File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0304, message 32


From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: the o/o gulf
Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2003 19:53:01 +0000


Rene de Bakker wrote:

> >Do you have any idea how utterly absurd it is to characterize
> >being-in-the-world as a feeling? You are like a dog ...
>
>25-3-03 I quoted Heidegger, What is metaphysics:
>
>"What we so call 'feelings', is neither a fleeting companying-appearance
>of our discursive and voluntative behavior, nor a mere causing drive
>to such, nor a mere occurrent state, to which we come to terms
>one way or the other."
>
>But 'feelings', moods, Stimmungen, are "the fundamental happening
>of our Da-sein", non-occurrent, non-objectifiable Grundgeschehen.

Yes, NON-OCCURRENT, and NON-OBJECTIFIABLE. What I was criticizing above was 
John Foster's interpretation, which is definitely occurent and 
objectifiable. John was interpreting what Heidegger said about feelings too, 
but ontically, and trying to conclude that anxiety and being-in-the-world is 
an ontic feeling - occurrent and quite objectifiable. That is what I was 
objecting to. Feelings AS states-of-mind (i.e., ontologically) are 
constitutive, and therefore do not come and go, whereas ontic feelings come 
and go.

Anthony Crifasi

>If it is utterly absurd to characterize Dasein as feeling, then Heidegger,
>but also Leibniz and Nietzsche  - who says dozens of times, wtp is a
>feeling- , and in fact all real thinkers, in fact all people, are reduced 
>to
>absurdity.
>And that's where formal distinctions will bring you, no further
>than distinctions of analytical philosophy, or of whatever technique
>else. The ontological distinction, as presented by Anthony, is
>a FORMAL, an ABSTRACT distinction, and that it must be so,
>is clear when you read section 1: if we don't know what the
>word 'being' means, then we also can't know what the difference
>of being and beings is. They're just two words, two distinct things.
>Thomas knew, he is able to speak of being, of 'ens', but we don't,
>that's what Heidegger is saying by quoting him.
>This is also a nice example of the blindness, that is the consequence
>of insisting on knowing, and not on asking.
>
>"The  question for the sense of Being shall be POSED." Gestellt.
>Eine Frage stellen, posing a question, here, is not merely a linguistic
>speech-act, the problem itself must be given a place, where it then
>can remain. That is "stellen" when one avers the word as H does here.
>We know from what follows, that the question for Being can only
>be fixated, when Dasein as the exemplary being is questioned
>(befragt) Posing questions belongs to the mode of being of Dasein.
>So that, when a new question is to be posed, a new Dasein is
>required.


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