From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: doing a chomsky?
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2003 07:51:14 +0000


John Foster wrote:

> > Huh? John there no clearer evidence of your ontic reading of the
>ontological
> > than this. To say that being-in-the-world encompasses any and every 
>"side"
> > does not mean that both sides are true, because being-false is also a 
>way
>of
> > being-in-the-world! The truth of a "side" is ONTIC truth, not 
>ontological
> > truth. So you are (yet again) interpreting ontological truth as ONTIC
>truth,
> > because you think that if fundamental ontology does not exclude either
>side,
> > then there can be no axiological truths or moral truths because all 
>sides
> > are true! That is a blatant conflation of ontic truth with ontological
> > truth.
>
>that is the implication of what you are claiming though. What you are now
>saying is that one-is-the-other.
>
>As you said, if 'every morality implies an im-morality', then every good
>intention implies a less altruistic intention. This is not simply the 
>making
>of a parallel comparison here, but, rather, 'the truth which has a 'side' 
>is
>not ontological truth.
>
>What you are saying is that a 'side' cannot have 'ontological truth', and
>the implication of course is that only that which has no sides can have
>'ontological truth', ie, a thing to have ontological truth must be
>'one-sided', ie have no 'sides'.

I didn't say "have". I said "IS". A side IS true ontically. Of course every 
side "HAS" ontological truth in the sense that ontological structure is 
exhibited in any ontic facticity. But that applies to ANY side John. 
Being-false as well as being-true, being-right as well as being-wrong, 
being-moral as well as being-immoral, being-correct as well as 
being-incorrect, are all ways of being-in-the-world. So fundamental ontology 
cannot possibly be "opposed" to any one of these "sides," or else we could 
not BE right as well as wrong, moral as well as immoral, correct as well as 
incorrect. The fact that we can BE any of these means that they are ALL ways 
of being-in-the-world. So if fundamental ontology does not exclude either 
"side," this does not mean that both an axiom and its contradictory are 
true, because being-false is also a way of being-in-the-world, and is 
therefore grounded in fundamental ontology too.

>Are you speaking 'from the perspective of the individual subject' or some
>'universal subject'? How does the good imply the bad in ethical judgements?

If you think that the US war in Iraq is ethically bad, then obviously you 
think that the opposite (not going to war in Iraq) would be ethically 
better. But since going to war in Iraq is obviously a way of 
being-in-the-world (since we ARE at war there), then fundamental ontology 
grounds BOTH the ethically good and the ethically bad. Therefore fundamental 
ontology cannot possibly "justify" or "support" ethical goods, because any 
ontological ground for the good will also apply to the bad. Take Sorge 
(care) for example. Malcolm made a vague proposal linking Heideggerian care 
to ethical goods such as peace and happiness, as opposed to suffering. But 
care means ANY kind of dealing, not just the kind opposed to suffering, so 
it cannot possibly be any ontological "justification" or "support" for 
happiness and peace over suffering.

Anthony Crifasi

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