File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0304, message 284


Subject: RE: o/o
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2003 15:46:27 +0200
From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl>




-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: Anthony Crifasi [mailto:crifasi-AT-hotmail.com]
Verzonden: woensdag 16 april 2003 7:19
Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Onderwerp: RE: o/o

>Your historical argument is therefore completely off the mark, because 
>Kant's denial of any possibility of encountering the Other naturally leads 
>to a subjectivization of ethics, but this does not result if our encounter 
>with the Other is NOT denied and the ethical is CONSTITUTIVE of this very 
>encounter! That is what Levinas does.


            >In the CONSTITUTIVE is the subjectivity. Maybe you see better when Husserl
            >and his grounding of intersubjectivity is compared. Heidegger's Mitsein is
            >never constituted. Dasein is never constituted. (they are 'given'
            >pre-ontologically)

Saying that mitsein is phenomenologically constitutIVE is different from 
saying that it is constitutED. Heidegger himself says that mitsein is 
constitutive of being-in-the-world, meaning that it is an ontological 
existential.

         So there is constitution, without something constituted?
         All right, that leaves the question, how do ontological existentials
         constitute?


>I don't understand: "Kant's denial of any ...." etc. As far as rational, 
>all
>people ARE conjoint.

For Kant, we do not encounter others as they are in themselves at all, but 
only as "phenomena." 


         Theoretically a man is an object as any other. But in Kant's view this gives
         the free way to a practical determination, wherein the spontaneity
         of the subject is the basis for autonomous action. Without this distinction,
         Kant says, man is merely an object for the law of causality.
         "I therefore had to suspend knowing, in order to make room for faith."  
         I dont't hold much of morals on the basis of (rational) coercion, but
         that's how the Kantian relation is. 

So Kant limits knowledge by denying access to entities as they are.

         Confusion cannot be greater. Heidegger's question for being a solution
         for the Kantian problematic of "Ding an sich". I hope, as the old
         German theologists said, that your confusion will be salutary
            

That of course results in total subjectivization. But Levinas 
and Heidegger limit knowledge not by denying access to the Other, but 
precisely by affirming this and making this phenomenologically prior to 
knowledge. That does not result in subjectivization. That is why your link 
between Levinas and Kant is simply inaccurate. The way Levinas limits 
knowledge is far closer to how Heidegger limits knowledge than to how Kant 
did.

>The history-less comparing of philosophers is the problem.
>Already when I hear the word 'interpretation', I get the feeling everything
>is lost. Heidegger's point is that Dasein cannot 'be', as long as 
>subjectivity reigns. Kant is one of those few who made a decisive step in the
>genesis of subjectivity: transcendental questioning, that is: questioning
>in  terms of conditions of possibilities. You read Heidegger as a bettered
>Kant.

Bettered yes, but precisely because Heidegger found a way to get BEYOND 
subjectivity through questioning in terms of conditions of possibilities. In 
other words, Heidegger found a way for phenomenology to reach entities as 
they are, thereby finally fulfilling the rallying cry of phenomenology: Back 
to the things themselves!

        The world then was and now is on fire, phenomenology having a party.


>I never said that "being right or wrong has no relationship to ontology." I 
>said that being right or wrong is an ontic facticity, not an ontological 
>existential. OF COURSE every ontic facticity has a "relationship" to 
>ontology, since the ontological is exhibited in every ontic facticity.
>
>rene:
>But this is (precisely) the ontological of metaphysics. The Being 
>(ontological)of beings (ontical)

What in the world are you talking about? Heidegger himself says that Being 
is not a being. That's not my interpretation - it's what he said. So that is 
hardly the ontological of metaphysics.


    Then you don't understand yourself. *You*, not Heidegger, said:
    "... the ontological is exhibited in every ontic facticity."
    So, if that is not (post-)metaphysical, what does it mean non-
    metaphysically? If you're not able to say something on that, or,
    more moderately, cannot even point to a beginning of a possible
    way to an understanding, you have apparently said too much. 
    And fooled those who you accuse of ontic constriction.
    (and meanwhile you want us to accept Powell's catenation of lies
     as true ontic statements, not realizing that they have nothing
     to do with truth or falsity, and everything with machination.)
         

>Anthony,
>SuZ, Section 4: The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being, p. 12-13:
>
>"The task of an existential analytic of Dasein is in regard to its 
>possibility
>  and necessity fore-marked in the ontic constitution of Dasein.
>
>and p. 13, end:
>
>The existential analytics, however, is in the end EXISTENTIELL, that is:
>ONTICALLY rooted.

Of COURSE it's ontically "rooted" Rene! But that's different from saying 
that an existential is existentiell! 

    Sure.

If the analysis of the former is rooted in the latter, that doesn't mean
that they are synonymous!

    Indeed. The relation is rather problematic.

Heidegger himself says many times that Being is not a being. That is all I mean.
   
     Well, everybody agrees on that, Anthony, even Jud. So stating ontological
     difference, is not enough to make a difference. 
     When H says, that Being is not a being, he means that we *don't* understand
     it, because we are familiar at first with beings, and not with the *meaning*
     of Being, which still has to be SHOWN, namely as what is asked for. 
     You, however, or anyone repeating Heidegger's dictum, that Being is not a being,
     accuse others, that they don't know what they're talking about, when they're
     talking of Being. Then you come with your o/o distinction, implying that *you*
     know by that the difference of Being and beings. But you don't know. Not because
     you're dumb, but because it cannot be KNOWN. Metaphysics knew about being. And
     specifically from Descartes on, the need is felt and responded to, that only
     certitude counts, when it comes to knowledge of being, re-grounding first knowledge
     (prima philosophia) in a new determination of 'subject'. 

     rene
           
         
Heidegger 2
In "The leap from ground" is spoken of a double reading of the principle "Nothing is 
without a ground." The prima facie reading: NOTHING is WITHOUT a cause, turns out to 
be a saying on beings, and not on Being. After 100 pages the other way of reading it
comes into sight: Nothing IS - without GROUND. Indirectly there still is something
said of Being. Not that Being has a ground, but that Being itself is groundlike (and
as such ab-ground). Then he reacts to a possible reclamation on the side of students:
why did he not go immediately to this more fundamental ontological reading, why did
the students have to come 10 times to hear the less fundamental, ontic reading? 
And then he explains, that without the first 100 pages there is not the realm to leap
off (Absprungbereich), a realm that even is not left out after leaping, but remains,
in Andenken. 

Now there is still one more (a.o.) complication, namely, that in 1929 Heidegger wrote
in "The essence of gound", that Leibniz principle of ground is not saying of Being,
but of beings, and immediately thereafter that therefore it is insufficient for a 
thinking of Being.
But now, in 1957, the fatal of a bare pointing to o/o, can be seen: fooled one more
time by that inconspicous self-evident principle, that only in Leibniz plays an
important role and before or after him nowhere, till Heidegger in 1957. All the time
it was right there in front, but it never showed itself questionworthy.  













   


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