File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0304, message 445


From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2003 15:02:06 EDT
Subject: Embodied Brain-Embrained Body 



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Hi Jud,
I've stuck a quote by Ryle at the bottom of this message, mostly because it's
been sitting in my Drafts folder for a while, and I can't quite remember what
I was originally planning to do with it! Still, I thought it might interest
you since although his approach is perhaps different from yours, but it
doesn't lead to a presupposition of Cartesian dualism or mental essences.

Anyway, what I say below is partly a response to your points and partly just
a rap of my own. To some extent I'm saying the same thing in a different way,
but there are some important (for me) elements in this difference of approach.

Hi Jon,
I enjoyed your piece immensely,  firstly as a quick skim reading, and now I
will go through it slowly and address each point. First a little preamble to
set the scene so to speak.

I am basically challenging the albatross of dualism that was slung around our
knecks by the Greeks.  It is an insidious, cognitive yackyness that has
gunged up our thinking for centuries.  This sludge about the so-called 
"ontological difference" and the claim that there is a difference between the
actuality or fact of an entity being in the world, and the ways, features,
properties, modes and states of the way that it exists. It is plain to me
that all entities simply exist the way they exist and the various ways in
which humans attempt to categorise perceived differences is the business of
the human beings and not of the entities which simply proceed to carry on
existing the way that they exist the way that thay have always done and
always will.
Dualism is like a lot of Hellenic crap on your shoe that you can't shake off,
and in this sense I am in complete agreement with Wittgenstein that western
philosophy is basically not worth a blast on a ragman's trumpet.

As you know my main interest in this entire Embodied Brain-Embrained Body
thing is mainly ontological.  =E2=80=9COntological=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Contology=E2=80=9D are not words
that I have ever felt happy using, for they refer to the metaphysical study
of the nature of being and existence, and I don=E2=80=99t believe that either of them
exist. This puts me in the same sort of quandary as when I am discussing God
with a believer.  I am forced to employ the word =E2=80=9CGod=E2=80=9D in order to
communicate, even though I do not believe that the significatum =E2=80=9CGod=E2=80=9D has
any actual designatum at all, either in this world or anywhere else. I
suppose that if I took old Parmenides=E2=80=99 advice I wouldn=E2=80=99t even talk about
non-existent things, and should shut up about them, and go and sulk in a
corner or something, and only chime in when someone in the philosophical
community mentions a word which has an actual referent in the real world.



Concerning the words =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D which, though I don't
believe exist  I am nevertheless forced to employ in order to promulgate
their consignment to history.

For me when I am contemplating or talking about simple presence - an entity
either exists or it does not exist.

It could be said that when referring to the simple existential presence of an
entity we are bracketing the assumed modalic particulars of an entity=E2=80=99s
existential states and simply addressing the fact that it can be found in the
world, or not be found in the world.

If an entity doesn=E2=80=99t exist then it is not an entity in the first place. This
brings me to the subject of nouns as the names of things.  For me - - -
though not for transcendentalists - nouns only apply to referred entities
that actually exist in the world, or describe imagined entities that are
sententially existentialised for the purposes of fictional writings or
statements. Some of the imagined designata of sentential existentialisations
I accept as possibly existing denotata, that is  if there happened to be a
coincidental correspondence between significatum and denotatum. Some or the
more outlandish ones I reject as being too improbable. If for example I made
the claim:

=E2=80=9COlaf Goude is the name of a real person,=E2=80=9D

I could be pretty sure that somewhere in Scandinavia we would be able to find
a person existing who bears that name, and there would be a match, but if I
made the statement:

=E2=80=9CEphraim Ulysses Bottlescrumple is the name of a real person,=E2=80=9D



It is unlikely that such a person exists. In both cases however, if we felt
sufficiently strongly about it we could trawl through the yellow pages and
telephone directories and voting registers of Scandinavia and possibly the
whole world =E2=80=93 check it out on the internet and goodness knows what else to
try to verify the claims made in the two statements. No doubt we could
eventually arrive at an agreement that whilst the statement concerning Olaf
Goude was a true one, the statement about Ephraim Ulysses Bottlescrumple was
not a true one.



