From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: RE: o/o
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2003 05:18:30 +0000


Rene de Bakker wrote:

>Your historical argument is therefore completely off the mark, because 
>Kant's denial of any possibility of encountering the Other naturally leads 
>to a subjectivization of ethics, but this does not result if our encounter 
>with the Other is NOT denied and the ethical is CONSTITUTIVE of this very 
>encounter! That is what Levinas does.
>
>Anthony,
>
>In the CONSTITUTIVE is the subjectivity. Maybe you see better when Husserl
>and his grounding of intersubjectivity is compared. Heidegger's Mitsein is
>never constituted. Dasein is never constituted. (they are 'given'
>pre-ontologically)

Saying that mitsein is phenomenologically constitutIVE is different from 
saying that it is constitutED. Heidegger himself says that mitsein is 
constitutive of being-in-the-world, meaning that it is an ontological 
existential.

>I don't understand: "Kant's denial of any ...." etc. As far as rational, 
>all
>people ARE conjoint.

For Kant, we do not encounter others as they are in themselves at all, but 
only as "phenomena." So Kant limits knowledge by denying access to entities 
as they are. That of course results in total subjectivization. But Levinas 
and Heidegger limit knowledge not by denying access to the Other, but 
precisely by affirming this and making this phenomenologically prior to 
knowledge. That does not result in subjectivization. That is why your link 
between Levinas and Kant is simply inaccurate. The way Levinas limits 
knowledge is far closer to how Heidegger limits knowledge than to how Kant 
did.

>The history-less comparing of philosophers is the problem.
>Already when I hear the word 'interpretation', I get the feeling everything
>is lost. Heidegger's point is that Dasein cannot 'be', as long as 
>subjectivity
>reigns. Kant is one of those few who made a decisive step in the genesis
>of subjectivity: transcendental questioning, that is: questioning
>in  terms of conditions of possibilities. You read Heidegger as a bettered
>Kant.

Bettered yes, but precisely because Heidegger found a way to get BEYOND 
subjectivity through questioning in terms of conditions of possibilities. In 
other words, Heidegger found a way for phenomenology to reach entities as 
they are, thereby finally fulfilling the rallying cry of phenomenology: Back 
to the things themselves!

>I never said that "being right or wrong has no relationship to ontology." I 
>said that being right or wrong is an ontic facticity, not an ontological 
>existential. OF COURSE every ontic facticity has a "relationship" to 
>ontology, since the ontological is exhibited in every ontic facticity.
>
>rene:
>But this is (precisely) the ontological of metaphysics. The Being 
>(ontological)
>of beings (ontical)

What in the world are you talking about? Heidegger himself says that Being 
is not a being. That's not my interpretation - it's what he said. So that is 
hardly the ontological of metaphysics.

>Anthony,
>SuZ, Section 4: The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being, p. 12-13:
>
>"The task of an existential analytic of Dasein is in regard to its 
>possibility
>  and necessity fore-marked in the ontic constitution of Dasein.
>
>and p. 13, end:
>
>The existential analytics, however, is in the end EXISTENTIELL, that is:
>ONTICALLY rooted.

Of COURSE it's ontically "rooted" Rene! But that's different from saying 
that an existential is existentiell! If the analysis of the former is rooted 
in the latter, that doesn't mean that they are synonmous! Heidegger himself 
says many times that Being is not a being. That is all I mean.

Anthony Crifasi

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