From: GEVANS613-AT-aol.com
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 19:50:57 EDT
Subject: Dear Heidegger



Dear Heidegger,

Dear Heidegger, 
Why do people, driving in their cars, so often forget that their blinkers are 
on, and drive down the highway all blinking and shit, for miles and hours at 
a time? Why? Is it true that one must get out of one's brain before getting 
into one's car? —Felix
Dear Felix,We come across "equipment" in "signs." The word "sign" designates 
many kinds of things: not only may it stand for different kinds of signs, but 
Being-a-sign-for can itself be formalized as a universal kind of relation, so 
that the sign- structure itself provides an ontological clue for 
"characterizing" any entity whatsoever.But signs are themselves items of equipment whose 
specific character as equipment consists in showing or indicating. We find such 
signs in signposts, boundary-stones, signals, banners and the like. Indicating 
can be defined as a kind of referring. Referring is, if we take it as 
formally as possible, a relating. Every reference is a relation, but not every 
relation is a reference. Every "indication" is a reference, but not every referring 
is an indicating. This implies at the same time that every "indication" is a 
relation, but not every relation is an indicating. The formally general 
character of relation is thus brought to light.As you have noted, motor cars are 
sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, or blinking light, whose 
position indicates the direction the vehicle will take—at an intersection, for 
instance. The position of the arrow is controlled by the driver. This sign is an 
item of equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver in his concern with 
driving, and not for him alone: those who are not travelling with him—and they in 
particular—also make use of it, either by giving way on the proper side or by 
stopping. This sign is ready-to-hand within-the-world in the whole 
equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and 
as equipment it is constituted by reference. It has the character of the 
"in-order-to," its own definite serviceability. This indicating which the sign 
performs can be taken as a kind of "referring." But here we must notice that this 
"referring" as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as 
equipment.Instead, "referring" as indicating is grounded in the Being-structure 
of equipment, in serviceability for.... But an entity may have serviceability 
without thereby becoming a sign. As equipment, a "hammer" too is constituted by 
serviceability, but this does not make it a sign. Indicating, as a 
"reference," is a way in which the &ldqutowards-which" of a service-ability becomes 
ontically concrete. On the other hand, the kind of reference we get in 
"serviceability-for" is an ontologico-categorial attribute of equipment as equipment. 
That the "towards-which" of serviceability should aquire its concreteness in 
indicating is an accident of its equipment- constitution as such.In this example 
of a sign, the difference between the reference of serviceability and the 
reference of indicating becomes visible in rough and ready fashion. These are so 
far from coinciding that only when they are united does the concretenes of a 
definite kind of equipment become possible. What do we mean when we say that a 
sign "indicates"? We can determine this only by determining what kind of dealing 
is appropriate with equipment for indicating. And we must do this in such a 
way that the readiness-to-hand of the equipment can be genuinely grasped. In 
our example of the arrow/turn signal, we must say that the kind of behaving 
(Being) which corresponds to the sign we encounter is either to "give way" or to 
"stand still" vis à vis the car with the arrow. Giving way, as taking a 
direction, belongs essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Dasein is always 
somehow directed and on its way; standing and waiting are only limiting cases of 
this directional "on-its-way." The sign addresses itself to a Being-in-the-world 
which is specifically "spatial." The sign is not authentically "grasped" if 
we just stare at it and identify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs. Even if 
we turn our glance in the direction which the arrow or flashing light 
indicates, and look at something present-at-hand in the region indicated, even then 
the sign is not authentically encountered. Such a sign addresses itself to the 
circumpsection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that 
the circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings 
into an explicit "survey" whatever aroundness the environment may have at the 
time. This circum-spective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it 
achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. There is another way 
in which we can experience equipment: we may encounter the arrow simply as 
equipment which belongs to the car. We can do this without discovering what 
character it specifically has as equipment: what the arrow is to indicate and how it 
is to do so may remain completely undetermined; yet what we are encountering 
is not a mere Thing. The experiencing of a Thing requires a definiteness of 
its own and must be contrasted with coming across a manifold of equipment, which 
may often be quite indefinite, even when one comes across it especially 
close.Thus, a sign may be interpreted in three ways: 1) Indicating, as a way 
whereby the "towards-which" of a serviceability can be come concrete, is founded 
upon the equipment-structure as such, upon the "in order to." 2) The indicating 
which the sign does is an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand, and 
as such it belongs to a totality of equipment, to a context of references. 3) 
The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its 
readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each case explicitly accessible for 
circumspection. A sign is something ready-to-hand which functions both as this 
definite equipment and as something indicative of totalities, and of worldhood.When 
Dasein doesn't pay heed to the reference made by a turn signal—that is, when 
Dasein does not take note of the relation of which such a signal is a sign, 
Dasein fails to note the ways in which a sign is something ready-to-hand which 
functions both as equipment and as an indication of totalities, and of 
worldhood. In turn, when drivers of auto-mobiles do not use their signals to indicate, 
but rather leave them blinking as if they signalled something other than an 
intention to turn, the sign itself is no longer an indication. As I said 
earlier, every indication is a relation, but not every relation is an 
indicating.This does not answer your question, but rather clears the way for a more 
authentic questioning.Yours,Martin Heidegger 

Cheers,

Jud.

<A HREF="http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/ ">http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/</A> 
Jud Evans - ANALYTICAL INDICANT THEORY.
<A HREF="http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com">http://uncouplingthecopula.freewebspace.com




















</A>


--- StripMime Warning --  MIME attachments removed --- 
This message may have contained attachments which were removed.

Sorry, we do not allow attachments on this list.

--- StripMime Report -- processed MIME parts --- 
multipart/alternative
  text/plain (text body -- kept)
  text/html
---


     --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---