Thank you for being patient with the above rather childish example =E2=80=93 most of
which you=E2=80=99ve heard a thousand times before. The above is not the case when we
are dealing with abstract nouns like =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D however,
for abstract nouns do not refer to entities at all, but to the activities and
states of entities and they can=E2=80=99t be verified =E2=80=93 they can either be accepted
or refuted.

In this case the names/nouns =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D  are being used to
refer to perceived attributes belonging to ourselves as human beings, and we
speak of ourselves as =E2=80=9Chaving=E2=80=9D a =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and=20=E2=80=9Chaving=E2=80=9D a =E2=80=9Cconsciousness,=E2=80=9D
as if they were =E2=80=9Cthings=E2=80=9D that are somehow separate from the=20flesh of our
brains, which in some way =E2=80=9Cgenerate=E2=80=9D them, or are responsible for their
=E2=80=9Cexistence=E2=80=9D in our heads.



What I am doing with abstract nouns like =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9C consciousness=E2=80=9D is
refuting their existence and separateness from the brain altogether, for they
can=E2=80=99t be looked up and checked and ticked off as =E2=80=9Cexisting=E2=80=9D in the yellow
pages or traced on the internet =E2=80=93 or any neurophysiological encyclopaedia or
journal in the world and there are no jars in laboratories where minds can be
seen pickled in formaldehyde =E2=80=93 though there are plenty of preserved=20brains to
be found. People either believe in the existence of the =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and the
=E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D or they do not.

This conclusion and its consequential rejection of Cartesian souls or
spirits, or =E2=80=9Cmind" and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness,=E2=80=9D and other "spooky stuff" generated
by and existing individually from the brain is no caprice. It is a highly
likely surmisal grounded on information presently and easily acquirable from
Internet sites on physics, chemistry, neuroscience and evolutionary biology.
Cognitive physicalism is a conception derived from experiment and observation
rather than intuitive theory =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s a serious cutting-edge empirical matter.



There is no doubt that human beings are aware of their spatio-temporal
experience of the world and that we accrue and store data about ourselves and
the world we inhabit, and there is no doubt that the organ of our bodies
which carries out this processing is our brain. The brain is undoubtedly an
entity =E2=80=93 the =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D is not, and furthermore cannot be proved to be an entity
by those who believe that there is such a thing.  So for me the meaty organ
of the brain does the thinking =E2=80=93 thinking is its main existential modality =E2=80=93
its developed specialised cells over the millennia and become endowed with
the capacity to reason.  It is a piece of meat that reasons and the way it
arranges and re-arranges its specialised cells, and the way that those cells
connect using chemical and electrical  processes do not =E2=80=9Cproduce=E2=80=9D or  =E2=80=9Cbring
forth=E2=80=9D a modality which =E2=80=9Cordinary people=E2=80=9D call =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D
that mass interconnectedness is simply the brain in a certain mode. Why
should  =E2=80=9Cawareness=E2=80=9D intrinsically be considered more incomprehensible than
motor control? In other words =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D is not =E2=80=9Cgenerated=E2=80=9D from the meat =E2=80=93
MIND IS THE MEAT in the same way that Jon moving his arm is not a separate
movement generated by Jon=E2=80=99s brain =E2=80=93 it IS JON existing in a=20certain modality
which is inseparable from the meat of the embrained body of Jon.



