Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 14:15:01 -0800
From: hugh bone <hughbone-AT-worldnet.att.net>
Subject: Re: Reason & Metanarratives


MATTHEW FRANCIS WETTLAUFER wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 10 Dec 1997, jon roffe wrote:
> > Or, for another perspective, science as a particular view of the world
> > is profoundly based in the modernist epistemology, and is built into the
> > power/knowledge structures in our societies.
> 
> I agree entirely--this is very Nietzschean, in seeing perspectives as
> varying ways of viewing the world, varying ways of positing values, each
> adopted or rejected not on bases of "truthfulness" somehow latent or
> buried beneath the text--waiting to be found or retrieved--but on account
> of their power, their desirability. There is no way to legislate or
> systematize this so that it stands outside of temporality or out of a
> specific cultural context, out of a collection of practises, of
> linguistic habits.
> I think that one has to "forget" this in order to philosophize, and I'm
> being pejorative when I use the term "philosophize"--one has to forget the
> provisionality of one's assertions in order to make a claim to "truth"
> without quotation marks.
> 
> > I think that we need to reject the vocabulary we have inherited here
> > from the history of philosophy, and look for new ways of dividing up the
> > world.  As Wittgenstein says, philosophy should be about getting around
> > the problems inherent in our ways of describing the world.
> 
> It is the way the question is asked, how to ask new questions in new
> ways, which Wittgenstein was very good at doing.  And Derrida too.
> 
> Best regards
> Matt
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REPLY:  Matt, Jon, et.al.

Recent posts from this List and another List 
seem to be converging on some common basics.

One, which is probably well-known to advanced
students, is the regression in justifying belief.
The person who brought this up, accurately,
I think, claimed that participants were replaying
the regression theme, which he attributed to Aristotle.

In the area of science as meta-narrative, and scientists "doing"
philosophy, and the role of language (relates to Lyotard), I extracted
the following:
             
                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Saicho wrote:
>
> I enjoyed Carl Mills' remarks about scientists 
and philosophers, especially > his paragraph:
>
> "What is interesting, I think, is the rise
of scientists functioning as quasi-philosophers.
People like Gould, Lewontin, Hawking, Pinker,
Newmeyer, Sperber, Lamb, Yngve, Stirling,
Givon, and numerous others.  I am not sure  
what this means, but it is interesting."
>
> I offer an explanation for "what this means."
At the extreme end of most scientific inquiry 
is the holy grail of the causa causans.

When the scientist thinks he/she is on a 
sufficiently tall peak and can see the glimmer
of that event, process or truth, they
frequently shift into a mode of speculation
(sorry, Irwin) which is viewed as philosophical,
or possibly religious.  This has always
been the case.  It is easy to see how scientific
inquiry can move into philosophy or religion --
it has no where else to go.

> The drive toward "truth" must be seen as one
with a culminating point, or at least series
of quasi-culminating points, and not a
helter-skelter search for interesting findings.
When the scientist decides that beyond a 
certain point there is the haze of teleology
or a process which is clearly unfathomable,
> they often hold forth opinions that are
obviously a-scientific.  I welcome such
opinions since they can greatly influence
the "real" philosophers. Scientific findings
are the fodder for philosophy -- not the
other way around.  It is interesting to
consider what role language plays in all of this; 
it is  my opinion that it plays a very important one.
>
> Regards,
> Richard
*****************************************

Part of the language thing is assignment
of words as labels to human beings, who 
are social homo sapiens womb-to-tomb, 
and who are of necessity dependent on
each other.

Whether we label them scientists,
theologians, or philosophers, the
term describes only a small portion
of the totality of their life experience
and interests. Their engagement in the world,
the business of being, and specifically,
and individually, being the persons
they are, constitutes a personal
symbolic universe. 

Of the species, the earliest, and probably
the latest, to achieve lingual competence,
use stories to communicate to each other
who and what they think we humans are.

So when gifted scientists, and occasionally
we see them interviewed on television,
reflect on their lives, they share stories
of their interests, feelings, beliefs,
which describe the symbolic universe
they inhabit; 
a vast domain which extends far beyond
professional expertise.