Subject: RE: Gestell/Gewinnst - Truth as opinion Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 11:16:13 +0100 From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl> -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- Van: owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU [mailto:owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU]Namens michaelP Verzonden: dinsdag 16 december 2003 7:28 Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU Onderwerp: Re: Gestell/Gewinnst - Truth as opinion on 15/12/03 7:10 pm, John Foster at borealis-AT-mercuryspeed.com wrote: > The Platonic exposition relates that opinions contain a varying degree of > truth, opinions are situated on a continuum between 'non-being' and 'being' > meaning opinion 'varies' as to it's validity. John, it has seemed to me that Plato in the Socratic dialogues exemplifies the necessity of opinion to truth without it in any way being truth, in the same sense that appearances can show the way to what is not an appearance but of necessity hides what appears. The very process of Socratic dialectic brings truth to appearance through the 'conversation', whereupon no 'opinion' is itself the truth, but rather the play of opinions and appearances (light and shade) bring something to emergence (something revealed, an image, an ikon, Idea...). Platonically, opinion has no "validity" whatsoever by itself apart from the simple observation that we have to start somewhere, we have to be somewhere, we have to say something... steps along the way, but not the destination (truth). At least, that's my opinion :-) regards mP Yes Michael. Knowledge is of the stable, and opinion of the unstable. So Socrates/Plato lead from opinion - our domain, insofar we are ourselves unstable amidst unstables - to knowledge ... and back. And that's the task of the philosopher. Nothing can be further remote from Socr./Plato than to simply claim knowledge. rene --- from list heidegger-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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