File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0304, message 429


Subject: RE: problem of technology
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2003 17:53:12 +0200
From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl>




-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: Anthony Crifasi [mailto:crifasi-AT-hotmail.com]
Verzonden: donderdag 24 april 2003 16:58
Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Onderwerp: RE: problem of technology



>Are you saying that for Heidegger, whatever "different attitude" towards
>technology may be in principle possible, still the bonding power of
>technology is so inescapable that technological Enframing must always be
>resisted?
>
>Anthony Crifasi
===================>
>          So inescapable that it must be ... accepted. Only then freedom
>          makes a chance. I know, sounds strange.

No I understand. But doesn't this freedom consist precisely in having the 
proper orientation towards technology as described in the last paragraph of 
the passage I quoted from the Discourse on Thinking? Hence Heidegger goes on 
in other passages about how technology enframing contains its own saving 
power, despite its tendency towards exclusivity.

What is 'saving', of what, from what, into what etc. ?
Saving (retten) is 'bringing into its essence, says H.
So we have something unconceivable, Gestell  - the fact that
it is talked about is no guarantee - , which is the Wesen of 
technique - and now even the Wesen of the Wesen of technique.

No, back to John's Befindlichkeit. I saw that in "What is metaphysics"
Befindlichkeit, as a everyday mood, is the decisive moment of the
lecture. It's the part directly in front of my earlier longer quote.
  


>          I don't deny that technology has to do with revealing. It has,
>          because of its origin. (Of itself it's only after the hiding
>          of revealing.) But only if this origin is not something
>          historical, but something that still *is* now. (Gewesenheit)
>          Using 'revealing' as a general concept, to be able to compare
>          different ways of revealing, such as also Michael Eldred did
>          with his cows, stands in utmost opposition to what is required 
>here:
>          the thinking together of what belongs together. (identity & 
>difference)
>          To say the most innocent: comparing is metaphysical.

Comparing DIFFERENCES is metaphysical, since differences imply different 
things (something "had" by one thing but "lacked" by another thing). But 
Heidegger still says that we can have a DIFFERENT without a DIFFERENCE.

I can't see what you mean. But 'compare' What is metaphysics again, where
the Nothing is at fist taken as the denial of everything. Then it would
be the result of the human act of denying. In fact a special, extreme case
amongst all other denying. But to be denied, beings as a whole must already 
be there. Where he writes: Indeed! that's important.




So if you limit "comparing" to the traditional metaphysical sense, then yes, 
for Heidegger comparing is necessarily metaphysical. But just as we can have 
a different without a difference, we can also have a comparing without two 
comparable things.

Anthony Crifasi

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