From: "John Foster" <borealis-AT-mercuryspeed.com>
Subject: Re: the o/o gulf
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2003 12:51:18 -0800


There is a philosophical definition of feelings.

I think I have stated many times what that definition is. No need to argue
ad infinitum what Anthony Crifasi has so commony and frequently failed to
dis-engage from thought. While on the one hand he argues for this massively
huge chasm or o/o gulf and on the other hand interprets dread or anxiety as
something which is not a state of mind. He is saying that there is something
which cannot be feeling, something he refers to as the 'ontological' and
then states that the only thing which can be felt is the ontic which is
invariably occurent, objectifiable, et cetera. [but read his last sentence]

There is really no use of the phrase "ontic feeling" anywhere that I have
come across in Heidegger's writings. Feeling has been used in modern
philosophy as a term for 'sensibility' or 'sense' which is certainly a
common term in Heideggers' philosophy.

Just to remind all, <befind> means "to feel" or something like that.
Heidegger writes that feeling anxious is a feeling. Now the term attunement
can be interpreted 'ontologically' - I have already sent a message about
this to this list, but again Anthony C. has is bleep bleep bleep ing
retreating into a defensive position for his widing O/O gulf chasm.

You see now how Anthony is saying that feelings are also states of mind, are
constitutive, and therefore are constitutive, or eternally present, but
non-states of mind, or "ontic feelings" only come and go....

I have to chuckle now....over the contradictions he has related.

sincerely

john



> >But 'feelings', moods, Stimmungen, are "the fundamental happening
> >of our Da-sein", non-occurrent, non-objectifiable Grundgeschehen.
>
> Yes, NON-OCCURRENT, and NON-OBJECTIFIABLE. What I was criticizing above
was
> John Foster's interpretation, which is definitely occurent and
> objectifiable. John was interpreting what Heidegger said about feelings
too,
> but ontically, and trying to conclude that anxiety and being-in-the-world
is
> an ontic feeling - occurrent and quite objectifiable. That is what I was
> objecting to. Feelings AS states-of-mind (i.e., ontologically) are
> constitutive, and therefore do not come and go, whereas ontic feelings
come
> and go.
>
> Anthony Crifasi
>
> >If it is utterly absurd to characterize Dasein as feeling, then
Heidegger,
> >but also Leibniz and Nietzsche  - who says dozens of times, wtp is a
> >feeling- , and in fact all real thinkers, in fact all people, are reduced
> >to
> >absurdity.
> >And that's where formal distinctions will bring you, no further
> >than distinctions of analytical philosophy, or of whatever technique
> >else. The ontological distinction, as presented by Anthony, is
> >a FORMAL, an ABSTRACT distinction, and that it must be so,
> >is clear when you read section 1: if we don't know what the
> >word 'being' means, then we also can't know what the difference
> >of being and beings is. They're just two words, two distinct things.
> >Thomas knew, he is able to speak of being, of 'ens', but we don't,
> >that's what Heidegger is saying by quoting him.
> >This is also a nice example of the blindness, that is the consequence
> >of insisting on knowing, and not on asking.
> >
> >"The  question for the sense of Being shall be POSED." Gestellt.
> >Eine Frage stellen, posing a question, here, is not merely a linguistic
> >speech-act, the problem itself must be given a place, where it then
> >can remain. That is "stellen" when one avers the word as H does here.
> >We know from what follows, that the question for Being can only
> >be fixated, when Dasein as the exemplary being is questioned
> >(befragt) Posing questions belongs to the mode of being of Dasein.
> >So that, when a new question is to be posed, a new Dasein is
> >required.
>
>
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