From: "Anthony Crifasi" <crifasi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Re: Liberal vs. social democracy
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2003 21:40:27 +0000


Henry wrote:

>No, I am talking about ontological power dispersement.  the closing off of 
>possibilities, the flattening out of everything into the calculable and the 
>efficient.
>It is noticable in language and cultural practices.

But the question is still whether it is merely an ontic closing off of 
possibilities - i.e., some power in the world cuts off access to some 
possibility for me. If so, then it is still not an ontological issue, since 
as pure potentiality for being, Dasein remains open to them ontologically. 
For example, let's say that some power turned everything in the world 
yellow, and that it was so pervasive that it could suppress any other color. 
In that case, my access to other colors has been ontically cut off, but does 
that mean that I am no longer OPEN to other colors? The latter would be 
analogous to an ontological issue, but it seems to me that what you are 
talking about is analogous to the former - a power in the world that is 
suppressing access to other possibilities at this time. Even if that 
suppression of access occurs with ontic necessity, as long as Dasein remains 
pure potentiality for being then it is not ontological "necessity," since 
Dasein is always ontologically open to other possibilities.

>Perhaps better said;  the differentiation of the state and corporations is 
>less and less vital or necessary. the driving force of both, and mutually 
>is this drive for efficiency and calculability.

I admit that there is something of an ontic imperative to what you're saying 
- something like this:

1. Philosophically, Enframing tends to cover up Being.
2. Corporate activity is the primary perpetuator of Enframing.
3. Therefore corporate activity effectively tends to cover up Being.

But to get to actual opposition to corporate activity, you have to add:

4. Being should not be covered up.
5. Therefore, corporate activity should be resisted.

Now it seems to me that there are two possibilities here. #2 could be 
questioned, which would get into particular issues concerning whether or not 
the state is the tool of corporations, etc. But more philosophically, #4 
seems to run right into the whole is/ought problem that Hume pointed out 
centuries earlier. Remember that if this is an ontic issue (since the 
specific kind of "covering up" here is done by a specific power during a 
specific epoch, and therefore cannot be ontological in character for the 
reasons give earlier), then it is subject to ontic objections, such as the 
ones pointed out by Hume.

>But if the possibilities are all being levelled down to those of 
>quantification and efficiency, then the opening provides only those
>possibilities. Circular, aint it?

I agree that the remaining ONTIC opening provides only those possibilities 
(i.e., access to other possibilites is being ontically suppressed by some 
power in the world at this time), but the ontological opening remains as 
long as Dasein is pure potentiality for Being, because pure potentiality for 
Being means precisely that Dasein is open ("pure") to ANY possibility of 
Being. So I don't see how you can say what you are saying without denying 
that Dasein is pure potentiality for Being.

> >>I asked the philosophical question... where does one meet consciosuness
> >in
> >>Heid? I think taxation's relationship to consciousness is way 
>overrated...
>
> >That's why I don't think this is an ontological issue, because we are 
>merely
> >talking about influences on CONSCIOUSNESS. Heidegger is talking about a
> >different level altogether. We can talk about influences on 
>consciousness,
> >but not about influences on Dasein as pure potentiality for Being. The
> >latter cannot be "changed," but consciousness can.
>
>I'm not sure consciousness exists. I don't think Heidegger addresses 
>consciousness. Ever. ???

Usually when he brings it up he is criticizing it in some way. He brings it 
up a lot in SuZ section 43a and b, when he criticizes the way previous 
philosophers treated problem of reality and the external world. He also 
discusses it in section 53, critizing those who place the immediate 
certainty of consciousness before the certainty of death.

>The cultural practices of repubs and demos can be discussed without 
>consciousness

Well whatever that other analysis may be, it seems to me that it still must 
be an ontic issue precisely because you would be dealing with some specific 
power during a certain epoch. Heideggerian ontology cannot be limited in 
these ways. Even if the power you are talking about were to achieve total 
domination, it would still be an ontic domination precisely because it 
occurs by ontic means during a specific time, and does not change Dasein as 
pure potentiality for being.

Anthony Crifasi

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