Date: Thu, 03 Jun 2004 15:39:17 -0500
From: allen scult <allen.scult-AT-drake.edu>
Subject: Onticality


Every once in a while, I think it pays to once again look into the 
onto--what is it in the ontic that not only is transposable, but 
perhaps even must be transposed into the ontological as a constituent 
of ontological thinking, or, to put it another way,  What is 
fundamental in fundamental ontology?

Based on Aristotle, I would say that that transposable ontic etwas 
must be justice:  A common sense of what is right, of dikei, and a 
thinking through of the particular situation in which that common 
sense of what is just might be threatened seems (at this frenzied 
moment) as essential to fundamental ontology as religion (as such). 
And that to me says a lot.

I guess I'm also saying( I still think with Aristotle) that the 
judgement,made through the discourse we hold in common, that our 
shared sense of what is just is threatened, is as reasonable and 
valid as any  "philosophical" argument that holds water ( or doesn't 
hold water) with us.

That's not to say that everyone would agree.  That's not the way 
sensus communis works.  Even the Romans knew that it was not a matter 
of numbers, but the discourse--It's all in the discourse baby!

Best regards,

Allen( embroiled by the political, local in this case, but that 
really doesn't matter)






>M and M
>
>The point you make below Marilynn is very similar to that made by 
>Jan Patocka (The Czech philosopher I mentioned in an e-mail from 
>Prague, mentor of Vaclav Havel, student of Husserl and Heidegger) 
>talking about the relevance to philosophy, especially Husserlian a 
>phenomenology to the situation he and other "velvet philosophers" 
>faced during late communism, really the most suppressive time during 
>the thirty years of "occupation."  Before reading a collection of 
>lectures he gave in the homes of friends (He was forbidden to teach 
>at the University) called PLATO AND EUROPE, I would have 
>wholeheartedly agreed with Michael.  Now I seem to be thinking about 
>a slightly more fluid version of "fundamental ontology," which 
>considers, which is willing to consider, how reflecting on the time 
>which we participate in making might bear on our thinking about Time 
>and temporality, as in thinking through the apparent tautology, 
>"Time is temporal."
>
>Best regards,
>
>Allen
>
>P.S.  Michael, "you've gone and changed your name again!"  This is a 
>step which should not be considered lightly.  Jacob changed his name 
>to Israel (okay, so it was somewhat different, but the fact that he 
>thought he heard a divine command to that effect is sort of beside 
>the point) which wreaked havoc in his family and is partially 
>responsible for the present crisis in the Middle East.
>
>But, of course, whatever you decide is okay by me.
>
>
>>Michael,
>>
>>I quoted this for the interesting first sentence.  It has momentum, which is
>>sadly lost by the end - but the singularity of human nature.   We could give
>>him the benefit of the doubt and assume that his thinking is
>>'philosophical'.  In the context he is comparing the timing of the first
>>publication 1924 to the second edition 1950, and thinks that the
>>multiplication of atrocities should increase the tension for historical
>>thinking.  But the span of time, from the world wars to his writing of the
>>preface was still too short to goad us into thinking about history, though
>>the materials of atrocities for comparison with the Greek encounters is
>>there.
>>
>>I picked up this volume to review before delving into Ortega y Gassett's
>>work using Toynbee as a foil for his own spin on 'universal history'.
>>
>>
>>>  Marilynn quoted Toynbee:
>>>
>>>  > "Thinking is as unnatural and arduous an activity for human beings as
>>>  > walking on two legs is for monkeys.  We seldom do more of it than we
>>have
>>>  > to; and our disinclination to think is generally greatest at the times
>>when
>>>  > we are feeling the most comfortable...
>>>  >
>>>  > ...but twentieth-century Western man, with a most exceptionally
>>comfortable
>>>  > quarter of a millennium behind him, is not very well equipped for this
>>>  > necessary but difficult intellectual task...
>>>  >
>>>  > In essence, the historical experiences which wrung these thoughts out of
>>>  > Greek souls are akin to the experiences through which we ourselves have
>>been
>>>  > passing.  The Greek thoughts...are reflections, in human minds, of world
>>>  > wars and class wars, cultural encounteres at close quarters between
>>peoples
>>>  > with sharply different social heritages, atrocities and acts of heroism,
>>and
>>>  > all the other enigmatic patterns, woven in the part-colored web of Good
