Date: Mon, 09 Nov 1998 13:59:02 -0500 From: "Bayard G. Bell" <bbell01-AT-emory.edu> Subject: Re: PMC: What is Postmodernism? A Demand This is a multi-part message in MIME format. Huechroma-AT-aol.com wrote: > > Might I suggest that the attempt to determine the precise meaning of the > words science , philosophy or any other word for that matter runs counter > with what might be expected when doing a poststructuralist reading of a > postmodern theme. I believe, and please correct me if I’m mistaken, that the > theoretical position from which Lyotard writes is poststructural. Therefore > let’s be a little less literal in our reading. Poststructuralism is a name given to a number of non-American theorist largely for the convenience of taxonomy. Quite simply, the term is not one which defines Lyotard's philosophical affinities but which allow the American academy more conveniently to schematize him. As for being less literal in reading, that's a privilege which should be accorded only to, say, deconstruction or French feminism. One should also be a little less literal in reading _The Republic_ or _The Bible_. > Suffice it to say that Lyotard’s point was that postmodernism calls into > question the metanarratives that legitimize all things social in the modern > era, including science, and that the legitimation had a philosophical > origin. Lyotard is trying to move our thinking away from these metanarratives > so that we can apply a poststructural understanding to the status of > knowledge in the postmodern world. Through modern times, the social > reproduction of knowledge, including science, has been legitimized through > philosophical theories turned narrative to the point that the theory is > forgotten and the social activity seems natural. I'm sure if it's a question of "Lyotard moving our thinking away from these metanarratives so that we can apply a poststructural understanding to the status of knowledge in the postmodern world." This account is far too neatly schematic. It is not a question of Lyotard moving thought; in his account, part of the postmodern condition is an incredulousness towards the metarecits. In Lyotard's case, I believe it more appropriate to say that Lyotard refuses to legitimate his own discourse in terms of the grand narratives. As for turning us in a direction such as the one given above, I believe Lyotard's strategy is an engagement of the complexities of postmodernity (and I think these challenges are more considerable than your definition admits; Lyotard goes beyond naturalization to de-realization in the appendix, a move that seems to indicate further "reiteration"). In a strong sense "a poststructural understanding" does not exist prior to this book (certainly one can make gestures towards Deleuze and Guitarri as counter-examples, but the issue is that postmodern philosophy is still coming into being, with _A Thousand Plateaus_ as one of several philosophical experiments; one might say that some of the texts that Lyotard cites, such as Austin, are already on their way to postmodern philosophy in that they reveal the challenges postmodern philosophy must face). Lyotard's philosophy is an attempt to create a language game more equal to the postmodern challenge, of which he finds ample evidence in a library of citations. I would also say that "poststructuralism" is not a simple corrective (i.e. something that supplies reality, in the words of the appendix). In summary, postmodernity can be said to demand an "alteration" in philosophy: this is the field in which Lyotard toils and expands beyond simple corrective critique. If you want a really juicy example, look at the latest adventures of Mulder and Sculley, aka the deconstructive duo. While Mulder is fond of asserting the absolute truth of his claims and is sloppy about gathering supporting evidence, Sculley is absolutely fastidious in demanding concrete evidence and is, if we recall last night's episode, scared to accept the conclusions to which such evidence will lead her. While Mulder suspects everyone at one time or another (most often because they refuse to accept his tenuously presented claims) and gets played by anyone who tells him they believe in the cause, Scully finds herself with split allegiances: she both believes in science and has faith in Mulder's righteousness. Mulder demands justice and invokes it rhetorically in a very heavy-handed way but cannot produce evidence equal to the standards of justice and thus cannot achieve justice. Scully's devotion to both her allegiances is only tenable given her drive to keep Mulder honest and the fact her fidelity to the authority Mulder needs her to lend him allows her to refuse Mulder where his claims cannot be scientifially supported. Neither one of them alone is equal to the task of the X-Files (Scully is scared of the truth because she has a sense that it will call into question the certainty that science has previously afforded, and Mulder is such a zealot that he destroys his own case when given half a chance), but with the two working in a very volatile relationship, there is a *possibility* that they might be able to bring whatever sordid affair to the light of day. The point is that the two of them together define the task Lyotard assigns philosophy par excellence. Mulder figures the question, but his questions only obtain legitimacy when they are formulated on the basis of Scully's rigorous method. Only the two together can make the passage (although their togetherness opens up a whole other set of questions) which is the work of philosophy. (I am leaving out the difficulties of the relationship between truth and justice for the time being.) In short, the question of method remains. This isn't just a turf war to keep philosophers employed, or a claim for a unique and unassailable privilege accorded to philosophy. Philosophy has to do more than make simple adjustments; philosophy must "work", albeit in a difference sense than the performativity of input/output matrices. > The point is not which comes first, philosophy or science but simply that a > metatanarritive based in philosophy has been used to ground science to the > point where for most people science is now the only arbiter of truth. That is > a modern notion which poststructuralism now challenges. I think this gives undue credit to too small a number of philosophers and theoreticians. One can point back at least as far as Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lie in Extra-Moral Sense" to find a critique not simply of the claims made by or for scientific knowledge but of anthropomorphic truth in general. Very much to the point is that Lyotard does not simply address the relation of narrativity to knowledge but the coupling of the true and the just which Lyotard claims is definitional to Western philosophy since Plato. To generalize somewhat wildly, this is what I have argued is an attempt to program the just using the true or to use knowledge of the true to determine the just. All for now, Bayard name="bbell01.vcf" Content-Description: Card for Bayard G. 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