without getting
philosophical. On the basis of this simple notion of the 'being' of the
screen we can then go on to argue about how we might put this being
into words and then argue about the grammatical structure and semantics
of those statements. But the fact that we can talk about 'something'
implies that 'something' is already understood by us in some way or
another, and that 'something' is already perceptible as what it is.


Jud:
You are perfectly correct when you say that "generally in everyday usage we don't have to consider ontological
meanings when we refer to things" for our minds have developed that way of thousands of years.
Again the unusual  tautologous example you cite of my computer screen being what it is does not
mean that the screen has any "Being"  - it simply exists or is present in the way it exists and "has" no "Being"
You, along with Heidegger having fallen at the first hurdle of existential understanding, may well proceed
to put this non-existent and totally imagined  "Being"  into words, and then argue {and you Heideggerians certainly

do a lot of that amongst yourselves] about the grammatical structure and semantics
of those statements.




Malcolm:


That's where ontology starts, and Heidegger's question of being is a
fundamental ontological question, as far as I'm concerned it's all very
simple and quite straightforward.


Jud:
Then it's a false start, for the  trouble with Heidegger's question of "Being"  is that there isn't any question of "Being" to question.
As far as you are concerned it may well be all very simple and quite=20straightforward, but that doesn't seem
to be the case with many of your fellow list members.

There are entities in the world which are present, and there are no entities in the world which are not present.
Those entities in the world which are present, are present in a certain=20way or ways which we call states, modes, manners and ways, etc.,
they "have" no accompanying  reificational attachments - no spiritous gerundial adherences - no metaphysical fellow-travellers or non-figurative collaborators,
they are simply present in the world and exist as they exist, being in the world unencumbered by any  "Being"  in the world in the=20way that they exist.
The only dancing-partner a dancer has is his or her  dancing partner, he or she  doesn't have a "Dancing" or a "Being" too.=20There is no
ectoplasmic substance oozing or  emanating from their heels and the top of their heads, slyly shadowing them like some non-objective, ontological marionette  - just the dancers and the music -  existing as they exist swaying to the beat of the rhythm  -  out there "Beingless" on the dance-floor.



Shall we dance?  :-)

And there they danced on Sunnan Isle to R=C3=B6nnerdahl=E2=80=99s violin,
With wind, with waves and last years snow, and memories of sin.
They danced until the silvery dawn suffused the morning sky,
And the southern cuckoo's magic call had witched away the night.
And R=C3=B6nnerdahl applied his bow, his eyes were raised above,
His mind was full of olden days and escapades of love.


And little Eva danced outside with Ensign Rosenberg,
Her face was red, her eyes ashine, her breathing fast and heavy,
But R=C3=B6nnerdahl's intensely pale, and getting in his stride,
His soul is riding on a cloud where Eva is his bride,
He soars above lustrous mists on music's golden wing,
To a land love and tenderness - where lies eternal spring.


From   The Dance on Sunnan Isle By Nils.  B. S=C3=B6derstr=C3=B6m
(
R=C3=B6nnerdahl is the blind, beingless violist)
translated by Jud Evans.

Cheers,

Jud.

















--part1_93.2c6b3f43.2bb8ad3d_boundary-- --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005