File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0304, message 63


Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2003 17:58:27 +0200
From: artefact-AT-t-online.de (Michael Eldred)
Subject: Re: the o/o gulf


Cologne 03-Apr-2003

Anthony Crifasi schrieb Thu, 03 Apr 2003 00:35:53 +0000:

> John Foster wrote:
>
> >I think I have stated many times what that definition is. No need to argue
> >ad infinitum what Anthony Crifasi has so commony and frequently failed to
> >dis-engage from thought. While on the one hand he argues for this massively
> >huge chasm or o/o gulf and on the other hand interprets dread or anxiety as
> >something which is not a state of mind.
>
> John weren't you the one who told someone to at least quote you correctly
> when they quoted you? Well you've just done what you criticized others for
> doing. When did I EVER deny that anxiety is a state of mind? What I denied
> was YOUR ontic interpretatino of a state of mind - as some ontic state. For
> Heidegger a state of mind is CONSTITUTIVE. Do you realize what that means
> John? It means that a state of mind does not come and go, like some ontic
> feeling. So when he speaks of feelings, you cannot simply assume that he is
> speaking in the usual common ontic manner.
>
> John, you never answered my question (not that I am surprised): a state of
> mind of what? Dasein? And what is Dasein? A mind? No, that is an entity,
> which Dasein is not. A soul? No, another entity. A body? No, definitely an
> entity. So he cannot possibly mean the same thing as you when he says state
> of mind!
>
> THINK before you post John.

That's what my father used to say to me: "Think before you speak."

It's a good piece of advice for philosophical endeavour, but can be fatal in the
real world. Those with the fastest responses are often the winners; thinking
only slows you down.

In the propaganda war side of the current Iraq war, we can witness in a drastic
fashion how truth becomes a perspective useful for the aggrandizement or
preservation of power. The medium of truth/propaganda is television through
which people see tele-images on electronic boxes all over the world. Such
world-disclosure through images allows almost no mediation in thought
(Vermittlung des Gedankens). Truth is what you see, what the world population
sees, which moves its emotions up or down, upliftingly or depressingly. Truth is
managed by allowing certain images to be transmitted and by forbidding other
images from being transmitted.

As they say, a picture is worth a thousand words (tells lies without mediation).

I don't have television and enjoy not having it.

Michael
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>
>
> Anthony Crifasi
>
> He is saying that there is something
> >which cannot be feeling, something he refers to as the 'ontological' and
> >then states that the only thing which can be felt is the ontic which is
> >invariably occurent, objectifiable, et cetera. [but read his last sentence]
> >
> >There is really no use of the phrase "ontic feeling" anywhere that I have
> >come across in Heidegger's writings. Feeling has been used in modern
> >philosophy as a term for 'sensibility' or 'sense' which is certainly a
> >common term in Heideggers' philosophy.
> >
> >Just to remind all, <befind> means "to feel" or something like that.
> >Heidegger writes that feeling anxious is a feeling. Now the term attunement
> >can be interpreted 'ontologically' - I have already sent a message about
> >this to this list, but again Anthony C. has is bleep bleep bleep ing
> >retreating into a defensive position for his widing O/O gulf chasm.
> >
> >You see now how Anthony is saying that feelings are also states of mind,
> >are
> >constitutive, and therefore are constitutive, or eternally present, but
> >non-states of mind, or "ontic feelings" only come and go....
> >
> >I have to chuckle now....over the contradictions he has related.
> >
> >sincerely
> >
> >john
> >
> >
> >
> > > >But 'feelings', moods, Stimmungen, are "the fundamental happening
> > > >of our Da-sein", non-occurrent, non-objectifiable Grundgeschehen.
> > >
> > > Yes, NON-OCCURRENT, and NON-OBJECTIFIABLE. What I was criticizing above
> >was
> > > John Foster's interpretation, which is definitely occurent and
> > > objectifiable. John was interpreting what Heidegger said about feelings
> >too,
> > > but ontically, and trying to conclude that anxiety and
> >being-in-the-world
> >is
> > > an ontic feeling - occurrent and quite objectifiable. That is what I was
> > > objecting to. Feelings AS states-of-mind (i.e., ontologically) are
> > > constitutive, and therefore do not come and go, whereas ontic feelings
> >come
> > > and go.
> > >
> > > Anthony Crifasi
> > >
> > > >If it is utterly absurd to characterize Dasein as feeling, then
> >Heidegger,
> > > >but also Leibniz and Nietzsche  - who says dozens of times, wtp is a
> > > >feeling- , and in fact all real thinkers, in fact all people, are
> >reduced
> > > >to
> > > >absurdity.
> > > >And that's where formal distinctions will bring you, no further
> > > >than distinctions of analytical philosophy, or of whatever technique
> > > >else. The ontological distinction, as presented by Anthony, is
> > > >a FORMAL, an ABSTRACT distinction, and that it must be so,
> > > >is clear when you read section 1: if we don't know what the
> > > >word 'being' means, then we also can't know what the difference
> > > >of being and beings is. They're just two words, two distinct things.
> > > >Thomas knew, he is able to speak of being, of 'ens', but we don't,
> > > >that's what Heidegger is saying by quoting him.
> > > >This is also a nice example of the blindness, that is the consequence
> > > >of insisting on knowing, and not on asking.
> > > >
> > > >"The  question for the sense of Being shall be POSED." Gestellt.
> > > >Eine Frage stellen, posing a question, here, is not merely a linguistic
> > > >speech-act, the problem itself must be given a place, where it then
> > > >can remain. That is "stellen" when one avers the word as H does here.
> > > >We know from what follows, that the question for Being can only
> > > >be fixated, when Dasein as the exemplary being is questioned
> > > >(befragt) Posing questions belongs to the mode of being of Dasein.
> > > >So that, when a new question is to be posed, a new Dasein is
> > > >required.





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