From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com Date: Sat, 10 May 2003 04:22:00 EDT Subject: Free Will - Is there Such a Thing? --part1_2d.2e5d1e71.2bee10a8_boundary Is Mental Life Possible Without the Will? A Review of Daniel M. Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will Bruce Bridgeman University of California, Santa Cruz Santa Cruz, CA 95064 U. S. A. bruceb-AT-cats.ucsc.edu Copyright (c) Bruce Bridgeman 2003 PSYCHE, 9(13), May 2003 Let me review the review. Bridgeman says: This is a terrifying book. It demolishes the idea of free will that has dominated Western thought for 3000 years, not with just another philosopher's opinions but with dispassionate research, some of it from the author's own laboratory, combined with evidence from a surprising variety of scientific and non-scientific sources. This is evidence that cannot be denied. The demolition of free will violates the very core of our existence as autonomous human beings, capable of planning, foresight, and responsible action. Who or what are we without the power to choose, to refuse, to accept, to deny, to sacrifice and struggle? Modern neurophysiology, though, leaves no room for the soul. ... What seemed a font of life is now part logical engine, part chemical soup, and all vulnerable to outside physical influences. ... Physical penetration into the depths of the self on this scale allows no free will -- neurons are affected only by other neurons, not by will or effort. So goes Wegner's argument. Disclose the sub-nature, and the super-nature disappears. (Terminology courtesy of V. V. Raman, Commentaries on Science and Religion, Metanexus, May 2003.) But is the argument valid? In this case, No. Why is it meaningful to say <neurons are affected only by other neurons, not by will or effort. Is will of necessity a wee ghostie, that either does or does not interfere with neurons? That constitutes a reification of will and a presumption of the metaphysical, as dualistic as Descartes, Plato, or the pagans. It is Platonic essentialism! It uses "Wonderful Me" as a proof, not (in this case) that the soul must exist, but here as a proof of the opposite: that the will even if it exists cannot affect the neurons, ergo it cannot meaningfully exist. This is exalting the Self to the metaphysical; it predicates that the Self cannot possibly be physical! It is as blatantly dualistic as any pagan theory of the spirits of the trees. As far as disproof goes, it's like looking for a town and driving right through it, looking at the houses while thinking the town has not been found. It has; you were in it when you were visiting the houses, or in this case the neurons. The will DOES exist. *The will is a neuronal phenomenon; it is among the things that neurons do.* Or, *the will does not A-ffect the neurons; the neurons E-ffect the will.* On this fallacy hangs Wegner's entire book. By no means has Wegner shown that Conscious Will is an illusion. This is not to dispute his physical observations; it is only to differently interpret them. Indeed there is "illusion" involved; but "illusion," in the sense of cognitive constructs which are at best reliable but never certain, is part of consciousness. We do not grasp reality, we grasp illusion. Or, more accurately, allusion. What we feel that we willfully do, indeed we do willfully do. Because the will is a neuronal (and deterministic) phenomenon. It is among the things that neurons (and atoms) do. Contra Wegner, then, Conscious Will is no illusion. In ending his review, Bridgeman says <In the end, the illusion of will is itself a story we tell ourselves to justify our behaviors and experiences. This nominally accepts Wegner's characterization; but not if, as I suggest, the entire behavioral complex constitutes the will. Turning from Wegner to Mark Johnson, I have just finished reading his 1987 book, "The Body in the Mind." The main hypothesis here is that the "dominant" (he says) Objectivist philosophy, that meanings exist objectively (a semantic approach), should be amended or extended by inclusion of the body; hence his title. To read his book might be quite annoying if one were an Objectivist, for Johnson's premise is from that viewpoint blasphemous. However, to read his book is extremely frustrating if one is (horror of horrors) a Relativist, since Johnson's premise is from that viewpoint utterly obvious. The education then lies in the discovery of how non-obvious it has seemed to some. This is an example of painfully descending from Olympus (and Johnson does call it the God's-eye view), when (and this Johnson never admits) Olympus should not have been climbed in the first place. That is, we are each of us on the inside looking out, and to pretend to a view from above - - and utter certainty of consensus - - is egregious conceit. If you want to read a real balancing act, paying homage to Objectivism while contributing some very valid and useful arguments in the realm of practical (as opposed to philosophical) semantics, I recommend the book. If you dismiss Objectivism as utterly presumptuous and untenable from the outset (as I do), it's not worth the trouble; its end point is already your starting point. "I knew that in the first place." But it's smugly rewarding to know what contortions the "20th century academic philosophers" are being forced to go through just to end up being halfway sensible. Cheers, Jud. <A HREF="http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/ ">http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/</A> Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY. <A HREF="http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com">http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com</A> --part1_2d.2e5d1e71.2bee10a8_boundary
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