When I first started to think about this I was a little worried that because
I am a dyed-in-the-wool materialist I was simply replacing the words used by
the folk psychologists with words of my own more compatible with and
conducive to my physicalist stance, but I realise now that it is not the
case, for I am saying that it is the meat that thinks, and that is the way it
exists - as thinking meat -  and not that the meat "generates" a thinking or
=E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D that can be hived=20off and addressed as something
different from the meat.  Thinking meat is not something which can somehow
distance itself from its material and think about it meatiness =E2=80=93 it=20is the
BODYMEAT thinking about its meatiness, and at that moment when it is thinking
about its meatiness - thinking about its meatiness is the way that the meat
exists.



Jon:

I think when it comes to the question of 'folk psychology,' I suppose my
approach is at least in part to take it with a pinch of salt, but also to
take it least partially seriously as something to be studied, in order to see
what it is that has to be reduced.



Jud:

I too take it seriously and recognise it as a tremendous achievement in the
history of humankind.  As I said in my piece:



=E2=80=9CThe great "mentalistic" achievements of human creative thought - philosophy,
science, politics, supported by the endeavours of ordinary folk and furthered
by the great brains of literature, music, film, and the plastic arts have
been created on the loom of a folk psychology. It is a folk psychology that
has become part of our very humanity and has delivered the "cultural goods."



We have a lot to thank it for as a way of trying to understand ourselves as
human entities.





Jon:

The reason why I think that is important I'll get back to. What folk
psychology (by which I mean just the everyday we talk and think about
ourselves) is often about is not just modes of behaviour, but conclusions
drawn from and about them. What I mean is, suppose someone says "Fred doesn't
seem very happy these days." Presumably they do so on the basis of a whole
host of clues, sagging posture, tone of voice, etc., etc. But the odd thing
is, if, rather than make the above kind of assertion, you were to give a list
of these physical manifestations, most people would feel you were telling
them less, not more, and I think they'd be right. The more general point is
that humans are a symbolic species-- and that doesn't just mean that we use
language. It means we see a cloudy sky, and think maybe it's going to rain,
so we might have to wear an overcoat, or bring the washing in, or whatever.
Or, more generally, we don't just look at things and see them, we also see
them in terms of other things. Or, more simply, humans are interpretative--
we place interpretations on what we see. We're certainly not the only
creatures that do this, but I think it's safe to say that we do it to a far
greater extent than other creatures. But perhaps more important is that we're
able to place interpretations on our own ability to interpret, we can look at
someone looking at a cloudy sky and wonder whether he interprets it in the
same way we do. So not only are we pretty much always interpreting, we're
also constantly responding to each other as creatures that interpret.



Jud:

All that you say is true.  My point however is the simple one that "we" are
the meat - it is the meat that does the interpreting =E2=80=93 the meat itself that
thinks and speaks using the symbolisation of language =E2=80=93 it is not a=20=E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D
that magically arises from the meat =E2=80=93 it is the meat that is =E2=80=9Cconscious=E2=80=9D not
a =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D that arises out of the meat and meditates=20the incoming
information that flows in through the sensory apparatus of the eyes, ears,
taste buds, touch etc. MEAT THINKS!





Jon:

J. L. introduced me to a word a while ago that I've come to very much like--
'telic.' We are creatures that make plans both individually and collectively,
we're always 'up to something' and usually something quite specific, and very
often those plans and ends presuppose whole systems of shared social
practices that define what's 'good' and 'normal'-- ready-made cultural
interpretations that we grow into when we are brought up into a particular
culture. All of this is perhaps a little airy-fairy and maybe also
make-believe, but it's part of what our everyday folk-psychology means when
we say "Fred's got something on his mind." We're talking about something that
could not be the case without the fact that Fred has a fully-functioning
human brain, but we don't say that for the simple reason that it isn't quite
what we mean. I think in this case it's more as if we're wondering whether
Fred is bothered by some event that has happened or which may happen, the
illness of a relative, the prospect of losing his job, or whatever. But Fred
isn't just responding to material entities, he's placing interpretations on
what he sees and is bothered by how he interprets them. And if I say "Fred's
got something on his mind" then this is my interpretation of Fred's
behaviour, based on the fact that Fred is an interpretative creature.



