File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_1998/lyotard.9811, message 23


Date: Mon, 09 Nov 1998 13:59:02 -0500
From: "Bayard G. Bell" <bbell01-AT-emory.edu>
Subject: Re: PMC: What is Postmodernism? A Demand


This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

Huechroma-AT-aol.com wrote:
> 
> Might I suggest that the attempt  to determine  the precise meaning of the
> words science , philosophy or any other word for that matter  runs counter
> with what might be expected when doing a poststructuralist  reading of a
> postmodern  theme. I believe, and please correct me if I’m mistaken, that the
> theoretical  position from which Lyotard writes is poststructural. Therefore
> let’s  be a little  less literal  in our reading.

	Poststructuralism is a name given to a number of non-American theorist
largely for the convenience of taxonomy.  Quite simply, the term is not
one which defines Lyotard's philosophical affinities but which allow the
American academy more conveniently to schematize him.  As for being less
literal in reading, that's a privilege which should be accorded only to,
say, deconstruction or French feminism.  One should also be a little
less literal in reading _The Republic_ or _The Bible_.

> Suffice it to say that Lyotard’s point was that postmodernism  calls into
> question the metanarratives  that legitimize  all things social in the modern
> era, including science,  and that the legitimation  had a philosophical
> origin. Lyotard is trying to move our thinking away from these metanarratives
> so that we can apply a poststructural  understanding to the status of
> knowledge in the postmodern world. Through modern times, the  social
> reproduction of knowledge, including science,  has been legitimized through
> philosophical theories turned narrative to the point that  the theory is
> forgotten and the social activity  seems natural.

I'm sure if it's a question of "Lyotard moving our thinking away from
these metanarratives so that we can apply a poststructural understanding
to the status of knowledge in the postmodern world."  This account is
far too neatly schematic.  It is not a question of Lyotard moving
thought; in his account, part of the postmodern condition is an
incredulousness towards the metarecits.  In Lyotard's case, I believe it
more appropriate to say that Lyotard refuses to legitimate his own
discourse in terms of the grand narratives.  As for turning us in a
direction such as the one given above, I believe Lyotard's strategy is
an engagement of the complexities of postmodernity (and I think these
challenges are more considerable than your definition admits; Lyotard
goes beyond naturalization to de-realization in the appendix, a move
that seems to indicate further "reiteration").  In a strong sense "a
poststructural understanding" does not exist prior to this book
(certainly one can make gestures towards Deleuze and Guitarri as
counter-examples, but the issue is that postmodern philosophy is still
coming into being, with _A Thousand Plateaus_ as one of several
philosophical experiments; one might say that some of the texts that
Lyotard cites, such as Austin, are already on their way to postmodern
philosophy in that they reveal the challenges postmodern philosophy must
face).  Lyotard's philosophy is an attempt to create a language game
more equal to the postmodern challenge, of which he finds ample evidence
in a library of citations.  I would also say that "poststructuralism" is
not a simple corrective (i.e. something that supplies reality, in the
words of the appendix).  In summary, postmodernity can be said to demand
an "alteration" in philosophy: this is the field in which Lyotard toils
and expands beyond simple corrective critique.
	If you want a really juicy example, look at the latest adventures of
Mulder and Sculley, aka the deconstructive duo.  While Mulder is fond of
asserting the absolute truth of his claims and is sloppy about gathering
supporting evidence, Sculley is absolutely fastidious in demanding
concrete evidence and is, if we recall last night's episode, scared to
accept the conclusions to which such evidence will lead her.  While
Mulder suspects everyone at one time or another (most often because they
refuse to accept his tenuously presented claims) and gets played by
anyone who tells him they believe in the cause, Scully finds herself
with split allegiances: she both believes in science and has faith in
Mulder's righteousness.  Mulder demands justice and invokes it
rhetorically in a very heavy-handed way but cannot produce evidence
equal to the standards of justice and thus cannot achieve justice. 
Scully's devotion to both her allegiances is only tenable given her
drive to keep Mulder honest and the fact her fidelity to the authority
Mulder needs her to lend him allows her to refuse Mulder where his
claims cannot be scientifially supported.
	Neither one of them alone is equal to the task of the X-Files (Scully
is scared of the truth because she has a sense that it will call into
question the certainty that science has previously afforded, and Mulder
is such a zealot that he destroys his own case when given half a
chance), but with the two working in a very volatile relationship, there
is a *possibility* that they might be able to bring whatever sordid
affair to the light of day.  The point is that the two of them together
define the task Lyotard assigns philosophy par excellence.  Mulder
figures the question, but his questions only obtain legitimacy when they
are formulated on the basis of Scully's rigorous method.  Only the two
together can make the passage (although their togetherness opens up a
whole other set of questions) which is the work of philosophy.  (I am
leaving out the difficulties of the relationship between truth and
justice for the time being.)  In short, the question of method remains. 
This isn't just a turf war to keep philosophers employed, or a claim for
a unique and unassailable privilege accorded to philosophy.  Philosophy
has to do more than make simple adjustments; philosophy must "work",
albeit in a difference sense than the performativity of input/output matrices.

> The point is not which comes first, philosophy or science but simply that  a
> metatanarritive based in philosophy has been used to ground science to the
> point where for most people science is now the only arbiter of truth. That is
> a modern notion which poststructuralism now challenges.

	I think this gives undue credit to too small a number of philosophers
and theoreticians.  One can point back at least as far as Nietzsche's
"On Truth and Lie in Extra-Moral Sense" to find a critique not simply of
the claims made by or for scientific knowledge but of anthropomorphic
truth in general.  Very much to the point is that Lyotard does not
simply address the relation of narrativity to knowledge but the coupling
of the true and the just which Lyotard claims is definitional to Western
philosophy since Plato.  To generalize somewhat wildly, this is what I
have argued is an attempt to program the just using the true or to use
knowledge of the true to determine the just.

All for now,
Bayard
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