From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2003 07:46:53 EST
Subject: Re: Being and Time-section 2



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In a message dated 31/03/2003 06:40:04 GMT Daylight Time, 
riddoch-AT-central.murdoch.edu.au writes: On Monday, March 31, 2003, at 04:27 
AM, GEVANS613-AT-aol.com wrote:

Ahhhhhh yes... this text certainly exists in the modality of email, and the 
person who is referenced by and who exists in the existential identificatory 
modality of Jud implicitly understands that the existential modality of the 
text is being addressed, and not its simple existence, for otherwise you 
would have typed something to the effect that the text simply exists, rather 
than describing the mode or state of its existing as email text.

Malcolm:
Huh? No really, you're just confusing yourself mate, it is quite simple. In 
order for you to talk about 'existential identificatory modalities', in order 
for you to talk at all about something, you must have already come to 
understand that something. 

Jud: 
It all depends on what you mean by the abstraction "understand" People 
understand things in different ways. The way that you perceive entities as 
"having" a "Being," is quite different to my understanding of entities simply 
being present in the world

Malcolm: 
Or put another way, the world is already meaningful before you start trying 
to put it into words and pull it apart into 'is statements'. Your entire 
analysis is epistemological rather than ontological, but we're talking about 
ontology here, and not just Heidegger's but ontology in general.

Jud: 
The world is meaningful to individuate human beings in different ways. It is 
when we try to communicate our version of this meaningfulness to others, and 
introduce our perception of other worldly entities being present sharing the 
world with us through language in our predicational descriptions of the 
states and modalities of these entities that the "exist-word" and the 
"is-word" are used. . 

Malcolm: 
Quine's up with this, even given his strident critique of ontology. What 
we're looking for is the 'sensory barrage' and how to explain it... that's 
the question of being. 

Jud: 
The sensory barrage is an imagined one - no explanation is possible for there 
is no question to be answered. The notion of "Being" is illusion merely the 
"standby" or "background" mode of our own consciousness or awareness, a 
version of which we attribute to other human and non-human entities

Malcolm: 
The logical positivists opted for a one to one correlation of language with 
sense percepts, Quine opts for 'myths' that more or less describe sense 
experience, phenomenology describes lived experience as a whole - 3 different 
ways of dealing with the 'being' question that nonetheless address ontology 
which is more than I can say for you.

Jud: 
I do not accept the positivist notion of a one to one correlation of language 
with sense perceptions, it is only when I embark on language production that 
my thoughts - the basic components in the formation of a concept are 
translated into words. I think a lot without using language, whereas some 
folk can only think [so some have told me] using words as if silently 
reading.  It is only when I wish to communicate by word of mouth or writing 
that I resort to specific language. Only if I am cogitating about specific 
subjects which require indentificatory labels do I "formalise" my thoughts 
into language. Sometimes when planning some project or event I mentalise 
actual names or wordsto facilitate the thinking. I can view an object 
phenomenologically, but it requires a certain degree of effort to close off 
my natural analyticality as to its provenance and its existential modes of 
being the object that it is.

Malcolm: 
The question of being is about that 'simple existence' you refer to, but 
considered ontologically and before you go off on one of your 'existential 
modality' rants. At this point in BT we're working with the most general of 
introductory statements and what we're dealing with isn't even particularly 
'Heideggerean', it's certainly phenomenological but it's also a very general 
philosophical statement about ontology.

Jud: 
It is precisely the general introductory statements in BT that present the 
danger, particularly when coming to Heidegger for the first time, for it is 
there that the fatal mistake concerning "is" and "Being" is deftly glossed 
over by the wily H. 

Malcolm:
And do you really not 'more or less understand without even thinking about it 
what it means to say something or other 'is' something'? Cos if so you must 
have a really hard time socially, wandering from one unidentified existential 
modality to the other and having to piece it all together on the fly while 
everyone else already just understands everything in an average kind of way.

Jud: 
In my daily life and conversations I treat the "is-word" like everybody else 
without even thinking about it. It is only in discussions of an ontological 
nature that "is" looms large and becomes so important. H realised its 
importance too - that's why he spent so much time trying to understand it. 
After saying: 
"Where and what "is" the "is"? he fails and abandons his attempt saying: 
"... I intentionally steer clear of a simple answer to the question as to 
where the "is" can be found." 
This from a man who writes a book about "Being!"  It's a mad, mad world!
So much for the quality of his "general or introductory statement." 

Cheers,

Jud.

http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/ 
Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
 http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com



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