Jud:

All true and I agree =E2=80=93 all that I will add is that =E2=80=9CFred=E2=80=9D is his meat =E2=80=93 not
his =E2=80=9Cmind.=E2=80=9D  =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=9D am my brain-body meat =E2=80=93 my meat is me.



Jon:

I certainly think it's possible to talk in this way without necessarily
adding to our stock of entities.



Jud:

Yes it certainly is Jon. I think that in a sense my eliminative physicalism
reduces these [convenient] reifications like =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cme=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cmyself=E2=80=9D and
Jud etc., to the bare minimum.  Don=E2=80=99t worry though, I only intend to speak
this way when we discuss linguistic philosophy, I wouldn=E2=80=99t dream of=20referring
to myself as =E2=80=9CBrainmeat Evans.=E2=80=9D 



Jon:

I certainly don't think I've done so above. But when it comes to neurology
and the study of the human brain, I think it's important to be able to ask
what our brains allow us to do.



Jud:

To be honest I am trying desperately to distance myself from any hint of a
brain-body duality and I am moving in a direction where I see no dichotomy
between our brains and us =E2=80=93 for I believe that we ARE our brain-bodies.



Jon:

We need a teleological account what our brains evolved _for_. At that point,
terms like 'mind' and 'consciousness' are perhaps too vague, but we need
something like them, as I say, in order to describe what the brain allows us
to do. I've certainly got nothing against rigorous reductionism, but perhaps
in order to be rigorous we need to say exactly _what_ is being reduced to
_what_.



Jud:

For me the reduction is more than a reduction =E2=80=93 it is an elimination =E2=80=93 a
disposal of the Greekish cognitive =E2=80=9Cmiddle-man=E2=80=9D of =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Cback
to the meat=E2=80=9D movement if you like.



Jon:

To say that consciousness is the product of the brain is fine, and I'd
certainly agree with that, but if we want to explain how the brain produces
consciousness we have to be able to say something about what the brain
produces. If we rule such discussion out of court as a species of let's
pretend, though I'd agree that that's a fair description, haven't we cut our
own ability actually _to do_ the reduction, rather than just saying it's
possible, off at the knees? To use these words isn't automatically a sign of
dualism or the multiplication of entities-- I think the most we are presently
in a position to do is to say that 'mind' and 'consciousness' are reducible
in principle to the operations of the brain, but that we don't as yet know
nearly enough about how to do it in practice.



Jud:

The way I see it is not so much that =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D are
=E2=80=9Cproducts=E2=80=9D of the brain but that the brain exists in those changing
modalities but it remains the brain.  Like Jon gets up to all kinds of
actions but remains the entity Jon. Entity and action are one =E2=80=93 brain and
thought are one =E2=80=93 body and brain are one. It=E2=80=99s a lip-biting=20jump I agree and
one=E2=80=99s Wellington-boots being stuck in the thick dualistic ooze of Platonism
doesn=E2=80=99t exactly help either.



Jon:

Certainly, getting back to my original theme, perhaps it's because we are
interpretative creatures that we are often deceived into dualisms of some
kind or another --largely because we don't always know when to stop seeing
things in terms of other things-- so we end up interpreting ourselves in
terms of 'souls' and 'mental essences' and natural events in terms of
'thunder gods' and what not. And that we form groups based on shared social
practices and identify with the interpretative norms of our group means we
are hostile to those who don't share them-- we see them as simply 'abnormal.'

As you've often rightly pointed out, these two taken together represent an
explosive mix. On the other hand, I suppose my main query is to wonder
whether, by assuming that all talk of 'mind' or 'consciousness' is in some
way part of this kind of essentialist fallacy is to concede too much to
crapology of this kind?



Jud:

A good summing up of what=E2=80=99s gone on before Jon. Thanks for the stimulating
input.  More thanks for the great Ryle piece - I=E2=80=99ll settle down to read the
Ryle goodies below now and get back to you on this later if I may?



regards,

Jud.



