From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: Phenomenology and Science.
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 20:44:51 +0000


michaelP wrote:

>Anthony now:
> > Yes, and my point is that the scientist would dispute your claim that 
>this
> > passionless scientific endeavor is the result of just another passion,
>
>mP now:
>The passion I refer to is not just *another* passion, but, if you like,
>*the* passion, one that 'animates', 'drives', 'sex's up', etc, humans
>towards the nearing and distancing of beings; such nearing/distancing
>results in thinking (philosophically, scientifically, epistemologically,
>poetically, etc); and I am suggesting that the passion does not at all
>'reside' in the scientist-qua-human but 'originates' from the call(ing). In
>this sense, the scientific ideal of passionately leaving out
>scientist-qua-*human* passion is somewhat authentic, because the passion is
>not simply human but is essentially that of science itself in its 
>sciencing.
>In a sense I am drawing close to you in that the passion, drive, interest,
>etc, should not be seen in terms of the scientist-qua-human, since that is
>not the source of the passion to science [verb] in the first place, and 
>thus
>it is irrelevant for science-qua-science (thus my, perhaps rude, quip about
>the "fig").
>
>Anthony now:
> >since
> > this procedure results simply from the following analysis: if nature IS
> > indeed passionless, then nature would present itself as it IS (i.e.,
> > passionless) only when passion is completely removed from beings as they
> > present themselves.
>
>mP now:
>... a sort of 'resonance' of like with like?

Not just one thing like another, but by the very definition of passionless: 
passionless means without passion, therefore if nature is passionless, then 
it cannot possibly present itself as it IS (i.e., passionless) unless it 
presents itself COMPLETELY without passion. The scientist would dispute that 
this little bit of basic definitional logic has anything to do with passion, 
because if the world PRIMARILY presents itself objectively (which Heidegger 
of course denies), then the scientific attitude has nothing to do with 
passion, but is rather some passionless realization (hence the traditional 
separation of thought from passion). In other words, to present science as 
basically driven by passion (even THE passion) is to already assume that the 
world does not PRIMARILY present itself passionlessly and objectively, which 
is precisely what the scientist would dispute.

>Anthony now:
> >So if a scientist were to question your assumption
> > (i.e., that the world really does not present itself most primordially 
>as
> > passionless Nature in the first place), then what would you say? That 
>for
> > the most part, beings present themselves as useful and purposeful and
> > good-for-this?
>
>mP now:
>Hmmm... being-useful, being-good-for, being-out-there, just-be-ing... I
>'feel' are modes of a more primordial 'sense' of being,

And what if the scientist does not "feel" the same way, since many 
philosophers and scientists throughout history have certainly "felt" 
otherwise, treating the world primarily as Nature and objective. Again, my 
point is not that you are wrong, but rather that a scientist can indeed 
object in a way that challenges the very point of departure of Heideggerian 
phenomenology.

>Anthony now:
> > And again, the assumption behind this is precisely that be-ing is not
> > primarily the being that science considers in the first place.
>
>mP now:
>In terms of thinking science in the proximate first place, Aristotle
>(Metaphysics somewhere near the start) says that the separate sciences mark
>off being into particular parts of being as if being were a whole with
>parts; and that by and when such marking off is marked off, the inquirers
>study and speak of such 'parts' without regard (disregarding, forgetting,
>etc) to their being such parts. Aristotle's first philosophy (Metaphysics)
>was intended to mark out this disregarding marking-off and (as it were)
>bring back the 'parts' of being into the whole they once were... needless 
>to
>say this could not and cannot be done because Metaphysics was conducted
>towards being much in the same manner the separate sciences regarded their
>marked-off parts of being: by disregarding being itself (as that which not
>only has no parts but is the very source of marking-off and disregarding,
>etc). Witness the contemporary impossible (?) struggle for a Unified Field
>Theory that would unite all of science in the One discipline...

Well wouldn't the scientist question precisely the claim that scientific 
metaphysics essentially disregarded being itself, since if the world is 
primarily objective (as scientists believe), then science in its very 
methodology hits precisely on what being IS? Further, I don't know that a 
Heideggerian must hold that a Unified Field Theory is impossible, because 
such scientific theories deal with the world as subject to scientific 
calculation, and the world as subject to calculation may indeed be subject 
to TOTAL calculative unifying (and not necessarily in the classical 
deterministic mechanistic sense, since contemporary physics is not 
mechanistic or deterministic).

Anthony Crifasi

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