Subject: RE: o/o Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2003 15:46:27 +0200 From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl> -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- Van: Anthony Crifasi [mailto:crifasi-AT-hotmail.com] Verzonden: woensdag 16 april 2003 7:19 Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Onderwerp: RE: o/o >Your historical argument is therefore completely off the mark, because >Kant's denial of any possibility of encountering the Other naturally leads >to a subjectivization of ethics, but this does not result if our encounter >with the Other is NOT denied and the ethical is CONSTITUTIVE of this very >encounter! That is what Levinas does. >In the CONSTITUTIVE is the subjectivity. Maybe you see better when Husserl >and his grounding of intersubjectivity is compared. Heidegger's Mitsein is >never constituted. Dasein is never constituted. (they are 'given' >pre-ontologically) Saying that mitsein is phenomenologically constitutIVE is different from saying that it is constitutED. Heidegger himself says that mitsein is constitutive of being-in-the-world, meaning that it is an ontological existential. So there is constitution, without something constituted? All right, that leaves the question, how do ontological existentials constitute? >I don't understand: "Kant's denial of any ...." etc. As far as rational, >all >people ARE conjoint. For Kant, we do not encounter others as they are in themselves at all, but only as "phenomena." Theoretically a man is an object as any other. But in Kant's view this gives the free way to a practical determination, wherein the spontaneity of the subject is the basis for autonomous action. Without this distinction, Kant says, man is merely an object for the law of causality. "I therefore had to suspend knowing, in order to make room for faith." I dont't hold much of morals on the basis of (rational) coercion, but that's how the Kantian relation is. So Kant limits knowledge by denying access to entities as they are. Confusion cannot be greater. Heidegger's question for being a solution for the Kantian problematic of "Ding an sich". I hope, as the old German theologists said, that your confusion will be salutary That of course results in total subjectivization. But Levinas and Heidegger limit knowledge not by denying access to the Other, but precisely by affirming this and making this phenomenologically prior to knowledge. That does not result in subjectivization. That is why your link between Levinas and Kant is simply inaccurate. The way Levinas limits knowledge is far closer to how Heidegger limits knowledge than to how Kant did. >The history-less comparing of philosophers is the problem. >Already when I hear the word 'interpretation', I get the feeling everything >is lost. Heidegger's point is that Dasein cannot 'be', as long as >subjectivity reigns. Kant is one of those few who made a decisive step in the >genesis of subjectivity: transcendental questioning, that is: questioning >in terms of conditions of possibilities. You read Heidegger as a bettered >Kant. Bettered yes, but precisely because Heidegger found a way to get BEYOND subjectivity through questioning in terms of conditions of possibilities. In other words, Heidegger found a way for phenomenology to reach entities as they are, thereby finally fulfilling the rallying cry of phenomenology: Back to the things themselves! The world then was and now is on fire, phenomenology having a party. >I never said that "being right or wrong has no relationship to ontology." I >said that being right or wrong is an ontic facticity, not an ontological >existential. OF COURSE every ontic facticity has a "relationship" to >ontology, since the ontological is exhibited in every ontic facticity. > >rene: >But this is (precisely) the ontological of metaphysics. The Being >(ontological)of beings (ontical) What in the world are you talking about? Heidegger himself says that Being is not a being. That's not my interpretation - it's what he said. So that is hardly the ontological of metaphysics. Then you don't understand yourself. *You*, not Heidegger, said: "... the ontological is exhibited in every ontic facticity." So, if that is not (post-)metaphysical, what does it mean non- metaphysically? If you're not able to say something on that, or, more moderately, cannot even point to a beginning of a possible way to an understanding, you have apparently said too much. And fooled those who you accuse of ontic constriction. (and meanwhile you want us to accept Powell's catenation of lies as true ontic statements, not realizing that they have nothing to do with truth or falsity, and everything with machination.) >Anthony, >SuZ, Section 4: The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being, p. 12-13: > >"The task of an existential analytic of Dasein is in regard to its >possibility > and necessity fore-marked in the ontic constitution of Dasein. > >and p. 13, end: > >The existential analytics, however, is in the end EXISTENTIELL, that is: >ONTICALLY rooted. Of COURSE it's ontically "rooted" Rene! But that's different from saying that an existential is existentiell! Sure. If the analysis of the former is rooted in the latter, that doesn't mean that they are synonymous! Indeed. The relation is rather problematic. Heidegger himself says many times that Being is not a being. That is all I mean. Well, everybody agrees on that, Anthony, even Jud. So stating ontological difference, is not enough to make a difference. When H says, that Being is not a being, he means that we *don't* understand it, because we are familiar at first with beings, and not with the *meaning* of Being, which still has to be SHOWN, namely as what is asked for. You, however, or anyone repeating Heidegger's dictum, that Being is not a being, accuse others, that they don't know what they're talking about, when they're talking of Being. Then you come with your o/o distinction, implying that *you* know by that the difference of Being and beings. But you don't know. Not because you're dumb, but because it cannot be KNOWN. Metaphysics knew about being. And specifically from Descartes on, the need is felt and responded to, that only certitude counts, when it comes to knowledge of being, re-grounding first knowledge (prima philosophia) in a new determination of 'subject'. rene Heidegger 2 In "The leap from ground" is spoken of a double reading of the principle "Nothing is without a ground." The prima facie reading: NOTHING is WITHOUT a cause, turns out to be a saying on beings, and not on Being. After 100 pages the other way of reading it comes into sight: Nothing IS - without GROUND. Indirectly there still is something said of Being. Not that Being has a ground, but that Being itself is groundlike (and as such ab-ground). Then he reacts to a possible reclamation on the side of students: why did he not go immediately to this more fundamental ontological reading, why did the students have to come 10 times to hear the less fundamental, ontic reading? And then he explains, that without the first 100 pages there is not the realm to leap off (Absprungbereich), a realm that even is not left out after leaping, but remains, in Andenken. Now there is still one more (a.o.) complication, namely, that in 1929 Heidegger wrote in "The essence of gound", that Leibniz principle of ground is not saying of Being, but of beings, and immediately thereafter that therefore it is insufficient for a thinking of Being. But now, in 1957, the fatal of a bare pointing to o/o, can be seen: fooled one more time by that inconspicous self-evident principle, that only in Leibniz plays an important role and before or after him nowhere, till Heidegger in 1957. All the time it was right there in front, but it never showed itself questionworthy. --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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