<A HREF="http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/">http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/</A>
Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
<A HREF="http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com/">http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com








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Hi Jud,
I've stuck a quote by Ryle at the bottom of this message, mostly because it's been sitting in my Drafts folder for a while, and I can't quite remember what I was originally planning to do with it! Still, I thought it might interest you since although his approach is perhaps different from yours, but it doesn't lead to a presupposition of Cartesian dualism or mental essences

Anyway, what I say below is partly a response to your points and partly=20just a rap of my own. To some extent I'm saying the same thing in a different way, but there are some important (for me) elements in this difference of=20approach.

Hi Jon,
I enjoyed your piece immensely,  firstly as a quick skim reading, and now I will go through it slowly and address each point. First a little preamble to set the scene so to speak.

I am basically challenging the albatross of dualism that was slung around our knecks by the Greeks.  It is an insidious, cognitive yackyness that has gunged up our thinking for centuries.  This sludge about the so-called  "ontological difference" and the claim that there is a difference between the actuality or fact of an entity being in the world, and the ways, features, properties, modes and states of the way that it exists. It is=20plain to me that all entities simply exist the way they exist and the various ways in which humans attempt to categorise perceived differences is the business of the human beings and not of the entities which simply proceed to carry on existing the way that they exist the way that thay have always done=20and always will.
Dualism is like a lot of Hellenic crap on your shoe that you can't shake off, and in this sense I am in complete agreement with Wittgenstein that western philosophy is basically not worth a blast on a ragman's trumpet.

As you know my main interest in this entire Embodied Brain-Embrained=20Body thing is mainly ontological.  =E2=80=9COntological=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Contology=E2=80=9D are not words that I have ever felt happy using, for they refer to the metaphysical study of the nature of being and existence, and I don=E2=80=99t believe that either of them exist. This puts me in=20the same sort of quandary as when I am discussing God with a believer.  I am forced to employ the word =E2=80=9CGod=E2=80=9D in order to communicate, even though I do not believe that the significatum =E2=80=9CGod=E2=80=9D=20has any actual designatum at all, either in this world or anywhere else. I suppose that if I took old Parmenides=E2=80=99 advice I wouldn=E2=80=99t even talk about non-existent things, and should shut up about them, and go and sulk in a corner or something, and only chime in when someone in the philosophical community mentions a word which has an actual referent in the real world.

Concerning the words =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D which, though I don't believe exist  I am nevertheless forced to employ in order to promulgate their consignment to history.
For=20me when I am contemplating or talking about simple presence - an entity either exists or it does not exist.
It could be said that when referring to=20the simple existential presence of an entity we are bracketing the assumed modalic particulars of an entity=E2=80=99s existential states and simply addressing the fact that it can be found in the world, or not be found in the world.
If an entity doesn=E2=80=99t exist then it is not an entity in the first place. This brings me to the subject of nouns as the names of things.  For me - - - though not for transcendentalists - nouns only apply to referred entities that actually exist in the world, or describe imagined entities that are sententially existentialised for the purposes of fictional writings or statements. Some of the imagined designata of sentential existentialisations I accept as possibly existing denotata, that is  if there happened to be a coincidental correspondence between significatum and denotatum. Some or the more outlandish ones I reject as being too improbable. If for example I made the claim:

=E2=80=9COlaf Goude is the name of a real person,=E2=80=9D

I could be pretty sure that somewhere in Scandinavia we would be able to find a person existing who bears that name, and there would be a match, but if I made the statement:

=E2=80=9CEphraim Ulysses Bottlescrumple is the name of a real person,=E2=80=9D

It is unlikely that such a person exists. In both cases however, if we felt sufficiently strongly about it we could trawl through=20the yellow pages and telephone directories and voting registers of Scandinavia and possibly the whole world =E2=80=93 check it out on the internet and goodness knows what else to try to verify the claims made in the two statements. No doubt we could eventually arrive at an agreement that whilst the statement concerning Olaf Goude was a true one, the statement about Ephraim Ulysses Bottlescrumple was not a true one.

