Subject: RE: Ontologisch Geheimdienst Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 16:46:15 +0200 From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl> -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- Van: michaelP [mailto:michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk] Verzonden: maandag 21 juli 2003 15:53 Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Onderwerp: Re: Ontologisch Geheimdienst on 18/7/03 3:10 pm, Bakker, R.B.M. de at R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl wrote (where "you" = Jud: > Rene: > btw I also think seriously that you, with your refusal of ontological > difference was of all the closest to Heidegger. You have been the only one > to take refusal serious, whether pro or contra. (there is no pro and contra > in re Heidegger) Rene, I find difficult your depiction of Heidegger's refusal of the ontological difference (although not at all concerned with Jud's refusal since it is fairly based upon something less than a misunderstanding of the difference and thus not at all interesting to me). What I mean to say is that this difference is the only difference Heidegger makes in the entire of philosophy (pre- and post-Heidegger); or, without the difference, being (and thus beings too) amounts to nothing, since being *is* the difference between being and beings (Heidegger says this somewhere, I forget where) Michael, Yes, he does, and I saw lately Sheehan beginning a piece with it, namely that Heidegger is not at all about being but about difference, which rings some correct bells, but no true ones. Heidegger also writes: to the matter of thinking belongs the way. That was precisely Sheehan's sin: if he had realized that, he wouldn't have said bluntly what he said, and how he said it. Heidegger also writes: Being = the forgetfulness of being. Or: The leaving out of Being = Being. (in Nietzsche 2) He also writes: The truth of Being = Being. He also writes: The history of Being = Being. And so on. But all this is to be understood not-indifferently. But difference is only reachable through (radical) indifference. Thats why Hegel is so important for the later Heidegger, because Hegel (that is nowadays: the smoothness of dialectics, in fact: comparatism) always manages to pose things indifferently next to each other. (Hegel in: Identity and difference) I think Anthony was close to this when he spoke of a necessity of a Heidegger after ages of science, which means really after 2000 years of a metaphysical thinking, that combines the indifference of everything that is (as such) with a fundamental trait (Grundzug) of beings, and that is: with a highest being. as a whole) Because of the necessarilly (but still to be thought, so not simply negative) nihilistic core of it, the end of metaphysics is hiding itself, so that only faggot stories are left. *OR*, and here's the difference: we take the leaving-out of the staying-out (of being, while the staying-out itself is Being) seriously, we decide NOT to leave it out. But I would not recommend that to anyone, Michael, because if one does that seriously, one sets oneself apart from society (=the modern subject: i'll come back to this), and more or less decides to know it better than all others. In order to do that, one has to 'kill' society in oneself, while of course continuing to play one's part. When Heidegger sometimes says things like: I've thought this over quite long, all that is presupposed, he does not make much noise about it, as I do. So his harsh remarks to Gadamer or to whomever, are precisely the opposite of how they are usually, socially, taken. They are real warnings: if you don't feel like giving everything, don't do it! Do something else, which might be your talent, teaching Greek for instance. Gadamer knew this well...and somehow he didn't at the same time. Maybe I'll tell an interesting story once more, because i left sthing out the first time. But (in-)difference is already there with the first mentioning of formal indication: a decision not to take for granted normal, 'objective' meanings of words, but to prohibit, to forbid them, so that an empty (formal) space 'originates', that can only be pointed to, and to which one delivers oneself more or less. I'm always remembered of Castaneda, when he is horrified by the perspective of giving up everything for something so insecure. But Don Juan answers: With me it's the opposite: I am horrified at the sight of people without such a perspective. regards rene Allen, insultarme! ; or, that such an ontological difference has been 'forgotten', "faggoten" (as you put it), is Heidegger's history of being/beings/metaphysics, is his thinking difference, the thinking of difference. Without the difference (indifferent to the difference) we are in Judland (where the difference is refused even whilst it is implied by the very possibility of its refusal). This is a question because I am neither pro nor contra in this, rather, I need some help in understanding Heidegger *without* ontological difference; this difference refused makes Heidegger (however insightful, however tragic, however brilliant...) an indifferent thinker... so, Rene, how/wherefrom have you divined this refusal (Heidegger's not Jud's!)? peace mP --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005