>>and
>>>  > Evil, that stimulate human minds to wrestle with the paradoxes of Human
>>>  > Nature."
>>>  >
>>>  > A. J. Toynbee - 1950.
>>>  > Preface to Second Edition of Greek Historical Thought
>>>
>>>  Marilynn, I presume that "thinking" here means thinking as in
>>philosophical
>>>  thinking and not just that everyday cogitating or reckoning or opining
>>that
>>>  seems to go on incessantly; and that by " Greek thoughts" we are talking
>>of
>>>  the likes of the pre-Socratics and Plato and Aristotle (as well as
>>perhaps,
>>>  Homer, Sophocles, Aristophanes, et al). The second two quotes seem to be
>>>  somewhat contradictory: the first suggests that with relatively
>>comfortable
>>>  environs and conditions, 20th C western man is "not very well equipped for
>>>  this necessary but difficult intellectual task"; whereas in the 3rd, the
>>  > "historical experiences" that stimulate thinking are very much the same
>>for
>>>  the Greeks as 20th C western man (who is ill-equipped?). But anyway, his
>>>  thesis in these quotes seems to be that certain kinds of historical
>>environs
>>>  and conditions (namely, war, conflict, hard contact with difference, good
>>&
>>>  evil acts) are a stimulus (and perhaps necesary) to thinking; and thinking
>>>  consists in wrestling with "the paradoxes of Human Nature". One thinks
>>then
>>>  of philosophy as the explanations of the so-called 'human condition' that
>>>  itself becomes more highly defined and outlined under certain hard & harsh
>>&
>>>  testing conditions, that shows its paradoxes more clearly when under
>>>  extremes, that the thinkers (being human) also thereby gain a heightened
>>>  grasp of such humanity under such extremes because they too are under such
>>>  extremes.
>>
>>I think he indeed feels a heightened tension from a study of recent
>>conditions, covered over but the comfort (of the late 40's early 50's?) of
>>the ill-equipped animal, for which thinking is 'unnatural'.
>>
>>>  You probably know I am going to argue against this thesis, but before I do
>>I
>>>  need to know whether you think I have gotten hold of the critical points,
>>or
>>>  interesting enough critical points, or not...
>>>
>>>  Is Toynbee going along with the oft quoted bit of the Heraclitean fragment
>>>  that is usually translated as "War is the father of everything...[etc]",
>>>  where polemos is interpreted as war, struggle, strife, etc? And ta panta
>>is
>>>  interpreted as simply the cosmos, the universe. I, of course, have argued
>>>  against this interpretation of polemos and ta panta, although it is highly
>>>  prevalent.
>>
>>You are most likely correct - Toynbee is prey to the popular reading of
>>polemos.  I don't see a problem, though, with strife as a part of the
>>interpretation/translation  -  Heraclitus' polemos is not 'war' in an
>>ordinary sense - he is most likely responding to a line in Homer - "Zeus is
>>the father of all" -
>>replacing Zeus the handmaiden of apportioning Moira with a principle of
>>differentiation - a laying forth of difference through time and place.   But
>>I don't think the words strife or even struggle (minus the politically
>>charged baggage and the interpretation of this as external hardship) need to
>>be left aside.  Struggle is as close as one's self, as one's neighbor and
>>spouse.  And it is always accompanied by the cohesive power of Philotes.
>>
>>
>>In the 'Heraclitus Seminars' Fink argues for the equivalence of
>>a
>>>  whole set of Heraclitean paronomasic terms (logos, sophon, polemos, pyr,
>>>  hen, karainos, etc), in their 'steering', 'bringing-forth', etc, relations
>>>  with ta panta, polla, etc. At least the question must be raised as to
>>>  whether war (as a good interpretation of polemos) fathers everything, and
>>>  thus (if the answer is yes) we have the ancient wisdom ratifying the
>>always
>>>  prevalent doxa (even in 'comfortable' modern times) that it is struggle
>>and
>>>  hardship and pain, etc, that brings out the best in humans (being a part
>>of
>>>  everything), and thus the best in thinking too, it being regarded as just
>>>  one more activity and entertainment, or cultural exercise, that humans
>>>  engage in to puzzle out the meaning of 'human nature'. Is this the thesis?
>>
>>I can only imagine that Toynbee's motivation - particularly given the
>>opening sentence - is not to simply add the product of strifing as one thing
>>among many to muse about in the puzzle of 'human nature'.  He falls prey to
>>the question of a human nature, though.  Will have to consult Ortega for
>>more clues.
>>
>>Best,
>>
>>ML
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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