Thank you for being patient with the above rather childish example =E2=80=93 most of which you=E2=80=99ve=20heard a thousand times before. The above is not the case when we are dealing with abstract nouns like =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D however, for abstract nouns do not refer to entities at all, but to the activities and states of entities and they can=E2=80=99t be verified=20=E2=80=93 they can either be accepted or refuted.
In this case the names/nouns =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D  are being used to refer to perceived attributes belonging to ourselves as human beings, and we speak of ourselves as =E2=80=9Chaving=E2=80=9D a =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Chaving=E2=80=9D a =E2=80=9Cconsciousness,=E2=80=9D as if they were =E2=80=9Cthings=E2=80=9D that are somehow separate from the flesh of our brains, which in some way =E2=80=9Cgenerate=E2=80=9D them, or are responsible for their =E2=80=9Cexistence=E2=80=9D in our heads.

What I am doing with abstract nouns like =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9C consciousness=E2=80=9D is refuting their existence and separateness from the brain altogether, for they can=E2=80=99t be looked up and checked and ticked=20off as =E2=80=9Cexisting=E2=80=9D in the yellow pages or traced on the internet =E2=80=93 or any neurophysiological encyclopaedia or journal in the world and there are no jars in laboratories where minds can be seen pickled in formaldehyde =E2=80=93 though there are plenty of preserved brains to be found. People either believe in the existence of the =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and=20the =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D or they do not.
This conclusion and its consequential rejection of Cartesian souls or spirits, or =E2=80=9Cmind"=20and =E2=80=9Cconsciousness,=E2=80=9D and other "spooky stuff" generated by and existing individually from the brain is no caprice. It is a highly likely surmisal grounded on information presently and easily acquirable from Internet sites on physics, chemistry, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. Cognitive physicalism is a conception derived from experiment and observation rather than intuitive theory =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s a serious cutting-edge empirical matter.

There is no doubt that human beings are aware of their spatio-temporal experience of the world and that we accrue and store data=20about ourselves and the world we inhabit, and there is no doubt that the organ of our bodies which carries out this processing is our brain. The brain is undoubtedly an entity =E2=80=93 the =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D is not, and furthermore cannot be proved to be an entity by those who believe that there is such a thing.  So for me the meaty organ of the brain does the thinking =E2=80=93 thinking is its main existential modality =E2=80=93 its developed specialised cells over the millennia and become endowed with the capacity=20to reason.  It is a piece of meat that reasons and the way it arranges=20and re-arranges its specialised cells, and the way that those cells connect=20using chemical and electrical  processes do not =E2=80=9Cproduce=E2=80=9D or  =E2=80=9Cbring forth=E2=80=9D a modality which =E2=80=9Cordinary people=E2=80=9D call =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D that mass interconnectedness is simply the brain in a certain mode. Why should  =E2=80=9Cawareness=E2=80=9D intrinsically be considered more incomprehensible than motor control? In other words =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D=20is not =E2=80=9Cgenerated=E2=80=9D from the meat =E2=80=93 MIND IS THE MEAT=20in the same way that Jon moving his arm is not a separate movement generated by Jon=E2=80=99s brain =E2=80=93 it IS JON existing in a certain modality which is inseparable from the meat of the embrained body of Jon.

When I first started to think about this I was a little worried that because I am a dyed-in-the-wool materialist I was simply replacing the words used by the folk psychologists with words of my own more compatible with and conducive to my physicalist stance, but I realise now that it is not the case, for I=20am saying that it is the meat that thinks, and that is the way it exists - as thinking meat -  and not that the meat "generates" a thinking or =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D that can be hived off and addressed as something different from the meat.  Thinking meat is=20not something which can somehow distance itself from its material and think=20about it meatiness =E2=80=93 it is the BODYMEAT thinking about its meatiness, and at that moment when it is thinking about its meatiness - thinking about its meatiness is the way that the meat exists.

