Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 19:02:09 EDT
Subject: Truth as an Entity


THE TRUTH -- For me a true statement is a correct description of the manner  
in which an entity or entities exist, or a correct description of the actual  
way, modality or manner in which an entity exists in relation to the way 
another  entity or entities exist, subject to and depending upon,  the  statement 
being  capable of  being verified as  to the actuality of the entity or 
entities - it's as simple as that.
 
I recognise the importance of using abstractional mathematical  signification 
in calculations, as long as they truly correspond to the way in  which some 
[any] entitic [base proof-object of last resort] exists. Even the  notion of 
'time' to my way of thinking, is tied to the way objects exist.   As far as 
motion is concerned, it can only be measured in relation to the motion  or stasis 
of some other entity, whether that entity be the earth's movement  around the 
sun, sand or water  dribbling through a small hole in a piece of  glass, or 
the regular pulsing of an atomic particle. '
 
Truth, reality, time, motion, causality — in fact in the case of any one of  
Richard Sansom's eight elements of 'The Way The World is,' (TWTWI ) or  
Aristotle's catergorical version] and my own 'existential octet,' entities of  
ultimate reduction are mapped in ALL existential categorisations as 'examples of  
last resort' [like the golden meter rod in the Louvre.] Without entities there  
wouldn't even be a 'null set' of TWTWI elements. That is not to say that I  
believe 'sets' exist either, but that 'sets' and 'time' and 'number', etc.,  
provide important ways for our transient little species to understand TWTWI  
while we are still around to do so in this relentless and ever-changing cosmos  
of ours.
 
My own view regarding the matter of truth is that the human statement:  
'correctness of statement,' is an abstract concept or idea not associated with  any 
specific instance. Furthermore, it presupposes a Platonic form of  
'correctness,' that is floating around somewhere waiting for somebody to apply  it or 
incorporate it into a suitable statement.
 
In other words — the information provided  by definer (A) about the  world 
described by a truth statement claimed as correct, may well be  rejected as 
erroneous by definer (B). The question is, does the rejection of a  truth claim by 
(B) as defined by (A) which is claimed as embodying: 'correctness  of 
statement' invalidate it — or does the very fact that it is defined by the  Platonist 
definer as being a 'correct statement' ensure that the claim is indeed  
truthful? I think not.
 
On the other hand, in the case of an actual entity, [any entity] no  
statement of any sort whatsoever is required — indeed any statement [truth claim  or 
otherwise] regarding its actuality is superfluous, redundant and tautologous,  
for all that is required is to draw somebody's attention to it so that it may 
be  physically apprehended.
 
Sadly, 'statemental correctness,' or 'predicational veracity'  is a  semantic 
variable, and whilst some people claim correctness as residing in some  
statement, others would dispute the claim and counter with the opposite — that  
such and such a thing is incorrect. In the absence of some heavenly enthroned  
Plato acting as an arbitrator in the matter, the whole thing might well descend  
into disputation and chaos, which is EXACTLY what the result of such  
obfuscational logic has led to over the course of the last two thousand  years.
 
If on the other hand I silently slip a pebble into your hand, it is beyond  
dispute that what you hold in your palm is actual, and what is actual  
corresponds to the human concept of truth, therefore [metaphorically speaking]  you 
are like a god holding truth in the palm of your hand. The notion of  appearing 
godlike and in possession of truth will no doubt appeal  to many 
Heideggerians, and it is to hoped that they do not all immediately  rush out and strip the 
beaches of pebbles -  leaving no shelter for crabs  and other shoreline fauna.
 
Incorrectness regarding the actuality of the pebble would not be an issue,  
for if I didn't draw your attention to it, or place it in your hand, then you  
would not be aware of its actuality, and you would therefore have no notion of 
 its actuality at all, and be prevented from either ascertaining the  truth 
of it, or rejecting any putative falsity of its actuality. Even if you  were 
under the impression that it was NOT a pebble that you held in your hand,  and 
represented it as being something else, that would not change the entitic  
actuality of the object, for it would continue to be a truthful  existential 
actualisation of what it really was - it would simply mean that your  denotatum was 
false.
 
The way I see it, any statement incorporating claims about both 'truth' and  
'existence' are made possible as concepts by their respective counter concepts 
 'falsehood' and 'non-existence,' which are available for verificational  
purposes in the actuality of the 'entities of last recourse' or 'ultimate  
reduction', or 'exhibits of physical actuality' or some such title...take your  
pick. 
 
Therefore an abstract truth claim such as: 'The Americans are pulling out  of 
Baghdad," can only be truly verified by a physical check upon the human  
entities mapped by the statement — the actualities that are the American  
personnel and their military and civilian accoutrements that are, or are not  actually 
vacating the de facto soil of Iraq. 
 
I doubt very much whether the Iraqi people, or the voters of the US and  
Britain would be willing to accept the way that Bush and Blair talk about  
entities — they would much prefer to make sure and have somebody physically  check 
out the US tanks and hardware in the raw so to speak. 
 
For me 'entity + language = truth' is not acceptable. Just think  of Blair's 
statement about the so-called 'entities' of mass destruction, and the  
'language' he used to describe their existence, in which he included the 'fact'  that 
they could be launched within 15-minutes. All falsity, and all 'entity +  
language' that equalled misrepresentation. For me then only 'entity= truth is  
relevant, and THAT is precisely the reason for my battles with the  
transcendentalists, because their notion of an 'entity' is so primitive and  slippery 
[abstract objects and so on] it obscures truth — and my small side-show  of a 
battle is ultimately about the meaning of truth.
 
 
 
Nullius in Verba

_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_ 
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm) 
JUD  EVANS - XVANS XPERIENTIALISM



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