File spoon-archives/heidegger.archive/heidegger_2003/heidegger.0307, message 128


Subject: RE: Ontologisch Geheimdienst 
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2003 16:46:15 +0200
From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl>




-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: michaelP [mailto:michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk]
Verzonden: maandag 21 juli 2003 15:53
Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Onderwerp: Re: Ontologisch Geheimdienst 


on 18/7/03 3:10 pm, Bakker, R.B.M. de at R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl wrote (where
"you" = Jud:

> Rene: 
> btw I also think seriously that you, with your refusal of ontological
> difference was of all the closest to Heidegger. You have been the only one
> to take refusal serious, whether pro or contra. (there is no pro and contra
> in re Heidegger) 

Rene, I find difficult your depiction of Heidegger's refusal of the
ontological difference (although not at all concerned with Jud's refusal
since it is fairly based upon something less than a misunderstanding of the
difference and thus not at all interesting to me). What I mean to say is
that this difference is the only difference Heidegger makes in the entire of
philosophy (pre- and post-Heidegger); or, without the difference, being (and
thus beings too) amounts to nothing, since being *is* the difference between
being and beings (Heidegger says this somewhere, I forget where)


Michael,
Yes, he does, and I saw lately Sheehan beginning a piece with it, namely
that Heidegger is not at all about being but about difference, which
rings some correct bells, but no true ones. Heidegger also writes: to the
matter of thinking belongs the way. That was precisely Sheehan's sin:
if he had realized that, he wouldn't have said bluntly what he said,
and how he said it.

Heidegger also writes: Being = the forgetfulness of being. Or: The leaving out
of Being = Being. (in Nietzsche 2) He also writes: The truth of Being = Being.
He also writes: The history of Being = Being. And so on.

But all this is to be understood not-indifferently. But difference is only
reachable through (radical) indifference. Thats why Hegel is so important 
for the later Heidegger, because Hegel (that is nowadays: the smoothness
of dialectics, in fact: comparatism) always manages to pose things indifferently
next to each other. (Hegel in: Identity and difference) 

I think Anthony was close to this when he spoke of a necessity of a Heidegger
after ages of science, which means really after 2000 years of a metaphysical
thinking, that combines the indifference of everything that is (as such) with
a fundamental trait (Grundzug) of beings, and that is: with a highest being. 
as a whole) Because of the necessarilly (but still to be thought, so not simply
negative) nihilistic core of it, the end of metaphysics is hiding itself, so that
only faggot stories are left.
*OR*, and here's the difference: we take the leaving-out of the staying-out
(of being, while the staying-out itself is Being) seriously, we decide NOT
to leave it out. But I would not recommend that to anyone, Michael, because
if one does that seriously, one sets oneself apart from society (=the modern
 subject: i'll come back to this), and more or less decides to
know it better than all others. In order to do that, one has to 'kill' society in
oneself, while of course continuing to play one's part. When Heidegger sometimes
says things like: I've thought this over quite long, all that is presupposed, he
does not make much noise about it, as I do. So his harsh remarks to Gadamer or
to whomever, are precisely the opposite of how they are usually, socially, taken.
They are real warnings: if you don't feel like giving everything, don't do it! 
Do something else, which might be your talent, teaching Greek for instance.
Gadamer knew this well...and somehow he didn't at the same time. Maybe I'll tell
an interesting story once more, because i left sthing out the first time.

But (in-)difference is already there with the first mentioning of formal indication:
a decision not to take for granted normal, 'objective' meanings of words, but to
prohibit, to forbid them, so that an empty (formal) space 'originates', that can only
be pointed to, and to which one delivers oneself more or less. I'm always remembered of
Castaneda, when he is horrified by the perspective of giving up everything for something
so insecure. But Don Juan answers: With me it's the opposite: I am horrified at the sight
of people without such a perspective.

regards

rene



Allen, insultarme!

















; or, that
such an ontological difference has been 'forgotten', "faggoten" (as you put
it), is Heidegger's history of being/beings/metaphysics, is his thinking
difference, the thinking of difference. Without the difference (indifferent
to the difference) we are in Judland (where the difference is refused even
whilst it is implied by the very possibility of its refusal). This is a
question because I am neither pro nor contra in this, rather, I need some
help in understanding Heidegger *without* ontological difference; this
difference refused makes Heidegger (however insightful, however tragic,
however brilliant...) an indifferent thinker... so, Rene, how/wherefrom have
you divined this refusal (Heidegger's not Jud's!)?

peace

mP



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