Jon:
I think when it comes to the question of 'folk psychology,' I suppose my approach is at least in part to take it with a pinch of salt, but also to take it least partially seriously as something to be studied, in order to see what it is that has to be reduced.

Jud:
I too take it seriously and recognise it as a tremendous achievement in the history of humankind.  As I said in my piece:

=E2=80=9CThe great "mentalistic" achievements of human creative thought - philosophy, science, politics, supported by the endeavours=20of ordinary folk and furthered by the great brains of literature, music, film, and the plastic arts have been created on the loom of a folk psychology.=20It is a folk psychology that has become part of our very humanity and has delivered the "cultural goods."

We have a lot to thank it for as a way=20of trying to understand ourselves as human entities.


Jon:
The=20reason why I think that is important I'll get back to. What folk psychology=20(by which I mean just the everyday we talk and think about ourselves) is often about is not just modes of behaviour, but conclusions drawn from and about them. What I mean is, suppose someone says "Fred doesn't seem very happy these days." Presumably they do so on the basis of a whole host of clues, sagging posture, tone of voice, etc., etc. But the odd thing is, if, rather than make the above kind of assertion, you were to give a list of these physical manifestations, most people would feel you were telling them less, not more, and I think they'd be right. The more general point is that humans are a=20symbolic species-- and that doesn't just mean that we use language. It means we see a cloudy sky, and think maybe it's going to rain, so we might have to wear an overcoat, or bring the washing in, or whatever. Or, more generally, we don't just look at things and see them, we also see them in terms of other things. Or, more simply, humans are interpretative-- we place interpretations on what we see. We're certainly not the only creatures that do this, but I think it's safe to say that we do it to a far greater extent than other creatures. But perhaps more important is that we're able to place interpretations on our own ability to interpret, we can look at someone looking at a=20cloudy sky and wonder whether he interprets it in the same way we do. So not only are we pretty much always interpreting, we're also constantly responding to each other as creatures that interpret.

Jud:
All that you say is true.  My point however is the simple one that "we" are the meat=20- it is the meat that does the interpreting =E2=80=93 the meat itself that thinks and speaks using the symbolisation of language =E2=80=93 it is not a=20=E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D that magically arises from the meat =E2=80=93 it is the meat that is =E2=80=9Cconscious=E2=80=9D not a =E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D that arises out of the meat and meditates the incoming information that flows in through the sensory apparatus of the eyes, ears, taste buds, touch etc. MEAT THINKS!


Jon:
J. L. introduced me to a word a while ago that I've come to very much like-- 'telic.' We are creatures that make plans both individually and collectively, we're always 'up to something' and usually something quite specific, and very often those plans and ends presuppose whole systems of shared social practices that define what's 'good' and 'normal'-- ready-made cultural interpretations that we grow into when we are brought up into a particular culture. All of this is perhaps a little airy-fairy and maybe also make-believe, but it's part of what our everyday folk-psychology means when we say "Fred's got something on his mind." We're talking about something that could not be the case without the fact that Fred has a fully-functioning human brain, but we don't say that for the simple reason that it isn't quite what we mean. I think in this case it's more as if we're wondering whether Fred is bothered by some event that has happened or which may happen, the illness of a relative, the prospect of losing his job, or whatever. But Fred isn't just responding to material entities, he's placing interpretations on what he sees and is bothered by how he interprets them. And if I say "Fred's got something on his mind" then this is my interpretation of Fred's behaviour, based on the fact that Fred is an interpretative creature.

Jud:
All true and I agree =E2=80=93 all that I will add is that =E2=80=9CFred=E2=80=9D is his meat =E2=80=93 not his =E2=80=9Cmind.=E2=80=9D  =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=9D am my brain-body meat =E2=80=93 my meat=20is me.

