Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2003 15:22:49 +0100
Subject: Re: Godt, Wahrheit und Amerika
From: michaelP <michael-AT-sandwich-de-sign.co.uk>


on 11/9/03 7:20 am, Anthony Crifasi at crifasi-AT-hotmail.com wrote:

mP:
>> Should we not be attending to these limits of thinking instead of trying to
>> define "true" atheism" (as compared to merely intellectual atheism)? Which
>> means, surely, not taking sides and not taking the side of not taking
>> sides...

Anthony: 
> To emphasize an explication of God in terms of the limits of thinking is to
> already take a side - the side that God is a mere limit of thought, not
> more. Mother Theresa did not encounter the limit of thought on the streets
> of Calcutta.

Anthony, to begin (begin!) with the hint that (say) gods are limits and
conditions of (serious) thinking does not imply a "mere-ness" (i.e., nothing
more in the derogative sense); does not imply any thing *yet*; nothing yet
until the thinking is under way. In the same sense that Nietzsche's
under-standing that to eradicate the 'world of being' is to eradicate 'the
world of appearance' along with it; and where does this lead us? I think
that a large part of Nietzsche's oeuvre consists in an exploration of where
such a damning starting point could lead. My point is that (serious)
thinking can never be subsumed under the taking of sides (although it may
take cognisance of the taking of sides, though it may see the taking of
sides {even if merely the expression of opinion, doxa} as a necessary
*moment* in the fullness of thinking [see Socratic dialogues, esp.
Parmenides]).

The ways that thinking deals with, engages, sides are myriad: some of the
most obvious are -- (1) the taking of one side over against another --
commitment... (2) the taking of the side that is neither of the
protagonists' but at a huge distance from both, such that they seem actually
very close and relatively indistinguishable {like the way that Harry Lime in
The Third Man sees the individuals from a great height as "ants"} --
distanced, cool, godlike... (3) the attempt to make less of the difference,
to bring them nearer to each other through compromise, blurring, suggestion
of the third man, etc -- diplomacy {taking of a third side equidistant as a
bridge side} (4) distinguishing the sides as opponents in a fight between
principles etc, e.g., truth/falsity, right/wrong, freedom/oppression,
good/evil, good/bad, wise/foolish, etc, but... without taking obvious sides
nonetheless {seeing the play of 'history' in the turning and returning of
sides} -- ideology. No doubt there are many more. But they all share the
taking of this side or that side or some other side (even the taking of 'all
sides'), never stepping a-side, stepping back, never simply (!) opening up
sidedness. I am asking how such a-sidedness can be as a starting point in
thinking this omni-sided, multigonal, world...

At every point the sides are there. Thinking muist begin anew upon every
occasion of thinking, and thinking immediately demolishes its thoughtfulness
the moment it sides with a side or a group of sides or even no-side.
Anthony, you say such a non-taking of not-taking-sides is impossible: how
come you think this, and where does such thinking hail from?

I do not understand your comment concerning Sister Theresa: we are talking
philosophy here, are we not? We are talking about how to think gods, not how
to tend the poor, etc?

regards

michaelP



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