Subject: RE: grave thots on a great hack
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2004 17:09:33 +0200
From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker-AT-uva.nl>




-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU
[mailto:owner-heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU]Namens allen scult
Verzonden: maandag 14 juni 2004 15:42
Aan: heidegger-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU
Onderwerp: RE: grave thots on a great hack


>Rene clarifying recently,
>
>    Bob,
>    You're absolutely right in not throwing away subjectivity before acquiring
>    something else. So i hadn't forgotten your mail with Kant: there's no point
>    in returning to a new kind of dogmatic metaphysics - sure.
>    After BT, Heidegger keeps on coming back to Kant and subjectivity  --
>    compare for instance Jud's 'world': the same objective monster as the Being
>    of so many Heideggerians, while to Kant world is differentiated: on the one
>    hand the theoretical realm of a causality, that rules everything 
>and everyone,
>    on the other a practical world of people.
>    But Heidegger was taking subjectivity more serious than anyone, 
>so he DIDN'T
>    let it go by 'overcoming' it. That's what the Heideggerians do, who are
>    simply bourgeois subjectivists in a very late phase. There is indeed
>    nothing gained by replacing 'subject' by 'Dasein'. Rather 
>everything is lost,
>    when Da-sein is substantiated. The hyphen is not a trick, it points exactly
>    to the how of its being understood (if that is English): without *being* it
>    oneself, it's all less than nothing. And because also this is not enough he
>    writes: Da-seyn, to discern it from a metaphysically understood Da-sein.
>    One could name this heightened subjectivity, but with the warning that
>    subjectivity is here not to be understood from that one and same eternity.
>   
>    (like with Hoelderlin's or Trakl's bread and wine, which in their cases is
>     not just another variation of the Christian theme. Or Beethoven's missa
>     solemnis, Berlioz' requiem)
>
>   But it's nothing dreamlike. In fact   - in a normal situation i would never
>   say this - in my subjective life, it has proven quite effective. Without
>   holding a mirror in front of the dictatorship of inter-omni-subjectivity and
>   its representations, i would never have gotten my self again, nor 
>would those
>   who are with me.

Would you characterize this holding -a- mirror -in -front- of 
"philosophizing," at least of
a sort?  Heidegger points out again and again that factical life 
experience "manifests an indifference
with regard to its manner of experiencing."  "Subjectivity"  as we 
experience it is especially persistent in  its self-sufficiency and 
reckless indifference to any questioning as to its "how."  As you 
suggest,
it is so totally absorbed in its Da, its surrounding world, that the 
how of its being-there-in-that-way
must remain utterly indifferent to it.

   *Utterly* indifferent would mean irretrievably lost. But an 
   indifference, that still feels an Unbehagen, an unease, also
   still has a chance. "How the fuck was i supposed to know?" - 
   Eminem. Nobody told you, and you had to find out for yourself. 
   It turned out that the guy never was a nihilist.

    Look what i read this morning in Nietzsche II, 'ER of the same
    and WtP', nr. 6, where total meaninglessness is considered as
    the Lichtung-less, and thus is an indication of Lichtung.

    "What really happens, is the abandonment by Being of beings:
    that Being (das Sein) leaves beings (das Seiende) to itself
    and REFUSES itself therein.
    Insofar this REFUSAL is noticed (erfahren), already IS happened
    (IST geschehen) a Lichtung of Being, for such a refusal is not 
    Nothing, it is not even a negative, no missing and no break off
   (Ab-bruch). It is beginning-like (anfaenglich), first manifestation 
    of Being in its questionworthiness - as Being."  (II, p. 28)




So how does philosophy begin ?(if in fact it is philosophy you were 
talking about) 

    I wasn't thinking of it.

The fact that you would never talk this way--say 
this--in a normal situation is a generous admission of the 
discrepancy that makes philosophy possible.  But then you quite 
credibly say that somehow a mirror gets held up in front of, and you 
get yourself again.  The holding up of the mirror, then, would seem 
to be a consequence,
I almost want to say  effect of, what Heidegger calls  the "the 
turning around which leads to philosophy."
But philosophy itself continues on in its own "useless" direction to 
a place where there are no mirrors.