Jon:
I certainly think it's possible to talk in this way without necessarily adding to our stock of entities.

Jud:
Yes it certainly is Jon. I think that in a sense my eliminative physicalism reduces these [convenient] reifications like =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cme=E2=80=9D and =E2=80=9Cmyself=E2=80=9D and Jud etc., to the bare minimum.  Don=E2=80=99t worry though, I only intend to speak this way when we discuss linguistic philosophy, I wouldn=E2=80=99t dream of referring to myself as=20=E2=80=9CBrainmeat Evans.=E2=80=9D  

Jon:
I certainly don't think I've done so above. But when it comes to neurology and the study of the human brain, I think it's important to be able to ask what our brains allow us to do.

Jud:
To be honest I am trying desperately to distance myself from any hint of a brain-body duality and I am moving in a direction where I see no dichotomy between our brains and us =E2=80=93 for I believe that we ARE our brain-bodies.

Jon:
We need a teleological account what our brains evolved _for_. At that point, terms like 'mind' and 'consciousness' are perhaps too vague, but we need something like them, as I say, in order to describe what the brain allows us to do. I've certainly got nothing=20against rigorous reductionism, but perhaps in order to be rigorous we need to say exactly _what_ is being reduced to _what_.

Jud:
For me the=20reduction is more than a reduction =E2=80=93 it is an elimination =E2=80=93=20a disposal of the Greekish cognitive =E2=80=9Cmiddle-man=E2=80=9D of =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Cback to the meat=E2=80=9D movement if you like.

Jon:
To say that consciousness is the product of the brain is fine, and I'd certainly agree with that, but if we want to explain how the brain produces consciousness we have to be able to say=20something about what the brain produces. If we rule such discussion out of court as a species of let's pretend, though I'd agree that that's a fair description, haven't we cut our own ability actually _to do_ the reduction, rather than just saying it's possible, off at the knees? To use these words isn't automatically a sign of dualism or the multiplication of entities-- I think the most we are presently in a position to do is to say that 'mind' and 'consciousness' are reducible in principle to the operations of the brain, but that we don't as yet know nearly enough about how to do it in practice.

Jud:
The way I see it is not so much that =E2=80=9Cmind=E2=80=9D and=20=E2=80=9Cconsciousness=E2=80=9D are =E2=80=9Cproducts=E2=80=9D of the brain=20but that the brain exists in those changing modalities but it remains the brain.  Like Jon gets up to all kinds of actions but remains the entity Jon. Entity and action are one =E2=80=93 brain and thought are one =E2=80=93=20body and brain are one. It=E2=80=99s a lip-biting jump I agree and one=E2=80=99s Wellington-boots being stuck in the thick dualistic ooze of Platonism doesn=E2=80=99t exactly help either.

Jon:
Certainly, getting back to my original theme, perhaps it's because we are interpretative creatures that we are often deceived into dualisms of some kind or another --largely=20because we don't always know when to stop seeing things in terms of other things-- so we end up interpreting ourselves in terms of 'souls' and 'mental essences' and natural events in terms of 'thunder gods' and what not. And that we form groups based on shared social practices and identify with the interpretative norms of our group means we are hostile to those who don't share=20them-- we see them as simply 'abnormal.'
As you've often rightly pointed out, these two taken together represent an explosive mix. On the other hand, I suppose my main query is to wonder whether, by assuming that all talk of 'mind' or 'consciousness' is in some way part of this kind of essentialist=20fallacy is to concede too much to crapology of this kind?

Jud:
A=20good summing up of what=E2=80=99s gone on before Jon. Thanks for the stimulating input.  More thanks for the great Ryle piece - I=E2=80=99ll settle down to read the Ryle goodies below now and get back to you on this later if I may?

regards,
Jud.

http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/
Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com








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