   That may be. I was thinking rather of the Versetztheit, the shifty
   displacedness in everydayness, and the trouble to envision this, to
   find out, and get moving. Being IN the world, is all we have, or 
   better: are. And this world knows no longer of the shining of art, 
   which could point to another world as in Plato, so   - and here seems 
   to be the knot  - it's all up to oneself, while the making of 
   representation is forbidden. How to begin, how to catch (an-fangen)
   a trace? 
   The quote above from 1940 says: Being is in beings, as what is *absent* 
   in them, so that they 'are' not really. It hides in THEM, in their 
   exclusive force, and not behind or beyond them!
   Then, being-in-the-world would always imply: being-not-at-home. 
   (das Un-zu-Hause). Only then can there be a *going* home, as in
   Novalis' idea of philosophy: the desire to be at home everywhere. 
   Nothing 'philosophical' at first sight, Heidegger writes in GA29/30.

   Maybe one arrives this way at an essential ambiguity. Only then,
   to me, it makes sense to read Heidegger. Ambi-guous: two sides
   mirrorring into each other. And that reminds me of Rene Char
   and the Provence i'm going to one more time this summer:

   the meadow says to me: stream
   the stream says to me: meadow

    
   


But perhaps I am twisting  your metpahors here.

   good twist

So here I'll stop for the moment.

   That's what i said the first time in the Provence,
   in a little place called Isles-sur-Sorgues. 
   It happened to have been the habitat of Rene Char.
   Lagnes is close. Heidegger wrote a little piece on
   an old woman in Lagnes, who took care of him the times
   he was there. I was quite 'myself' there.

   au revoir
   rene 





Best regards,

Allen


  

  










>  Again, normally i would never say this, but i don't see any
>   alternative left than showing the living proofs. And the others show their
>   proofs, and they're unmistakably utgaardian: the decomposition of the only
>   reality left: the bodysubject. The discrepancy of the words/images used for
>   justification, and the rottenness that presents itself, get more and more
>   frightening. But that at the same time points to where a solution, or the
>   beginning of it, might lie: that the lies, not only Iraq, but the whole god-
>   and earthforlorn mess that is intensifying, rob away our last 
>humanity, make it
>   ugly and endlessly usable. If one has nothing left to resist this 
>ultimate form
>   of subjectivism, which is a sort of evil beyond good and evil, if 
>one has lost
>   any possibility to be (the) Da, one is lost. But that is not what the
>   intellectual chatterers want to hear -but look when and how they run away,
>   there's a lesson in it- and now is the time to say it a bit more 
>clearly than
>   Heidegger himself could afford. So i'm afraid we meet on the crossroads of
>   Verelendung. The *Verelendung* however is the eternity!, and 
>humans only used
>   for IT! (also Bush's and Kerry's)
>   But what if there's no one left to expose them TO? As Heidegger 
>often writes:
>   where are the ears to hear? The ears and the hearing (hoeren) 
>might be missing,
>   but what never can be left out wholly, insofar the current type of 
>man is still
>   human, is the suspicion that there's something missing, that they 
>still belong
>   to... (ge-hoeren)  And that those who are said to be less 
>civilized, are in fact
>   superior, and the only way to fight that is to destroy them, waste them.
>   Turn them into dwarfs and ants, in order to crush them, like was 
>done 60 years
>   ago to the Jews. I like Erdogan, the Turkish leader. Very calm and 
>dignified,
>   he states clearly the impossible and suicidal tactics of Israel.
>
>   As to Malthus and eternity: first the oil seemed to outclass nuclear energy,
>   the switch of which, as you once wrote, was simply turned off. But 
>now it will
>   come back again, so that Heidegger is right any way. That is not 
>coincidental:
>   first there is (meaninglessness, then:) will to will, energy for the sake of
>   energy, and only then coal, oil, or nuclear energy. It is essential not to
>   interpret this as essentialism. It is the essential end of essentialism.
>   Another kind of essence therefore. Just like another kind of 
>(inter)subjectivity,
>   no longer one that can be constituted, as Husserl still tried.
>
>   rene
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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